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INTRODUCTION¹

BY

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The following remarks are intended only to serve as a short introduction to the reports presented by Drs. Sachs, Alexander and Radó. In them, for the sake of clarification, certain defining principles are put forward which can be used as a *point d'appui* to which various views may be referred. For this purpose two complementary series will be chosen, one relating to causal factors, the other to therapy. The former are thought of particularly in connection with the neuroses, but the scheme is of much wider validity.

The first distinction to be effected is between hereditary and acquired factors. The former, those already present in the parental germ cells, are of course not to be confounded with the congenital ones ; the latter are really ontogenetic, having been acquired by the individual himself, though before birth.

The hereditary factors may be divided into those of recent origin (e.g. familial) and those of remote (e.g. phylogenetic).

There are three groups of the acquired or ontogenetic factors : congenital, infantile, and current. The first refer to influences acting either before or during the act of birth. The infantile factors may also be divided into two for our present purposes, those the memory of which can be recovered by psycho-analysis and those which have to be reconstructed.

¹ Contribution to the Symposium held at the Eighth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Salzburg, April 21, 1924.

My object in reminding you of this classification is to draw attention to two fundamental considerations. In the first place, if we review the seven groups of factors as here enumerated it is evident that only the last two can be termed historical so far as the patient's consciousness is concerned, whereas the first five, the prehistorical factors, have to be reconstructed by a series of inferences. It is further clear that the sureness of these reconstructions varies with their chronological age. While the accuracy in the reconstruction of the primal scenes can reach a high degree of probability, hardly falling below that of the memories recovered by the analysis, the same cannot be said, so far at least as the present evidence goes, for the congenital factors, those relating to life before and during the birth act. As to the inherited factors, however important they may in the future prove to be, we can at present make little more than plausible guesses about them. It follows that, until our knowledge of these early factors begins to approach the definiteness pertaining to our knowledge about the later ones, an attitude of reserve and caution is the only possible one to adopt in regard to any speculations as to their possible nature and importance.

Let us now, in the second place, divide our complementary series into three groups: pre-infantile, infantile, and post-infantile. To the first belong all the inherited and congenital factors, to which we may apply the common term 'constitutional'. The noteworthy feature at once emerges that in the pre-Freudian era aetiological significance was attached to five out of the seven on our list, to all except the infantile ones, and that the five in question were believed to explain the whole of aetiology. The most signal contribution of psycho-analysis, i.e. of Freud, was that it interpolated in this series a group of factors, the infantile ones (in capitals in the accompanying table), which seem to be the most important of all. I say 'seem to be', for the question I wish to raise here is: what is to be our attitude if it should turn out from further knowledge that these factors are really not so important as we now think? Theoretically there can be only one answer so long as we have any pretensions to being scientific workers: we must, that is to say, follow the evidence whithersoever it may lead us. But as psychologists we know that in practice the matter is not so simple, and I wish to recall to your notice the existence of two strong motives which would probably affect our judgement. The first is the conservative one which makes all men tenacious of what they conceive to be the truth, and particularly so when, as in the present case, it is a truth the winning and maintaining of which has cost them dear, both emotionally and

materially. This motive is naturally one to be wholly resisted. On the other side, however, is the knowledge, amply fortified by experience, that depreciation of the Freudian (infantile) factors at the expense of the pre-Freudian ones (pre-infantile and post-infantile) is a highly characteristic manifestation of the general human resistance against the acceptance of the importance of the former, being usually a flight from the Œdipus complex which is the centre of the infantile factors. We also know that the practice of psycho-analysis does not always ensure immunity from this reaction. At a previous Congress (Munich, 1913), it fell to my lot to point out that the exaggerated significance attached by Jung to the current factors betokened a tendency which might lead to the surrender of the knowledge gained through psycho-analysis concerning the importance of infantile sexuality, and the forebodings then expressed were unfortunately confirmed beyond all doubt. I might just as well have taken as my text Jung's unjustified substitution of phylogenetic speculation for ontogenetic observation, for this obviously emanated from the same tendency. From all of which I think we may draw the conclusion that we should do well to combine with our scientific open-mindedness and curiosity an attitude of cool scepticism towards conclusions, especially when unsupported by evidence, which would shift the emphasis in ætiology away from the centre of our complementary series, that inserted by Freud.

In this difficult question, as in so many others, we have an excellent example of balanced judgement to inspire us. In Freud's early days, before even the 'shock' theory (i.e. post-infantile factors), ætiology was almost synonymous with heredity, and he was naturally accused of supposedly ignoring the importance of this. A lesser man than he would have made one of two opposite errors. Dazzled by his own discovery, he might have exalted it to the neglect of other considerations, such as hereditary influences. Or, yielding to the more subtle temptation of undue humility (as Darwin did in clinging to Lamarckian inheritance in spite of his better insight), he might have underestimated the value of his own discoveries. Freud did neither. He has maintained an even keel between these two extremes. Although necessarily he has written far more about the infantile factors, where he had so much that was new to give, no one familiar with his writings could say that he has ever neglected the importance of the other ones. One need only recall his theory of inhibition and privation in connection with the current factors, the attempts he is always making to define the nature of the constitutional factors (doctrine of erotogenetic zones, etc.), and

his attitude of expectant attention for news from the distant bourne of phylogenetic history. Yet he has never been seduced from laying the clearest emphasis on his own findings and what he believes to be the importance of them. Can we do better than strive as best we may to emulate this admirable balance?

Of the second complementary series hinted at above I have less to say. It concerns therapeutic practice. The possibility of psycho-analysis depends, as is well known, on the innate tendency of the mind to repeat over and over again in ever-varying forms its characteristic impulses, reactions and store of memories. Whether this tendency to repeat is one *sui generis*, as Freud has suggested, or can be brought under other ones such as the pleasure-pain principle need not detain us here, but the fact itself of repetition is a cardinal one. Transference is of course a familiar example of it. Now, as Freud has pointed out, patients commonly prefer to reproduce their unconscious experiences of infancy in the form of action and emotion rather than in the form of memory, and the practical problem arises of where the analyst should lay the stress in this reciprocal series of two members. It is of course much easier to renounce the laborious effort to resuscitate individual memories and to substitute for this more or less speculative reconstructions of typical prehistoric tendencies. But it seems to me that this also is a situation where balance of judgement is called for, so that the advantages of both directions may be combined. The two advantages of laying stress on the non-memory side of treatment are, first, that trends inaccessible to any form of memory can in this way be to some extent dealt with, and, secondly, that experiencing emotions in relation to an actual object at the moment gives a peculiar vividness and conviction to the patient. The advantages of laying stress on the resuscitation of memories on the other hand are, first, that the tendencies are in this way more definitely related to the patient's real past life, and do not thus belong only to the artificial analytic state, and, secondly, that after all the ground is surer when one is dealing with personal experiences that form integral parts of the individual's development.

In all these fundamental matters, therefore, both of theory and practice, my plea would be essentially for moderation and balance, rejecting nothing that experience has shown to be useful while ever expectant of further increases in our knowledge and power.

METAPSYCHOLOGICAL POINTS OF VIEW IN TECHNIQUE AND THEORY¹

BY

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Empirical proof of the existence of an unconscious was in the first instance an achievement of hypnosis (Bernheim's post-hypnotic experiment). This fundamental fact has formed the basis of psycho-analytic theory, but only through the practice of psycho-analytic technique has the full implication of this discovery been realized and its importance for the understanding of mental life been established.

The first formulations of psycho-analytic theory, embodied in the *Studien über Hysterie* by Breuer and Freud, are essentially based on the insight gained by the help of hypnotic technique. Hence the first question to be asked about the inter-relations of theory and technique is this: why was it that after this initial step hypnosis was incapable of contributing anything more towards advancing our theory? Or, to express the same idea in positive terms: why was it inevitable that a technique independent of hypnosis should be built up on this first theoretical principle?

The very first glance suffices to convince us that in hypnosis enormous quantities of libido are mobilized. The submissive attitude towards a comparative stranger, the amazing capacity for passing at his will into a different state of consciousness, even the possibility of somatic alterations—all these things prove what powerful libidinal disturbances must be brought about in the hypnotized subject, by means of the hypnotic situation and the personality of the hypnotist. Yet these processes take place, in both persons concerned, entirely within the same system of the mind, that is to say, the processes remain unconscious. That both cause and effect are confined to the unconscious in the active partner (the hypnotist) also is evident from his helplessness in respect of his own technique. He employs 'instinctively' now one weapon, now another, and he can never explain why in one case he meets with success and in another with failure. In fact what the hypnotist knows of his art, what he consciously does or leaves undone, is merely the façade which diverts attention from, and screens,

¹ Contribution to the Symposium held at the Eighth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Salzburg, April 21, 1924.

the processes actually involved. Psycho-analysis has succeeded in revealing the nature of these processes (Freud and Ferenczi). We must content ourselves here with asserting that the powerful mobilization of quantities of libido in hypnosis does not represent any development of the libido, nor, therefore, any fundamental change in the limitations due to repression. Even where the symptoms are cured the personality and its neurotic mode of reaction remain untouched.

Psycho-analysis alone has enabled us to perceive the point of view I have just put forward. The first stage in psycho-analytic technique followed directly on the failure of hypnosis and still bore traces of the same faulty results. Only when full justice was done to the dynamic factor (which hypnosis could not do, because, in order to measure quantitatively and to discriminate qualitatively the instinctual forces of the unconscious, it was essential to grasp their relation to repression and resistance) was psycho-analysis in a position wholly to eradicate this defect.

We distinguish the successive stages of psycho-analytic technique, according to the account given by Freud,² as that of interpretation, and that of overcoming the resistance and of transference, or in other words, of the substitution of recollection for the re-living of experience. These stages correspond exactly to the three possible ways of conceiving of the mental apparatus: the topographical, the dynamic and the economic point of view. Only in the last stage can we gain a complete, i.e. metapsychological, insight into the work done by the technique, but of course there are metapsychological features in its earlier stages as well, for they too, though without any clear idea of their true goal, achieve the economic regulation of the libido-processes, or in other words, of the ego to the libido. Looking back, we see evidence of this metapsychological element and realize once more the service rendered to theory by technique.

Except in certain exceptional cases the train of free associations can lead only as far as the wall of partition set up by the repression. The release from the reality-principle, effected by the liberation of the thought-processes from any conscious direction towards an end, allows the attraction of the unconscious to operate according to the laws of the pleasure-principle. It is in accordance with these same laws that attraction should be converted into repulsion if, on a closer approach to the unconscious, the equilibrium is threatened by masses of stimuli

² *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Chap. III.

which can be mastered only with difficulty and are wholly unsuited to motor discharge. It is only small quantities of affect, admitted from the unconscious, that achieve cathexis of isolated groups of ideas (reached by associative channels) and introduce them into consciousness, much as a searchlight shows up single objects in the dark. We have an extreme instance of this in the obsessional neurosis, where the ideas which are the object of repression are for the most part available in the preconscious, while the affect belonging to them is entirely withdrawn. Thus the technique which consists solely of free association can as a rule change the direction of energy (the repression being forced to turn against new groups of ideas and to set free others which are comparatively weakly charged with affect) but is unable to make any quantitative change. The latter takes place only through the work of *interpretation*, which breaks down the barriers of repression at a particular point.

The work of interpretation derives its capacity to accomplish this result from three different sources : (1) It is undoubtedly a prerequisite of correct interpretation that corresponding processes should have been brought into consciousness in the analyst's own mental life, for it is necessary not only that the dividing line between consciousness and the unconscious should be crossed, but that the bridges of association which have been destroyed should be reconstructed. Since the unconscious is universally the same, the task of discovering these intermediate links will be appreciably prejudiced by the analyst's projection of his own repressions on to the patient. And if the analyst simply tells the patient the last link in the chain of associations, without the intermediate links which lead to it, the interpretation will have only a partial success, or none at all, because the 'complex' remains as much as ever subject to the laws of the primary process. It is only when the quantity of affect which belongs to the 'complex' is completely subordinated to the secondary process that it is wrested from the unconscious and incorporated in the ego. (2) That 'institution' in the mind from which the repression proceeded and which therefore is the most easily able to cancel that process is the *ego*. Now Freud conceives of the ego as essentially a 'surface-ego', that is to say, one which in its principal function is directed towards the outside world, whose stimuli it receives or wards off. It is therefore more readily able to assimilate a piece of knowledge presented to it from without than one which proceeds from within the psychic apparatus. From that side it has no direct access to anything but the emotions. In order that

the emotions may be translated into thoughts and thus find expression it is necessary to take from the whole amount only the smallest quantities of affect, such as are easily dealt with. Obviously it is very difficult to obtain these small quantities when coming to close quarters with the unconscious. A circuitous route has to be taken by way of memory-fragments (chiefly of auditory impressions) in order to bring the thought to birth. Undoubtedly this is accomplished much more rapidly and at far less cost by means of the direct perception of the required word-images through the interpretation given. (3) This is supplied by a person to whom the patient is by no means indifferent, who occupies more or less completely the place of the ego-ideal; hence his demand that at a given point the patient shall renounce the pleasure-principle is taken very seriously. As yet we cannot say anything definite about the mechanism of this process.

To sum up: in the first stage of the technique only a partial change in the libido can be effected, namely, in relation to those complexes, or parts of complexes, which have been interpreted. The other parts remain in the unconscious just as before, and the element which a short time ago formed part of them behaves with regard to them like the other elements contained in consciousness. That is to say, it is still unable to absorb the masses of affect flowing from the unconscious. It is like building dykes to secure a piece of land: only the part which is protected by the newly-built dam is retrieved from the water. In perfection the method consists in regulating its flow and dictating its course to the current.

This is done by the second method employed in our technique: overcoming the resistances. As we know, the resistance belongs to the ego, but only in the wider sense in which we no longer use this word since the structure worked out in *Das Ich und das Es* was arrived at. The very fact that the resistance is unconscious was one of the main reasons for distinguishing the *id* from the ego. The resistance then is part of the *id*, which shelters it—above all from the demands of the ego-ideal which, at least in so far as identification with the analyst has taken place, strives against the resistance. It is true that another part of the ego-ideal will regularly ally itself with the resistance and the repression. Moreover the attitude of the ego (in the more exact sense) is twofold. In the first place it tries to overlook the resistance which the *id* cloaks in the folds of its mantle. This is the phenomenon of unconscious resistance, which imposes on the analyst one of his principal tasks—the necessity of discovering the resistance

and bringing it into consciousness. This task is fulfilled only in the face of the strongest opposition on the part of the *id*, which for the time being completely subjugates the ego. When the ego has been convinced of the existence and the nature of the resistance, impulses to master it are aroused: for example, the desire to get well, to obtain the fullest possible picture of the mental relations, and so forth. Whether these impulses, together with the demands which, as I have shown, are made by the ego-ideal, prove stronger than the desire to avoid 'pain', a desire represented by the *id*, which at this point acts as an agent of the repression—this is a question which has to be answered separately in each individual case. It is the analyst's business to choose a favourable ground for his onslaught and to take advantage of the factors which operate on his side. The one thing certain is that whenever a resistance is overcome, especially if this happens quickly, the ego is submerged by affects which can only gradually be absorbed or 'bound'. This distressing situation, resulting in sudden outbursts of affect in or outside the analysis, cannot well be avoided, though it may be mitigated by the exercise of caution in the technique.

Here we have a certain theoretical foundation for the so-called 'active' technique inaugurated by Ferenczi. In fact I think it can be shown that this method is an excellently logical consequence of the theories put forward in Freud's *Das Ich und das Es* and would have been arrived at by a process of deduction, had not Ferenczi's remarkable intuition anticipated this conclusion. As we have seen, the fight with the resistance consists in driving a wedge between the ego and the *id* and winning over to ourselves the ego, which was originally on the side of the *id*, by revealing the resistance and explaining its bearing. Now there are individuals in whom the relation between the ego and the *id* is closer than in the average neurotic, in whom the conflict between the repression and the claims of the libido does not correspond to the relations between the ego and the *id*. The cases I have in mind are those of unusually strong narcissism—that is, the very cases for which Ferenczi says his active therapy is particularly suitable. With these patients our ordinary resources will fail, the relation between the ego and the *id* will resist our efforts to bring about a rupture and a successful defence will be put up against the analysis by means of sheer inertia. Then perhaps the only means of bringing into being the conflict which is so essential is for the analyst to order the patient to do something which in itself seems innocent and trivial but which (as he has been able to gather from the preceding analysis) has represented at one time a

hotly disputed ground of contention between the ego and the *id*, that is to say, a libidinal gratification which has been renounced but is still desired by the *id*, whilst the ego in the service of the ego-ideal repudiates and condemns it. If the ego is induced by the analyst's command to accept and even indulge in this gratification the conflict begins again, for the claims of the *id* have been roused up once more by the experience of gratification, whilst the ego, which has entered into the 'degrading' situation only reluctantly and upon pressure from without, resists these claims. Of course this is only the first step, for if the analyst allowed this position of affairs to go on there would be a danger of the ego's adapting itself to the gratification thus experienced afresh, and this would simply restore the old condition of absence of conflict. So it is easy to see why Ferenczi emphasizes the point that the analyst must follow up the first step with a second, by once more forbidding the particular form of gratification which first he imposed. The *id*, now stirred up and indulged with the gratification, is not willing once more to give up that which at an earlier period it had already renounced. The claims of the ego, on the other hand, have become more peremptory than ever, for they are reinforced by the prohibition of the analyst, who here represents the ego-ideal. The conflict thus seems to be perpetuated and it is now possible to enlist the ego against the resistance at other points, i.e. to set the analysis in motion.³

Freud has depicted a case of a specially intimate relation between

³ Whilst I fully recognize the value of 'active' technique I am obliged to criticize the term. The word 'active' is misleading because it seems to exclude the notion of any activity in other parts of the field of psycho-analysis. But the rest of the technique is by no means passive: the interpretation itself represents a considerable amount of activity. The demand for abstinence on the patient's part and the setting of a term for the treatment, both of which Freud seems to regard as inherent in the ordinary method of technique, are certainly active. They are, however, so fundamentally different from the kind of activity recommended by Ferenczi that it does not seem advisable to class them together and separate them from the rest of the technique. We might then be said to have an 'old' and a 'new' form of activity. Again, the word active '*technique*' constantly leads to misunderstanding and (although Ferenczi emphatically deprecated this error when he introduced the term) the temptation does arise to oppose the 'active' to the 'old' or 'classic' technique, whilst really, as Ferenczi himself shows, it is a question of a technical device which may be employed in special cases to *supplement* our technique.

the ego and the *id* ⁴, which occurs when, upon the loss of the love-object, the ego takes its place and endeavours to assume the characteristics of that object. This enables the *id* to discharge the libido which has been re-converted into narcissism, for it 'binds' the libido to the ego now acting as a substitute for the object. The result is an enormously strong affective relation between the ego and the *id*, which cannot always be resolved by the ordinary psycho-analytic technique.

When hypnosis was discarded psycho-analytical theory gained by the appreciation of the dynamic factor. In its turn this knowledge necessitated the giving-up of the first stage in our technique and the substitution of a new phase, in which due consideration was accorded to dynamics (i.e. of resistance). The struggle with the resistance brought to light the transference as an attempt to reproduce positions of the libido formerly imperfectly surmounted. The third stage of the technique aims at guiding the repetition-compulsion into a new path, namely, that of recollecting and 'working through' the former experiences, instead of eternally re-living them in an incomplete manner. From the beginning metapsychological knowledge has been brought to bear upon this stage, but we still need light upon the relation between this part of the technique and the two most recent propositions of psycho-analytical theory, namely, the discrimination of life-instincts and death-instincts and the inclusion of the *id* in our hypotheses of the structure of the mind.

The importance of the latter assumption in connection with the theoretical principles of active technique has already been discussed. At this point I will indicate one only of the many consequences and possibilities which this new knowledge entails. I refer to the study of the influence exercised by the analytic technique upon the ego-ideal of the patient. The end to be desired is, of course, that the patient should as far as possible adopt as his ego-ideal the ideal put forward by analysis, first and foremost, perfect sincerity towards himself, removal of the repressions; that unperturbed by the idiosyncrasies and defects in the personality of the analyst, both in his ego and in his super-ego, the patient should adopt the analyst's ideal of the analysis itself. But it is invariably to personal characteristics and experiences, however trivial, that the transference attaches itself. It has to expand and magnify them so that they can be used for the purpose of re-experiencing old situations; hence the ego-ideal becomes repeatedly disturbed and

⁴ *Das Ich und das Es*, p. 34.

distorted. The psycho-analytical technique has to guard against the re-establishment of the patient's ego-ideal by the old method of the nursery and the school-room, namely, in response to commands, whether actual or produced by phantasy. In this way the ego-ideal which gradually emerges from the crucible of the transference comes to be gentler and more indulgent towards the ego and accustoms itself to recognize the ego's peculiarities and weaknesses and to take them into account instead of simply ignoring them, as hitherto, and issuing commands or prohibitions which were beyond its powers to obey. It is scarcely necessary to say that this process is of great therapeutic value.

It will be much more difficult to make use of the distinction between life-instincts and death-instincts for purposes of psycho-analytic technique. For the death-instincts are mute, and remain mute even when subjected to that technique. The earliest point at which to make our connection is probably in the phenomenon of sadism, which is particularly closely related to the death-instincts. The study of sadism (or alternatively, of masochism) begun by Freud in his most recent works and based on the new theoretical postulates may help us to see and avoid dangers hitherto unrecognized.

A METAPSYCHOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS OF CURE¹

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The object of the present paper is to describe in metapsychological terms the alteration in the mental systems which we seek to effect by means of psycho-analytical treatment. The change in question is the result of a process whereby an original condition of psycho-neurosis is terminated by recovery of health. Before going further, however, some orientation of a general kind is necessary. Throughout this metapsychological analysis of the ego-changes aimed at during treatment, I am guided by Freud's topographical-dynamic doctrine concerning the structure of the mental apparatus, which doctrine I regard as the ultimate result of our collective clinical experience. In attempting to refer these conclusions once more to their empirical substratum, I propose to retrace the difficult path traversed by the founder of this theory during its gradual formulation. In speaking of changes during treatment, I imply of course treatment in accordance with the technique as laid down by Freud himself; as opportunity occurs I shall examine from the metapsychological point of view recent suggestions and advances in technique.

Taking as a starting-point for our investigation the neurotic state as observed at the beginning of treatment, let us see if we can find a general formula which will be valid for all neuroses. We select this starting-point not because it comes first chronologically, but because experience shows that it is easier to understand the normal from a study of pathological states than *vice-versâ*. Disease supplies a dynamic motive power for research; accurate understanding is a prerequisite of successful treatment. Pre-analytic psychology was really a hobby or pastime; it lacked the dynamic factor which has aided us in our deeper investigations, namely, the ultimate aim of effecting cure of disease. It was only the pressure of necessity encountered in pursuing this aim that enabled the investigator of the mind to overcome the obstacle of those states of resistance with which we are so familiar, not only during the analytic session, but in the attacks on our science.

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Keeping then to the dynamic principle which has been the basis of the success of psycho-analysis, we shall find our general formula by means of general dynamic considerations, by setting out the relation of the mental system as a whole to the outer world—to reality. Since this relation is obviously disturbed in every neurosis, it provides an excellent starting-point. A dynamic standpoint is the more justified in that the essence of psycho-analytic theory consists in a dynamic conception of mental processes. In its latest and most general formulation as a topographical-dynamic theory of the ego, the principle of psycho-analytic theory is a dynamic principle : that of keeping stimuli at a constant level. This principle, first laid down by Fechner, implies that there exists in the mental system a tendency to reduce as far as possible or at the least to keep constant the amount of stimulation and tension in that system. Freud formulated this principle more precisely by distinguishing two sources of stimulation, outer and inner sources. We call those from without, *stimuli*, from within, *instincts* : these will be first considered from the dynamic standpoint apart from any difference in quality. The foregoing can be regarded as a preliminary step in the description of dynamic activity in the mental system : this consists in the mastering of stimuli and the mastering of instincts. When we come to investigate the more obvious of these two activities, the mastery of stimuli from without, two mechanisms differing in principle are to be found ; on the one hand, adaptation of the psychic, or more correctly of the psycho-physiological, system to outer sources of stimulation and, on the other, actions which are intended to abolish these sources of stimulation. In the former instance the psychic system is itself altered in an expedient way, it is adapted to the source of stimulus from without ; in the latter a change is effected in outer reality by means of suitable action which abolishes the particular source of stimulus from reality. To take a simple example : in the case of a fall in temperature, two defence-mechanisms differing in principle are possible : outer reality can be altered by means of heating, or the discharge of warmth from the body can be lessened by reduction of the exposed surface, in the case of constant exposure to cold by the gradual development of hair. Adopting Freud and Ferenczi's terminology, we can describe this suitable alteration of the outer world as an *alloplastic* modification and the alteration of the psycho-physiological system as an *autoplastic* modification ; from this point of view the biological type of development is seen to be mainly autoplastic, whilst human cultural development is mainly alloplastic.

In investigating the complicated process of mastering instincts we again meet with these same mechanisms. Psycho-analysis has taught us that the instinctual needs of the mature, fully-developed organism are directed for the most part towards reality. Gratification solely by means of changes in the system itself is only possible for sexual instincts, in the form of auto-erotisms, and then only during immature stages of development ; fully-developed instincts are attached to objects outside the system. Since, however, the sources of excitation lie in this case within the system, it is obvious that the excitation can be abolished only by an alteration within that system. This alteration necessary for relief from instinct-tension necessitates, however, actions directed towards without : in carrying out these actions both autoplasmic and alloplasmic mechanisms are involved. In order to seize and incorporate nutritive material, biological development has created autoplasmic apparatus—limbs, teeth, alimentary mechanisms, etc., whilst human civilization has developed alloplasmic means—weapons, agriculture, the art of cooking, food, etc. The reproductive instinct has in part, in association with the self-preservative instinct, adopted this autoplasmic moulding of the body-apparatus, together with alloplasmic modifications, through civilization, by creating new objects. We can find a libido-component in every product of civilization, as in every part of the bodily apparatus. Male libido in the final stage of genital maturity pursues the most extreme alloplasmic course, in that it actually creates objects for itself. Agriculture, industry, science and art are newly created objects for the libido. Pursuing Ferenczi's ingenious train of thought we can regard the female sexual apparatus, uterus and vagina, as an alloplasmic result of active masculine sexual instinct. Just as it created art and science, this instinct created the female body as an object for itself, a fact which for some years now we might have deduced from the biblical story of creation.

We must not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted from our main task, viz., the discovery through dynamic considerations of a formula common to all neuroses. Summarizing, we may say that in carrying out its function of abolishing inner tensions by the mastering of stimuli and instincts, the mental system makes use of autoplasmic or alloplasmic mechanisms. Either it attempts to modify reality to suit its own requirements or, unable to withstand the pressure of reality, it adapts by altering itself : and this not only when reality appears as a source of stimulation but also when instinctual necessities are directed towards the circumstances of reality. At the very outset we found that biolo-

gical development consisted in the products of mainly autoplasic processes, civilization in those of mainly alloplastic processes. The same line of thought indicates the ontogenesis of libido, namely, the replacement of an intra-psychical narcissistic object by extra-psychical objects, of auto-erotic libido-discharge by genital activities directed towards objects. Applying these considerations to the problem of neurosis, we see that neurosis constitutes an antithesis, a protest against the developmental tendency towards alloplastic modification. We are immediately reminded of a statement made by Freud² in his *Introductory Lectures*: he regards the neurotic symptom as an unsuccessful attempt at adaptation in place of a suitable action. We might express this principle as follows: every psycho-neurosis is an attempt at autoplasic mastering of instinct. It consists in changes within the system having the tendency to mastering of instinct. It is only partly successful, since the desired freedom from tension affects only one part of the system, the *id*; it gives rise to fresh tension in another part of the system, the ego, as is seen in the latter's rejection of the symptom. Instinct-tension which has disappeared from one part of the system appears in another part in a different form, as an ego-conflict, the feeling of illness. We know from Freud that this new tension, the effort to reject the symptoms, is due to the heterogeneity of the two parts of the mental system. The conscious ego has already reached the mature stage of exogamous, genital object-libido, has prepared itself for activities towards exogamous or sublimated objects; the symptom, on the other hand, consists in an autoplasic modification, in a substitution of incestuous, introjected objects for actual exogamous objects, and, with the exception of hysteria, in the substitution of pregenital relations for genital forms. These autoplasic and regressive processes signify the gratification of instinctual needs for one part of the mental system, whereas the more developed part demands *actual exogamous* objects and genital discharge.

The general formula therefore runs as follows: the dynamic task of neurosis is not accomplished; the discharge of total mental tension miscarries; the attempted *autoplasic* and *regressive* mastering of instinct relieves one part of the system only and leads to fresh tension in another part. In places of instinctual tension there arises a repudiation of the symptom which is expressed in the form of a feeling of illness.

² *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, London, 1922.

This formula provides us merely with a description of the dynamic results of neurosis ; the introduction of the topographical point of view, i.e. that of two heterogeneous part-systems, explains symptom-repudiation ; but we have still to discover the more immediate cause of regression, the dynamic factor which drives the mental apparatus to master instinct in a way which is not in keeping with the more developed part, the ego, but corresponds to immature periods of ego-development.

That a dynamic pressure in the direction of symptom-formation exists, one which is stronger than the counter-pressure of symptom-repudiation, can be seen when, in the course of treatment, we attempt to free the mental system from this conflict, i.e. when we attempt to enforce the ego-standpoint by undoing the neurotic discharge of instinct and the symptom. The object of the treatment is clearly to reverse the symptomatic gratification repudiated by the ego, to re-establish the original instinct-tension and to force the mental apparatus to make a fresh attempt at instinct-gratification, one in consonance with the requirements of the ego. The mind of the neurotic struggles against this by producing resistances to the treatment. In the last resort, therefore, resistance is directed against the form of instinct-gratification required by the ego, i.e. against genital activities directed outwards towards actual, exogamous objects. We can call this struggle against actions of this kind a *flight from reality*, since other activities are not permitted by social reality. The cause of this flight from reality will provide us, therefore, with the general etiology of neurotic formations.

At the very earliest stage of its formulation psycho-analytic theory provided us with an answer to this question : frustration, disappointment, trauma, in short, bitter experiences in the fight with reality induce the mental system to abandon attempts to alter reality and to seek the blissful state of freedom from tension by inner avenues of discharge, thereby avoiding the dangerous outer world. Reverses suffered during the struggle constitute then the general etiology of neurotic formations. If we regard *disposition* as the sum of traumatic experience in the first years of life, birth included, and the inherited experiences of forebears as *constitution*, it would seem possible to explain all neuroses from a traumatic point of view. The expression of unfavourable experiences is anxiety : anxiety is nothing more or less than the expectation of a ' painful ' increase of tension in the system, the lasting impression of a defeat in an attempt to discharge tension.

It follows on miscarriage in the mastering of instinct or stimulus, when instead of the expected relief from tension an actual increase even perhaps occurs. Anxiety is directed therefore against instinctual demands or against outer stimuli and is a reminder, both inwards and outwards, of miscarried attempts to overcome instincts and stimuli, i.e. attempts which have not led to the relief anticipated.

We see then that anxiety is the ultimate cause of resistance against our therapeutic efforts. Anxiety causes the flight from reality, the reluctance to deal once more with reality ; it explains the tendency to cling to autoplasic mechanisms of discharge : it explains introversion. Nevertheless it explains only the autoplasic nature of the symptom without clearing up entirely its second characteristic, the element of regression, that harking-back to old ways of mastering instinct, which constitutes the second fundamental character of the symptom. It is of course clear that difficulties met with, the defeats experienced, in these new processes of mastery which arise during the compulsive course of development, failures in the attempt to master a new instinctual organization will favour regression to a stage that has already been successfully attained. Yet, just as failure and trauma induce regression, so success, i.e. successful exploitation of a stage of organization which ensures instinct-mastery, provides a point of attraction, a fixation-point for later regressive movement. Anxiety commences the regressive process of symptom-formation and operates in the same direction as the attraction of the fixation-point.

To understand the character of regression more fully, we must now consider the second main principle of the mental apparatus. The Freud-Fechner principle enabled us to regard the mental processes as a whole as efforts towards relief of tension, but does not tell us why anyone out of many possibilities of relief is chosen ; it does not explain the regressive nature of neurotic relief-mechanisms ; it does not at present take into consideration developmental factors. This second principle which determines the *tendency* of discharge-processes is the *repetition-compulsion* or the Breuer-Freud principle—which as we shall soon see has the identical content—viz. a definite relation between free and tonic mental energy. In investigating this principle we shall once more consider separately the mechanisms of mastering stimuli and instincts respectively.

States of tension induced in the mental apparatus by outer stimuli always give rise to motor innervations, intended either to render the source of stimulation harmless or to establish some means of protection

by modification of the system itself. Against typical forms of outer stimulation the system protects itself by typical reflex-innervations, which occur without any mental operation, but which are only really adapted to deal with certain definite sources of stimulation. Where the stimulus is of an unusual kind, protection can only be achieved after measures of a tentative, experimental order, involving mental operations of a kind we describe as 'reality-testing', have been undertaken, and it depends on the discovery of innervations corresponding to the source of stimulation. It is easy to see that during this experimental work, which requires both time and energy, the mental system remains in a state of continuous excitation until the correct defence is established. Incorrect attempts do not lead to discharge of tension; they may indeed increase the amount of excitation. There can be no doubt that all reflex mechanisms were once tentative attempts to cope with reality, attempts from which the correct response was gradually formed and stereotyped. The mental system tends towards these sure methods of defence by reflex-mechanisms; they operate without expenditure of mental energy and are certain to be successful in an appropriate situation. In the same way it resists fresh situations, alterations in reality which involve fresh struggles with the testing of reality. It is fixated upon mechanisms which are already well practised, upon its memorials of successful combat with reality, and it strives to avoid fresh situations, seeking to deal with these on the older plan. We can recognize in these methods the Breuer-Freud principle of the relation of free and 'bound' mental energies. The mental apparatus tends to convert free into tonic energy, to substitute automatisms for actual labile energetic processes, for tentative, experimental examination of reality, for the comparison by means of memory of the present with past situations. It prefers to repeat automatically what has been learned in the past by its forefathers or itself in the exhausting work of 'reality-testing', to use the forces already available in the form of automatisms without any fresh effort. These automatisms preserve in tonic form the free energetic achievements of previous 'reality-testing'. Freud has recently characterized this principle as the most fundamental of our conceptions concerning the nature of the mental apparatus: it forms the basis of all our further investigations.³ The

³ In this presentation the compulsion to repeat is derived from fixation upon successful attempts at mastery of instinct. Nevertheless the manifestations which led to Freud's discovery of the compulsion to repeat as a general principle are of a different nature: they consist in the repetition

flight from reality, which was found in the investigation of neurosis to be of cardinal importance, is the expression of this principle. Reality is only accepted so far as it can be mastered by automatisms: anything that is new or unexpected is rejected by means of flight. Only when automatisms fail to act and the system is subjected to intolerable stimulation, is the latter prepared to rectify these and once more come to grips with reality. The principle finds expression also in the topographical structure of the mental apparatus. This is divided into two parts, viz. into the system Cs, the organ of reality-testing, of labile energetic processes, and into the corporeal or spinal mind, the organ of automatisms: in the language of anatomy, the cerebral cortex and the spinal cord.

Now this same principle and a similar topographical division into ego and *id* applies to processes of mastering instinct; confirmation of this is provided by collective psycho-analytical experience, by the theory of fixation and regression. As we know, the history of instinct-development represents the succession of various mechanisms of instinct-mastery—we call these stages of organization—and later on the succession of a series of objects. We find a marked tendency to regression, a clinging to stages of organization which have already been successfully reached and to familiar, accepted objects. Every innovation necessitated by the compulsive processes of development, and later by change in the circumstances of life, is rejected. Every stage of

of unadjusted situations in which no successful mastery of the stimulus took place. From this point of view the mental apparatus is fixated, not only on states where successful discharge of tension has been achieved, but also on unmastered states of stimulation. We believe, however, that this latter mode of fixation with its compulsive harking-back to states of tension is not in the strict sense of the term a repetition. We must rather regard these manifestations—as Freud himself does—as an indication that the mental apparatus is in a constant state of stimulation, as the result of traumatic rupture of the barrier against stimuli as well as of unmastered instinctual demands. Hence in reality it repeats only the stimulus situation and is in a state of constant tension from excitations which have not been bound, which it then attempts to bind by means of repeating the original stimulus or wish-situation. We might regard these as instances of *protracted* attempts to master stimuli or instinct-excitations. On the other hand, the above-mentioned repetitions of former successful mastery-mechanisms are genuine regressions to states which have already been given up. In traumatic repetitions the mental apparatus has never really emerged from a state in which stimuli have broken through the barrier.

organization attained forms a fixation-point which is abandoned for the next only after resistance. Nevertheless, every fixation-point is a source of relative protection against deeper regressions. The nature of a neurosis is determined by the relative strength of fixation-points, by the degree of regression. In catatonia, as Nunberg⁴ has shown, the regression reaches back to the intra-uterine situation. Rank⁵ imputes this deepest regression to all forms of neurosis. He does not, however, deal with the economic factor of this deepest regression, with the rôle of later fixation-points in the different neuroses. Yet, in the case of the obsessional neurotic, the main part of the libido is satisfied with a regression to the anal-sadistic stage, the melancholic with an oral regression, whilst the hysteric actually remains at the genital stage. The cause of regression is in all cases the same, a rejection of the exogamous object-choice demanded by reality. Neurotics appropriate the incestuously chosen object by the alloplastic method of introjection, but the hysteric alone preserves a genital relation to this object; in all other neuroses a pregenital is substituted for a genital relation. Intra-uterine life constitutes the earliest of these pregenital relations. Rank, in his ambitious work, has succeeded in showing that all subsequent organizations of the libido, including the final genital stage, are attempts to compensate for the loss of the blissful intra-uterine existence. In this sense he is justified in holding the view that all neuroses are attempts to reproduce this state. Nevertheless, in the choice of neurosis it is of the utmost significance which of the later stages of organization is picked out. In proportion to the degree of success with which the individual recaptures this vanished happiness in one of the post-natal mechanisms of libido-discharge, to that extent does fixation to a particular stage of organization occur, which then acts as a protection against further regression. We shall have occasion to return to this point later.

The foregoing considerations enable us to complete the dynamic formula for neuroses in the following way: from the point of view of the Freud-Fechner principle, the neurotic symptom is an attempt to discharge instinct-tension. It has three main characteristics: it is *autoplastic*, *regressive* and is *repudiated* by the conscious part of the mental apparatus, *the ego*. We can explain its autoplastic nature on the grounds of an exaggeration of the flight from reality, as the result

⁴ 'Der Verlauf des Libidokonfliktes in einem Fall von Schizophrenie', *Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. VII, 1921.

⁵ *Das Trauma der Geburt*, Vienna, 1924.

of trauma, of failure. The regressive character is the expression of the Breuer-Freud law, viz. : the general tendency in the mind to avoid new encounters with reality, and consequently to substitute for the fresh forms of instinct-mastery necessitated in development the automatic repetition of defence-mechanisms which have already been abandoned. Following Freud, we can regard this as the factor of *organic inertia*. We have already said that the third characteristic of the symptom consists in its rejection by the ego ; this brings us to the problem of mental topography, with which we are especially concerned in this paper, and which leads naturally to the description of healing processes.

Brief reference has already been made to Freud's explanation of this repudiation of the symptom : it arises from the different stages of development of the two component-systems. Whilst the ego shares fully in the process of adaptation to reality, the *id* lags behind in development and provides a great reservoir for archaic modes of instinct-mastery. This dissociation of instinct-gratification from the ego, its autoplasmic regression from reality to the interior of the system, is made possible through the separation of the two systems by a boundary-formation which Freud has called the *super-ego*. This institution was first recognized by psycho-analytic theory in the form of the dream-censorship : its function is to relieve the ego from the burden of investigating instinctual demands. This it does by taking over the function of perception inwards, but also the dynamic task of regulating instinctual life. Thus the super-ego forms the executive organ of the Breuer-Freud inertia-principle. As the deposit of earlier adaptations to reality it tends to hold the mental system fast to earlier schemata of instinct-mastery. It is an introjected legal code of former days which makes it possible to avoid encounters with reality by adherence to its ordinances, and by a system of rigid categorical imperatives obviates the necessity of fresh 'reality-testing'. Yet not only has reality altered in the course of development, but instinctual demands, too, have altered ; hence its laws now require revision. The super-ego has nevertheless no access to reality and behaves as if nothing had altered ; it performs its task automatically and with the monotonous uniformity of reflexes. Like the reflex, it represents mind which has become body. True to its developmental history in childhood, it operates with primitive methods of reward and punishment. And just as the super-ego has no access to reality, so the representative of reality, the ego, has no access to the instincts : this has been taken

over by the super-ego at the inner boundary of the ego. In this way the ego has been relieved of the task of inner perception and so is better able to perform the work of testing reality. The ego is blind to what goes on within and has forgotten the language of the instincts.⁶ The super-ego, however, understands this instinctual speech only too well and demands punishment for tendencies of which the ego is quite unaware. In this way the super-ego divides the mental system into two parts, one of which is in excellent touch with reality but cannot communicate its information to the instincts, and the other of which has no direct access to reality. The super-ego itself has only out-of-date information about reality and cannot perform the function of adaptation to reality; on the contrary, by reason of its obsolete, inexpedient sort of adaptation, the work it does runs counter to reality, since it holds instinct to earlier kinds of adaptation and exempts it from any new attempts. In the interests of the incest-prohibition it curbs the whole of genital sexuality and puts obstacles in the way of real sexual satisfaction with exogamous objects; through its punishment-mechanisms it permits autoplastic gratification of precisely what it has itself forbidden, namely, the incest-wishes. This gives rise to the neurotic symptom, which represents a discharge of tension in the *id* that is tolerated by the super-ego but is regarded with hostility and disfavour by the ego. In the matter of symptom-formation the ego is not consulted: it has delegated its function of instinct-regulation to the super-ego and the super-ego abuses its power. The latter enters into a secret alliance with the regressive tendencies of the *id* and by the ostensible severity of its self-punishments permits gratifications of a kind which, although only autoplastic, are none the less alien to reality.

We now see that our therapeutic endeavours must be directed against this two-faced overlordship on the part of the super-ego: hence it is necessary to make brief reference to the rôle of the super-ego in symptom-formation, the nature of which has been described by Freud in his latest work.

The neurotic activity of the super-ego is two-fold: it disturbs and inhibits ego-syntonic behaviour, which is *a priori* in conformity with the requirements of reality, by equating this, as the result of faulty reality-testing, with actions which it has learned to criticize in the past and by dealing with it in the way it dealt with them. At the same time,

⁶ See also my paper: 'Der biologische Sinn psychischer Vorgänge', *Imago*, Bd. IX, 1923.

by means of self-punishment, it permits autoplasmic, symbolic gratification of precisely those condemned wishes. In the form of impotence, for example, all exogamous wishes are equated with incest-wishes and as such are interfered with. The super-ego behaves, in short, like a dull-witted frontier guard who arrests everyone wearing spectacles, because he has been told that one particular person is wearing spectacles. It behaves like a reflex which can only produce one innervation. The corneal reflex is almost always an expedient reaction which protects the eyes from foreign bodies, yet on occasion it can prove a hindrance, as during medical examination by an eye-specialist. It would be simpler if this reflex action could be avoided by conscious effort, instead of having to be overcome by the use of eyelid retractors. In this case some communication between consciousness, which tests reality, and the 'spinal mind' is desirable: in other instances the reflex defence is more prompt and more certain. In a similar way the strict categorical imperative of a super-ego which is functioning well is frequently adapted to the requirements of social life: nevertheless there are occasions when, owing to new situations and alterations in reality, a more direct relation between the reality-testing faculty and the instinctual world is necessary, between the ego and the *id*, excluding the super-ego which is out of touch with reality.

It may at first seem paradoxical that this rigid inhibiting institution, the super-ego, should actually enable instinctual gratifications which have been condemned by the ego to be realized. We know, however, that the super-ego can easily be hoodwinked; once its punishing tendencies are gratified, its eyes remain shut. It is one of the oldest findings of psycho-analysis that a symptom represents a compromise between the need for punishment and the crime itself. It is in principle a matter of indifference whether these two tendencies are gratified in one phase as in hysteria, or in conjunction as in the obsessional neurosis, or in two stages as in the manic-depressive neuroses. It is striking to observe how meticulously the conscience of the obsessional neurotic records, like a careful shopkeeper, all debts and claims, all punishments and aggressions; with what sensitiveness it demands new punishments when the limits of the wrong-doing that is covered by punishment are overstepped. Similarly, in the melancholic phase of manic-depressive neurosis, conscience gives expression to acts of glaring tyranny and injustice only to be thrown over without any guilt-feeling during the maniacal phase. We might compare it with a struggle between two utterly antagonistic political parties, where one provokes the other to

excesses in order to compromise the latter and encompass its destruction with some show of justification.

Herein lies the two-fold rôle of the super-ego : knowing nothing of reality, it frequently inhibits activities that are actually ego-syntonic and, by over-severity towards the inner world, it permits condemned instinctual gratification along the autoplasmic route of symptom-formation. The results of its activity constitute the expression of the Breuer-Freud principle. As an automatic organ, as the tonic deposit of by-gone adaptations to reality, it obviates fresh testing of reality, and when it becomes neurotically diseased these by-gone attempts prove inefficient protection against the regressive tendencies of the *id*.

The super-ego, therefore, is an anachronism in the mind. It has lagged behind the rapid development of civilized conditions, in the sense that its automatic, inflexible mode of function causes the mental system continually to come into conflict with the outer world. This is the teleological basis for the development of a new science, that of psycho-analysis, which, be it said, does not attempt to modify the environment but, instead, the mental system itself, in order to render it more capable of fresh adaptations to its own instincts. This task is carried out by limiting the sphere of activity of the automatically-functioning super-ego, and transferring its rôle to the conscious ego. This is no light task ; it implies the conscious creation of a new function. The ego of those living under conditions of Western civilization has been instituted solely for the purpose of testing reality. It is an appreciable increase of the burdens of consciousness to take over the investigation and regulation of instinctual activities, to learn the laws and speech of the *id* in addition to the laws of reality. Quantities of energy which are tonically ' bound ' in the automatic function of the super-ego must once more be converted into mobile energy, a part that is now body must again become mind. The resistance against this reversal is well known to us from the analytic resistances during treatment and the general resistance against the science of psycho-analysis.

Here we have the solution of the problem set in this paper. The curative process consists in overcoming resistances to the ego's taking over of the function of the super-ego. Neurotic conflict, that state of tension arising from repudiation of the symptom, can be solved in two ways only : either the ego's rejection of the symptom must cease, in which case it must abandon reality-testing, together with those forms of instinct-mastery which are already adapted to reality, and take part in homogenizing all the mechanisms of instinct-mastery in the direction

of disease ; or it must put into force the point of view adapted to reality. This homogenization of the mental system in the direction of disease is familiar to us in the psychoses, where the ego abandons reality-testing and re-models reality in an archaic sense, in accordance with the stage of instinctual gratification preferred. Psycho-analytic treatment drives in the opposite direction : it seeks to effect a homogeneous system by bringing the whole system nearer to the conscious level, by opening communication between the ego and the *id*, which had been previously barred by the super-ego. The ego is now called upon to settle the claims made by instinct, to *accept* or *reject* them in accordance with the results of reality-testing. As Freud expressed it, the aim of treatment is to substitute judgement for repression. The repressive activity of the super-ego only bars the road to motor discharge of any instinctual demand : it does not imply the abandonment of that demand. On the contrary, it allows a secret gratification. For the ego there are two possibilities only : *accept and carry out* or *reject and abandon*. The task during treatment is to eliminate gradually the repressing institution, the super-ego : from the two component-systems, the ego and the super-ego, a homogeneous system must be constructed—and this must have a two-fold perceptual apparatus, one at the outer surface directed towards reality, and one at the inner boundary directed towards the *id*. Only in this way can a mastery of instinct be achieved which is free from conflict and directed towards a single end.

The transfer to the ego of the rôle of super-ego takes place in two phases during treatment. Making use of the transference, the analyst first of all takes over the part of super-ego, but only in order to shift it back on to the patient again when the process of interpretation and working through has been carried out ; this time, however, the patient's conscious ego takes it over. The achievement of analysis is a topographical one involving dynamic expenditure ; it displaces the function of testing and regulating instinct to a topographically different part of the mental apparatus, viz., the conscious ego. To do this, it must overcome the inertia-principle, i.e. the objection to exchange an automatic function for a conscious activity. The rôle of the analyst therefore consists in at first taking over the supervision of instinctual life, in order to hand back this control gradually to the conscious ego of the patient. By means of the transference he gains the patient's confidence and produces the original childhood situation during which the super-ego was formed. So long as the whole mental system of the patient is freed from the supervision of instinctual life, so long as the analyst

is responsible for the entire instinctual life, the process goes on without interruption. Once the rôle of super-ego has, with the help of this projection mechanism, been taken over in entirety, so that the previous intra-psychical relation between *id* and super-ego has been converted into a relationship between the analyst and the *id*, the more difficult dynamic task begins, namely, to shift back on to the patient once more this rôle of supervision. This returning of the rôle of super-ego takes place for the most part during the period of becoming detached from the analyst. In terms of this schema the psychological processes involved in treatment are very easily described, but it falls to me yet to go more fully into the universal applicability of this description.

The nature of transference from this point of view is that the intrapsychical relations between *id* and super-ego are transferred from super-ego to analyst. To understand this, we must think of the origin of the super-ego and compare it with the phenomena of transference. Put briefly, the super-ego is an organ of adaptation which has arisen through a process of introjection of such persons (or, more correctly, of the relationships to such persons) as in the first instance enforced adaptation. By this process a formation is set up in the mental system which represents the first requisitions of reality; this consists of introjected educative parental regulations. The super-ego is made up to an important degree of parental commands and prohibitions; hence it is mainly an acoustic formation, as the auditory hallucinations of melancholics show. The commands and prohibitions were conveyed through the auditory apparatus. As Freud has shown us, the relations between *id* and super-ego are nothing more or less than a permanent crystallization of the by-gone relations between the child and its parents. This can be best studied in the case of personalities which are neurotically split, the super-ego functioning as an utterly foreign body. The entire complicated symptomatic structure of the obsessional neurosis is a play enacted by an obstinate, untrained child and its parents; and just as all French comedies deal with monotonous regularity with the theme of adultery, so in every neurosis we come across the identical theme in varying guise. Even the methods of the '*id*-child' remain unchanging—always to provoke the parents, the super-ego, to unjust and over-severe punishment, in order to do what is forbidden without any feeling of guilt, precisely as in the triangle play the conduct of one partner is represented in a way which seems to justify the adultery of the other.

In the course of transference this intrapsychical drama is converted

into a real one between the *id* and the analyst. It is not necessary to enter into further details: the patient seizes with extraordinary alacrity the opportunity of realizing in relation to the analyst his former relations with his parents, which he has been forced to introject only because he was unable to realize them in reality. In this way he is able to cancel that piece of adaptation to reality which has been forced upon him and is represented by the super-ego. He soon observes, however, from the attitude of the analyst—who works counter to the pleasure-principle—that whilst these tendencies can be understood they are not ratified, and this in no case from personal motives. The new educative process then begins. The demands of reality are, however, not communicated by means of orders and prohibitions, as previously happened under the sway of the super-ego, but by a 'super-personal' method, by logical insight, by accurate testing of reality. In this way the re-living of his past becomes abandoned by the patient himself, and the original instinctual demands, which in consequence of a personal judgement can no longer be experienced in the transference-situation, appear in the mind as memories. Tonic discharge is blocked, automatic repetition is prevented; the former demands of instinct become active once more; they become problems of the immediate present, and as such form part of the content of consciousness. Instead of automatic repetition, memory appears, indeed, more, the demands of instinct are more active and necessitate new means of discharge. From now on this discharge must be not only ego-syntonic but in accordance with the demands of reality, since it can only be effected in agreement with the organ of reality-testing.

So events run in theory, but not in practice. Every analyst has, time after time, observed that when a transference-situation has been resolved and brought into a genetic relation with the original childhood situation, in no instance does an immediate orientation in the direction of normal libido-control occur, but instead a regression to still earlier stages of instinctual life. The libido eludes analytic endeavours by a backward movement, and retires to positions it had previously abandoned. Each fresh interpretation brings about a still deeper regression, so much so that the beginner often imagines he has driven a hysteric into a state of schizophrenia. I must confess that the desire to be clear in my own mind as to the nature of these processes was stimulated to a large extent by certain uncanny moments during analytic work, when to my dismay symptoms of conversion-hysteria which had already been carried over into the transference gave place to paranoidal and

hallucinatory symptoms. Further progress in the analysis, however, showed that each new symptom is carried over into a new transference-situation, so that every deep analysis runs through a whole gamut of artificial neuroses, ending regularly, as Rank has shown us, in a reproduction of the prenatal state. I have been able to trace the same gradation of regression in the contemplative states of Buddhism.⁷

Analysts cannot logically dispense with recognizing and appraising this ultimate mode of regression also, in order to be able to drive the libido from this most inaccessible hiding-place forwards in the direction of genital exogamy. We owe much to Rank for having called attention to the general significance of this deepest form of regression; above all that he has shown this regression during treatment to be an affective repetition of actual experience and not perhaps a pre-conscious phantasy. I cannot emphasize too strongly that those who oppose themselves to this view of it are making the same mistake that Jung made many years ago. One would have just as much right to regard all oral or anal-erotic regressions as the products of regressive phantasy-creation.

On the other hand, it is clear from the foregoing considerations that this regressive movement ensuing upon analysis of the transference-situations—which arise spontaneously and are characteristic in each individual case—is to be regarded as resistance.⁸ Observation during treatment of this continually backward-flowing regression provides us with an extraordinary picture, one which lays bare the entire complicated process of the construction of the super-ego. The picture is made up of a consecutive series of transference-situations, in which the analyst plays ever-changing rôles taken over from the super-ego. The consecutive series of regressive transference-rôles is a picture of the layers of the super-ego seen upside-down. It is a gathering together of imprints from the various stages of development. The deepest layer represents the biological relation between mother and child, and merges gradually more and more into social relations with the father. The mother represents the first demands in instinct-development: through the act of birth she first demands abandonment of the state of passive nutrition by the blood-stream and requires the substitution of nutrition through the alimentary canal and active employment of mouth and

⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁸ I wish to lay the greatest stress on this point in contradistinction to Rank's point of view; in his presentation the resistance-character of intra-uterine regressions is by no means clear.

lungs. Later she calls for the abandonment of breast-feeding and is usually the first to disturb the child's autocratic command over its excretions. Gradually the father and the whole father-series take over the larger part in the education of instinct and represent the demands of the community. The father, however, takes on the earlier mother-rôle not only in regard to frustration experiences but in a positive way: just as the mother was the source of bodily nourishment, so the father provides mental pabulum. The passive-homosexual relation to the father found in every analysis is the repetition and substitute for the passive suckling situation; the paternal penis is the substitute for the breast, as Freud showed already in his analysis of Leonardo da Vinci. We find the most strongly repressed ideas of oral incorporation of the penis and of the father as a whole, in a form with which we have been familiarized by Abraham's⁹ accurate descriptions. Roheim¹⁰ has shown us in his admirable study of primeval history how the sons tried to transfer the mother-rôle to the father, by devouring him and defæcating on his grave, on the parallel of suckling at the maternal breast. The same history in reverse order is faithfully reproduced during treatment. The father-rôle, which at the beginning is invariably transferred to the analyst, is more and more displaced by the mother-transference. On this point I can fully confirm Rank's observation. Attempts in a progressive direction disturb the picture often enough, nevertheless the regressive tendency predominates. Although not really free from conflict about the father the patient regresses to times when the latter was not a source of disturbance and when the only battle he had to fight was a biological one with the mother. The cause of the regression is now clear: it is the expression of the Breuer-Freud principle, the automatizing tendency to solve new problems according to the old plan. The mind attempts to solve the father-conflict on the model of the suckling-situation: the father is to be destroyed by way of oral incorporation, in this way providing new strength for the struggle for existence, just as the mother's milk provided strength for physical development.

The patient is under the influence of the same tendency to automatize when he attempts to meet the task of detaching himself from the analyst by a phantasy-reproduction of the birth-trauma. For the most part he has already solved the problem of birth with its transposition to extra-uterine life: the most conclusive evidence for this is that he is alive. Before the end of treatment, however, he is faced with the

⁹ *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido*, Vienna, 1924.

¹⁰ 'Über das melanesische Geld', *Imago*, Bd. IX, 1923.

entirely unsolved problem of doing without analytic aid. It is small wonder that he feels this to be similar to the severance from the mother's body. On that occasion also he had to learn the use of organs entirely *ab initio*, when taking over the nutritive rôle of the mother. Now at the termination of treatment his consciousness, which hitherto has been adapted only to testing reality, has to face new tasks. Having learned during treatment the language of instinct, it must take over responsibility for the regulation of instinctual activities, a regulation which has previously been exercised by the super-ego operating automatically. During treatment the analyst has thought and interpreted instead of the patient: indeed, by reconstructing the past he has done some remembering in his stead. From now on all this must be the patient's own concern. In bidding good-bye to his super-ego he must finally take leave of his parents, whom by introjection he had captured and preserved in his super-ego. He has indeed been ignominiously hoodwinked in analysis. The analyst seduced him into giving up the introjected parents, by himself taking over the rôle of the super-ego, and now he wants to saddle the patient with the burden. The latter protests and attempts in return to score off the analyst by sending him in the long-since-closed account for his birth, and this often by way of somatic symptoms. He feels, as did one of my patients, a circular constriction round his forehead, the pressure of the pelvic canal by which his head was so shamefully disfigured at birth: he is breathless and feels a heavy pressure round the chest. Only when all this has been proved mere resistance against detaching himself from the analyst, against independence, does he consciously attempt to do without further analytic help. The patient is not overcoming his birth-trauma by means of these birth-scenes; on the contrary, he is counter-ing detachment from the analyst with them; he is substituting action and affective reproduction of the birth which is done with, for the separation from the physician with which he is faced. He reproduces the past instead of performing the task in front of him. Even after treatment he will not have overcome the birth-trauma. Rank himself has shown us in the most convincing way that man never gives up the lost happiness of pre-natal life and that he seeks to re-establish this former state, not only in all his cultural strivings, but also in the act of procreation. These forms of representation are, however, ego-syntonic; in analysis the patient must give up only such attempts at repetition as are autoplasmic and dissociated from reality; he must give up symptoms, relations to the super-ego in which he has per-

petuated his whole past and which finally he aimed at rescuing for good in the analytical transference-situations. In the same way as he repeats in analysis the severance from the mother's body, he repeats all other difficult adaptations of his instinctual life which have been forced upon him during development, all with one end in view, to avoid a new adaptation to actual reality.

We are at one with Ferenczi and Rank in thinking that every subsequent stage of libido-organization is only a substitute for the abandoned intra-uterine state: we have already accepted this idea in the analysis of the castration complex.¹¹ Nevertheless each successfully established stage of organization represents a fixation-point: the intra-uterine state is the first, but, dynamically speaking, by no means always the most significant of the long series of fixation-points. The period at which an individual utters the negation which sets up a neurosis varies widely; yet it is precisely this point which determines the form of his subsequent neurosis. When in the course of treatment his special fixation is analysed out, subsequent regression represents resistance against the consequences of this analytic solution, against the demands of the ego, against the activity directed outwards.

We have here corroborated in principle Rank's significant conception but have had to amplify it by a needful quantitative (economic) valuation of intra-uterine fixation. For analytic treatment the task remains to convert the tonic energy 'bound' in automatic repetitions into the labile energy of conscious mental activity, in order that the struggle with reality may be taken up. The energies 'bound' in the acquired automatisms of the super-ego are freed through recollection. To compare memory-material with the testing of reality is the highest achievement of the mental apparatus. Only the ego can remember: the super-ego can only repeat. The dissolution of the super-ego is and will continue to be the task of all future psycho-analytic therapy.¹²

¹¹ 'The Castration Complex in the Formation of Character', *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS*, Vol. IV, Pt. 1 and 2, 1923.

¹² I am aware that in the foregoing presentation the concept of the 'super-ego' has been somewhat schematic and therefore more narrowly defined than in Freud's descriptions. I limit the 'super-ego' to the unconscious alone, hence it becomes identical with the unconscious sense of guilt, with the dream-censorship. The transition to conscious demands, to a conscious ego-ideal, is nevertheless in reality a fluid one. We might regard these parts of the 'super-ego' which project into consciousness as

The criticism will undoubtedly be advanced that I have been a little unfair to the super-ego. It will be said, and with justification, that in meeting the demands of reality the conscious ego is in principle very similar to the super-ego. The super-ego is merely a part of introjected reality from the past, an introjected educational code. Inner codes arise from outer. Now the conscious system, too, possesses a similar code. Logical thought in terms of reality is a product of adaptation. The laws of logic are copied from the laws of nature : they, too, represent a fragment of introjected reality. Leibnitz, who was not familiar with the theory of evolution, postulated a divine, pre-existing harmony between the laws of nature and the laws of thought. We know that the super-ego as well as the conscious ego are the inner representatives of reality, but not of reality alone ; the *id*, too, is represented by them. We have indeed imputed tainted motives to the super-ego, in that its over-severity and lack of justice represent a secret alliance with the *id* and permit expression of the latter's tendencies without sense of guilt. Now the same charge might be brought against the ego. The laws of logic are more strict than the laws of nature ; they admit of no exceptions. The ego, too, falsifies, renders inaccurately and caricatures reality in its logic, in order to master reality more easily ; in this way the ego serves the ends of the *id*.

Our investigation of the inner structure of the mental apparatus has revealed in it a petrified imprint, as it were, of actual by-gone struggles with environment : we saw the super-ego as a stereotyped mind, a mind which has become body. The laws of logic, too, have already become automatisms. Perception is mind : a logical law is mind stiffened into body. Psycho-analysis leads back from body to mind.

A few comments on the nature of these considerations may be appended here. I have attempted to trace the manifestations of psycho-analytic therapy as a whole to two main principles : to the

the most recent and final imprints in the structure of it, as constituents of the 'super-ego' *in statu nascendi*. They are not so fixed as the categorical, unconscious constituents of the conscience, and are more accessible to conscious judgement. This schematic presentation has been adopted in order to throw into sharper relief the dynamic principles concerned. I have compared extremes, the completely mobile apparatus of perception with the extremely rigid unconscious part of the 'super-ego'. Freud's conception and description, which takes into account the complete 'super-ego' system, is nevertheless the more correct psychologically.

Fechner-Freud principle of equilibrium and to the Breuer-Freud principle of inertia. This is synonymous with tracing all mental activity to these two fundamental dynamic laws. Here we have the basis of a system of mental dynamics which is of general validity independent of the quality of instincts and stimuli, and which can serve as a sure guiding-line in individual research. The two fundamental principles of the mind bear a strong resemblance to the two dynamic basic principles of physics, to the first and second principles of thermodynamics. Whereas the Fechner-Freud principle merely implies the equalization of states of tension, the inertia principle describes the tendency of psychic processes. In this sense it resembles the second principle of thermo-dynamics which, of the many possible conceivable transformations of energy, describes the only one possible in nature. This, too, is a law of tendency and includes the inertia factor, in that it implies the constant reduction of 'free energy', just as the principle of mental inertia implies the continuous 'binding' of *free, mobile* energy into *tonic* energy. Future investigation will decide whether we have here merely a formal analogy or an identity.

THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLE IN PSYCHO-ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE ¹

BY

SÁNDOR RADÓ

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Our interest in a systematic extension of analytic technique involves close investigation and theoretical appreciation of the phenomena occurring in the course of treatment. We must understand fully the relation between the methods employed and the results observed, which factors bring about the desired effect and through which channels they gradually become operative.

One has hardly settled down to these problems before it becomes apparent that the methods of treatment as carried out at the present time do not provide a suitable starting-point for the investigation. The technique of psycho-analysis, advancing tentatively along the lines of empirical observation, has already reached a stage where the analyst can achieve striking therapeutic (and pedagogic) results, but where the therapeutic conditions have become so complicated that it is by no means easy to dissect them or to present them in proper perspective. Following a hint given by Freud,² we shall exploit the advantages to be gained by a consideration of earlier procedures in psycho-therapeutics. Although the demands made on them were more modest and their possibilities more limited, these methods proved of good service and provided a satisfactory basis from which further advances were possible. I refer of course to those historic phases of development in technique, the use of ordinary hypnosis, the application of Breuer's cathartic hypnosis, of Freud's catharsis in a waking condition and 'analysis of symptoms' which laid the foundations of pure psycho-analysis. In so far as one views these fore-stages or forerunners of psycho-analysis as separate methods of treatment and practises them as such, consideration of them in the light of our present theoretical understanding becomes a plain necessity of immediate practical value.

Coming first of all to the *clinical sequence of events* during treat-

¹ Contribution to the Symposium held at the Eighth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Salzburg, April 21, 1924.

² 'Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psycho-Analysis', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, xxxii.

ment, we can begin by considering the fundamental principle established by Freud, viz. that the (classical) analytic technique is dominated by the manifestations of the artificial neurosis arising during treatment. Our treatment first transforms the patient's ordinary neurosis into a fresh 'transference-neurosis' and we are thereupon faced with the task of reducing this fresh formation. The analyst did not deliberately set out to effect this new artificial formation; he merely observed that such a process took place and forthwith made use of it for his own purposes. This being so, the question naturally arises: Are we here dealing with a specific product of the classical technique or does something similar come about in the case of the earlier methods of treatment, all of which are related to the phenomenon of transference? If, moreover, this should prove to be the case, the further question arises: Since this therapeutic neurosis is not recognized and not consciously taken into consideration during treatment, what ultimately becomes of it?

Let us consider first of all the ordinary hypnotic therapy, on the psychological mechanisms of which light has already been thrown by psycho-analytic research. As is well known, the hypnotist activates in the patient the latter's infantile erotic relationships to the parents and once more accomplishes the educative effect which on an earlier occasion forced the child to control its instincts by the way of repression. At that time education opposed the child's tendency to direct gratification through action; now the hypnotist deals with the later distorted derivatives of such actions, i.e. with the neurotic symptoms, which are for the patient a substitute for fulfilment of instinctual demands not capable of becoming conscious. At that time the child found compensation in parental love; now the patient consoles himself with the gratification implicit in love of the hypnotist, in hypnotic fascination. The symptoms which he must abandon are related to archaic phantasies of gratification, but the hypnotic situation actually brings about realization of the greatest of them on a living object as distinguished from an imagined object. We may assume that before the patient can repress his symptoms successfully he permits them to become *depleted* in favour of this potential gratification in actual (re-)experience. It is not quite clear how this withdrawn quantum of excitation is dealt with in the hypnotic experience, but according to the subjective sensations of the patient it is certain that it does become discharged, in all probability through the silent affective and somatic processes in hypnosis.

It would not constitute, one imagines, a departure from customary

analytical modes of expression to suggest that this transference of libido from the symptoms to the hypnotic experience represents the formation of a hypnotic transference-neurosis: the new symptom-formation, fascination, exhibits quite definitely the characteristic of a compromise, in spite of the fact that this fascination provides the neurotic instinctual demands of the patient with a gratification that is, to be sure, inhibited in its aim but is none the less real and actual, and that, regarded as a social process, is lacking in certain of the characteristics of a symptom. It might be interpolated as a boundary-manifestation between the phenomena that we have to deal with, and could also be quite truly described as a kind of sublimation. The intensity of the affective discharge may be less than is usually obtained through the ordinary symptom, but this difference seems to be balanced by the actuality of the object.

One gathers from observation of patients who have previously been treated by hypnosis that after recovery they repeat over and over again this experience of fascination by elaboration in phantasy (and dreams), provided the fixation on the hypnotist and recovery from symptoms persist. Apart from the manifest adoration which such persons lavish on their saviour, these phantasies constitute the invisible symptom-formations arising from the experience of hypnotic cure.

Hence we may regard a hypnotic cure as a transformation of the ordinary neurosis into an artificial, hypnotic neurosis and can therefore endorse the hypnotist's logical endeavour to perpetuate this permanent symptom of recovery although it is in no way recognized in the technique. The advantage gained by the patient from this formation is illuminating: he has exchanged his original symptoms for symptoms which are more in keeping with the demands of his ego and is freed from the direct injury associated with his malady. Apart from this there has been no alteration in his disadvantageous libido-economy.

In the case of cathartic hypnosis the formation and ultimate issue of the neurosis occurring during treatment is much more apparent to us. Its development from the reactivated nucleus of the Œdipus complex is to begin with very similar to that occurring in ordinary hypnosis, but a fresh factor is introduced owing to an alteration in the attitude of the hypnotist. Here the latter exerts all his influence to release from the pressure of repression those instinctual demands which are represented in the neurotic symptoms. This displacement of energy must give rise to the disintegration of the symptoms concerned; it puts an end to the final process of symptom-formation and uncovers

the raw material from which symptoms are constructed. The (partial) demolition of the symptoms sets free large charges of excitation which were previously 'bound'; these overflow into the motor system and by reason of their eruptive discharge give rise to dramatic scenes of 'abreaction' in the presence of the physician.

This 'abreaction', that is to say, catharsis, corresponds in every respect to an acute neurotic symptom. It presents in a marked degree the character of suffering, at the same time ensuring gratification of an intense kind which, although inhibited in its aim, is none the less real. The structure of the cathartic symptom is apparent, being constituted from two archaic situations of gratification (that of hypnosis and the situation contained in the disintegrated symptom) which are condensed through their common content (the *Œdipus complex*) and give rise to a unified process of discharge.

We see in abreaction the artificial counterpart of a hysterical fit and note that cure of a neurosis by catharsis comes about by its conversion into hysteria. This accords well with the fact that the cathartic method was built up from experience of hysterical cases and developed most rapidly with this neurosis.

Cathartic abreaction therefore changes the permanent symptoms of hysteria into hysterical seizures, and it goes without saying that the ordinary seizures of hysteria are converted into seizures of a different structure. Here a theoretically important question arises as to the economic difference between these two varieties of symptom, a question, however, which cannot be discussed at this juncture.

To judge from the many analogous circumstances it is probable that the enduring symptom-formations of cathartic treatment are formed in the same way as with hypnosis: it is a matter concerning which I have no personal experience.

Compared with simple hypnosis, cathartic hypnosis owes its greater practical results to the immeasurably greater intensity of substitutive satisfaction made possible through the disintegration of the symptoms. For the rest, cathartic hypnosis in the long run simply produces the situation of ordinary hypnosis: the release from repression is merely transitory and the discharge which results in the breakdown of symptoms is said to disappear from consciousness.

There is no notable difference between the special neurosis produced during treatment by catharsis in the waking state and that produced in ordinary hypnosis. The retention of ordinary consciousness during the cathartic procedure could not in itself lead to any special advan-

tages: its historical importance depends on the fact that its possibilities were developed by the genius of Freud in a truly marvellous way.

To sum up the foregoing considerations, we may say that the therapeutic achievement of the earlier technical methods consisted in an unintended and unrecognized production and preservation of an advantageous neurosis during treatment.

Having so far orientated ourselves on the clinical characteristics of the hypnotic and cathartic therapy, we may turn our attention to the *metapsychological* understanding of the *therapeutic situation* involved in these methods.

Our insight into the topographical dynamics of the hypnotic situation depends on the principle, enunciated by Freud, that the hypnotist takes the place of the patient's ego-ideal, usurping the functions of the super-ego. As we know, in the case of ordinary hypnosis he exercises his authority in conformity with the tendencies of the old ideal: he assists the patient's ego to carry the existing repression a stage further on to the symptoms. From the point of view of the patient we might say that the latter borrows from the hypnotist the forces necessary for repression, thus regressing, as far as aims and means of instinctual mastery are concerned, to the stage of childhood at which the father's omnipotence is supreme. It seems remarkable in this connection that the hypnotist himself takes part in this regression, in that he gives a faithful rendering of the rôle attributed to him by the unconscious of the patient. Hypnosis with all its 'uncanny' procedure is without doubt a therapy based on the archaic stage of magic, one which offers substantial gratification of the patient's longing for omnipotence, to say nothing of a similar longing on the part of the physician. This narcissistic pleasure constitutes one of the factors which ensure the therapeutic results of hypnosis. I have singled out this factor because it throws some light on an aspect of hypnotic therapy to which sufficient attention has not been paid.³ Hypnosis dazzles the patient's eyes with a vision of reality pleasing to his infantile attitude to life, which

³ I might mention, however, a paper by Jones which has come to my attention since writing: hypnotic therapy is there regarded from points of view similar to those given above and it is gratifying to me to find that many of his conclusions confirm my own. Jones, 'The Nature of Auto-Suggestion,' *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS*, 1923, Vol. IV, p. 3; reprinted in *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, Chapter XX.

in other respects is quite useless, being entirely governed by the pleasure-principle ; in so far as it counters his neurotic manifestations it does so by reinforcing their neurotic basis with all the impressiveness of actual experience. This contradiction which is implicit in hypnosis constitutes one of the most fundamental characteristics differentiating it from analysis.

In cathartic hypnosis the hypnotist plays a part which is completely opposed to the tendencies of the old ideal. He behaves like the leader of a successful revolutionary movement who overthrows the old constitution and repeals all the old legislative prohibitions. The cathartic excess which thereby comes about represents a triumph, as Freud has characterized it psychologically, a triumph which is celebrated by a 'crowd of two'.⁴

Returning to our fundamental proposition that the hypnotist plays the part of the super-ego, we have now to consider the method by which this is effected, to wit, the process of introjection. We shall study this process in its separate phases and differentiate its manifestations from the other transference-phenomena which characterize the hypnotic relationship.

Proceeding with our description, we may say that there is set up in the ego of the hypnotized person an *ideational presentation* of the hypnotist who is first regarded as an outer object, i.e. a sort of result of actual sensory perception and of the instinctual forces in the mind aroused by excitation. This ideational presentation continues incessantly to receive fresh impressions from without and to be subjected to alterations in cathexis from within ; through it mental processes can be influenced to a varying extent in the way of organization, direction and development, that is to say, it can continue the process of ego-alteration which we call identification. Should it now succeed in attracting to itself the natural cathexis of the topographically differentiated super-ego, its sphere of influence is thereby subjected to a new authority and the hypnotist is promoted from being an object of the ego to the position of a *parasitic super-ego*.

Incontrovertible clinical experience of hypnosis, e.g. awakening in response to suggestions of a criminal nature, show us that this withdrawal of cathexis cannot be complete. The super-ego, an organization genetically firmly established, seems to be equipped with a certain resistance against loss of power, nevertheless the residue of power it

⁴ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.*

preserves is crippled through repression by its self-controlling 'double.'⁵ The (relative) strength of cathexis of the introjected super-ego must vary ; it provides a quantitative measure of the depth of hypnosis.

Belonging as it does to the ego-structure, the hypnotic super-ego seemingly usurps to itself the function of consciousness : at any rate its experiences are subjected, after the awakening of the ego, to counter-repression.

Let us now consider what ultimately happens in hypnosis to the object-cathexes directed by the ego on the hypnotist. This is closely associated with the origin and development of these strivings towards the object and the matter can only be settled by discussion of a somewhat wider scope.

We may recall here Freud's description of the means by which the infantile ego overcomes the Œdipus complex.⁶ 'The object-cathexes are abandoned and replaced by identification. Paternal or parental authority, introjected into the ego, forms there the core of the super-ego which, taking over its severity from the father, perpetuates the incest-prohibition and so guards the ego against the return of libidinal object-cathexes. The libidinal trends pertaining to the Œdipus complex are in part desexualized and sublimated, . . . partly inhibited as to aim and changed into feelings of tenderness'. 'The process in question represents something more than repression ; under ideal conditions it is equivalent to a destruction and abrogation of the Œdipus complex. . . . If the ego has really not achieved much more than a repression of the complex, this latter persists unconsciously in the *id*, giving rise later to pathogenic manifestations'.

The neurotic, whose restoration to health is the concern of our therapy, illustrates this latter contingency : he has come to grief during childhood over the mastering of his Œdipus complex, has repressed the sexual trends pertaining to it and afterwards has had to put up with their reappearance in the form of symptoms. He finds himself in a situation of frustration, exhibits an intense craving for an

⁵ This conception of the newly-formed super-ego in hypnosis as a 'parasitic double' was formed in my mind from the study of some of Freud's speculations which have hitherto been neglected. See his introduction to *Psycho-Analysis and the War-Neuroses*, 1921.

⁶ *Das Ich und das Es*. The quotation is abridged from a passage in 'The Passing of the Œdipus Complex,' *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

object, the instinctual force of which is derived from the *id*, and which is due to the unconscious dominance of the Œdipus complex.

Hence it is the Œdipus libido of the *id* which at the commencement of hypnosis invests the person of the hypnotist and which, at the signal he gives, activates the 'feminine masochistic' attitude⁷ present in the ego.⁸ It is easy to conjecture the subsequent course of events. The ego takes alarm at the sudden intensity of the masochistic trend, even if it should at first give rein to this striving; stimulated by the active liberation of anxiety which follows, it takes flight, thus stultifying the endeavours of the hypnotist.

It must depend on certain characteristics of the masochistic trends, in all probability on their intensity and the durability of their manifest component, whether this eventuality is avoided and the road to hypnosis is finally traversed. If the ego is barred from both extremes (hasty repression or direct realization) it must of necessity strive to overcome the new (masochistic) demands of Œdipus libido on an infantile pattern by replacing the object through identification, desexualizing object-cathexes and binding this acute ego-alteration. This cannot be entirely successful: object-cathexis is in part retained but is transformed into an aim-inhibited feeling. Once accepted by the ego, this must endanger the unity of the ego, since its masochistic character is incompatible with the ego-alteration (identification) which takes place at the same time. This identification, the kernel of which arises from the ideational presentation of the hypnotist, separates itself eventually from the remaining masochistic content of the ego and retreats in the direction of the super-ego. Only after these preliminary steps have been taken is the identification in a position to deal with the super-ego in the manner already described, to establish itself by an extensive withdrawal of energy as a usurper of the super-ego's power.

Thus masochism ultimately gains a free hand in the ego and unites with the sadism of the introjected, parasitic super-ego to bring about the results of hypnosis. Return of the waking state, we might add in conclusion, puts an end to this forcible act of introjection and brings about an object-relation to the hypnotist: the parasitic super-ego then disappears, leaving behind, however, a permanent trace in the

⁷ 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

⁸ The so-called 'mother-hypnosis' is best explained as a clever device which conceals the hypnotist's ultimate aims under a hypocritical mask which is psychologically well conceived.

super-ego which induces an ever-increasing aptitude for later repetitions of hypnosis.⁹

To sum up our views regarding the metapsychological processes of hypnotic and cathartic treatment: Hypnosis masters the pathogenic Œdipus-libido withdrawn from symptoms, in part by narcissistic mobilization and in part by aim-inhibited motor discharge. The more complete the mastery, the more surely and permanently can the weakened vestiges of the symptoms be dealt with by repression. In catharsis an additional factor is operative, viz. that the masochistically bound ego obeys the commands laid upon it by freeing from the

⁹ According to the views presented above, the feminine masochism of the ego has to be regarded as the decisive factor in hypnotic fascination; this view is wholly in keeping with Freud's first fundamental observations on this matter (*Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, First Edition, 1905). Much yet remains to be explained, although the supplementary fragments of the analytic theory of hypnosis (classification of the phenomena of the Œdipus complex: Ferenczi, 'Introjection and Transference,' 1908) and also its wider application in the direction of cultural development (Freud, *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego*, 1923) provide fruitful sources of information, since the fundamental significance of the Œdipus complex has been demonstrated in every form of mental activity. Recently reference has been made in analytic literature to Bjerre's conception of hypnosis as a 'temporary relapse into the primary state of intra-uterine life' ('Das Wesen der Hypnose,' *Zeitschrift für Psychotherapie*, 1914). This represents an attempt to apply to the theory of hypnosis the known genetic relation between intra-uterine life, the state of sleep and hypnosis. There is a danger here of overlooking the artificial nature of the phenomenon and its specific mechanism, and in any case this conception is bound to come to grief as long as it is bound up with the deeply-rooted idea that hypnosis is merely an artificial sleep, a sleep-like reproduction of intra-uterine life. Hypnosis is certainly something *more*, it is a kind of artificial *dream* and should some day be seriously investigated from the point of view of this analogy, now that psycho-analysis has uncovered its dynamic secret. In a paper as yet unpublished (read before the Hungarian Psycho-Analytical Society, March, 1921) I have attempted to trace the development of hypnosis (and the related 'mediumistic' transference of thought and will by means of manual contact) as genetically an aim-inhibited derivative of coitus. Coitus seems clearly to be the biological prototype of hypnosis, and it appears to me that there is a close relation between the course of the sex act and that of dream-processes (i.e. not merely of sleep!). (See Ferenczi's observations on 'Coitus und Schlaf' in his *Veruch einer Genitaltheorie*, 1924).

Œdipus complex other libidinal excitations which are then discharged through the motor system (discharge of affect). The hypnotist first of all takes the place of an object for the ego, turns to the masochistic state of readiness in the ego, is quickly subjected to the defensive process of introjection which brings about his idealization and strengthens his authority over the ego by means of the super-ego. In this way the masochistic ego is able to reconcile in a situation of gratification at the same time the demands of reality, of his tyrannical super-ego and of his Œdipus-ridden *id*. This extensive gratification serves to free him from symptoms which, although due to similar economic conditions, are incompatible with reality;¹⁰ moreover, by means of phantasied (or actual) repetitions it gives rise to a therapeutic neurosis which is regarded as a cure.

¹⁰ For the sake of simplicity in presentation no reference has been made here to 'epinosic gain' or to the 'need for punishment'.

* The preparation of the second part of this contribution has been delayed by the author's illness, but we hope to be able to publish it in the next number of the JOURNAL.—ED.

SHORTER COMMUNICATIONS

A CASTRATION COMPLEX

BY

E. PICKWORTH FARROW

SPALDING

The results described in the present communication were obtained by a method of self-analysis consisting essentially in writing down consecutive series of free associations for periods of one or two hours at a time. Thus the common (although unfounded) criticism that the analyst reads the result into the mind of his patient cannot apply in this instance. The writer is much indebted to his friend, Mr. A. G. Tansley, F.R.S., for revising this paper and particularly for condensing it and cutting out much detail.

The writer was originally entirely sceptical as to the general occurrence of the castration complex in the human mind, considering the idea to be a very far-fetched one, and certainly did not believe that it was at all likely to be discovered in his own mind. After conversation with a friend who had been analysed and after some personal experience of analysis, however, he came to think it more likely that such a complex might enter into his own mental constitution, especially as he was conscious of a slight feeling of faintness when he read anything in scientific literature associated with castration—such as descriptions of the method of sterilization by severing the *vasa deferentia*.

In self-analysis his free associations eventually led to an incident of his childhood between the ages of six and seven when he pulled out one of his milk teeth in the street and was surprised how painlessly it came away. He remembered that at the moment of extraction of the tooth he was peculiarly impressed by the crack between two kerbstones a few feet away.

The following night he dreamed that he felt in the roof of his mouth at the back something which he was sure was some kind of internal parasite. This he took hold of with two fingers and pulled out of his mouth. It was then seen to be a definitely organized object, feeling slightly alive between his two fingers, and rather like an *Amphioxus* (i.e. pointed at both ends and about six inches long). A fish's head was faintly outlined at one end. He thereupon threw it on the floor, where it gave one wriggle and then lay still.

On awakening immediately from this dream he realized that the fish's head meant that the object was a phallic symbol to his mind and he then experienced intense horror. While the horror still lasted there flashed into his mind a very vivid recollection of seeing a butcher chop off with a sudden blow of a heavy cleaver a string of fat close to a joint of meat on a large block of wood. The details of the shape and size of the fat were very clear in his memory. Further horror accompanied this memory, which he was convinced represented a real incident of his childhood, an incident which aroused at the time a fear of sudden and violent castration carried out as the butcher had cut off the fat from the joint, but which was immediately completely repressed. The horror now quickly passed off and the recovery of this memory apparently largely freed the writer from a slight feeling of horror that he had felt for many years on seeing the Pleiades—known locally as 'the butcher's cleaver'—especially for the first few times after their rising in the autumn. This he was quite conscious of but would scarcely admit to himself, although he had several times vaguely wondered why it was there. After the recovery of the memory related above the writer was able to look at the Pleiades with comparative equanimity, though still with a slight shivering.¹

A little later on a long spell of free association came to a sudden stop and the writer found it impossible to proceed further. On asking himself what the repression could be which was causing this strong and obstinate resistance there came the spontaneous answer, 'Castration'. Finding it still impossible to proceed with association he hoped he would have a dream that night which might give him more informa-

¹ This slight remaining shivering has now completely disappeared with the raising of the complete castration complex (see later) to full consciousness and the subsequent working off of the affect formerly associated with it. This complete removal the writer considers to be sound confirmatory evidence of a causal connection.

Many people probably have from time to time similar slight but very definite feelings of horror in conscious life towards apparently quite harmless things, which they refuse to admit to themselves and would deny if questioned about, and are mostly unaware of, except at the comparatively rare moments when they are in the presence of the exciting causes, or until the matters come up in free association; but the writer's slight but very definite former feelings of unreasoning horror towards the Pleiades in fully conscious life—and the real reason of this indicated above—may be interesting to those who think that there is nothing in psycho-analysis.

tion, but he also thought that the dream must not be too horrible. Slight traces of a castration complex in the dream would be enough to satisfy his intellectual curiosity. At the same time something in his mind seemed to reproach him for using so powerful and dangerous an instrument as psycho-analysis, and for being so persistent. If he went on long enough he feared he would eventually discover something significant! He did indeed have a dream that night and it was certainly concerned with castration, but he found association to it non-productive of further results.

For many years the writer had recollected at infrequent intervals and with feelings of pleasure a certain walk he had taken as a child with a very close female relative. All he could remember about it was that it came on to rain and that either he or the relative put up an umbrella; also that it was after this walk that he first began, at intermittent intervals, to avoid stepping on the cracks between the paving stones, a tendency he rationalized by arguing that the centres of the stones were better able to bear his weight than the cracks, and that it was therefore cruel and inconsiderate to step on the cracks. During analysis association sometimes ran to the subject of this walk, and he gradually recollected that there were some bullocks in a field on one side of the road and that he asked his relative what was the difference between a bullock and a bull, though he knew the answer perfectly well. He was now convinced that the cause of his remembering this particular walk was interest in castration together with what can only be considered as sexual interest in the female relative.

Considerably later in the course of the self-analysis there occurred to him the sentence, spoken angrily, 'Oh, he's been doing that again, has he? Leave him to me, I'll soon cure him of that.' Associated with this was an extremely dim suggestion that it was Cousin — who spoke (not the same relative as the one referred to in connexion with the walk mentioned in the preceding paragraph). The associations then diverged to quite different topics. Several days later the sentence quoted above suddenly recurred, this time with full conscious realization, that Cousin — was the speaker. The writer then asked himself, 'Where did she say this?', and the reply came, 'In the kitchen of our house in —, where I was born, of course. I had been taken down to the kitchen to see her by a servant'. 'Why had I been taken down to see her by the servant?' Reply: 'For exposing my genitals in the back room on the first floor. On seeing this the servant took hold of me by the right arm, rather fiercely, and led me downstairs to

Cousin ——, who was working in the kitchen. Several times previously (and once before this same afternoon) this servant had threatened that if I exposed my genitals again they would be cut off. When she learned what had happened Cousin —— angrily replied, “ Oh, he’s been doing that again, has he ? Leave him to me ; I’ll soon cure him of that ”, at the same time seizing me roughly under the arms, and in spite of struggles and resistance dragging me, or letting me hang by her side, up to the back room again ’.

The writer then asked himself, ‘ What happened after this ? ’ Immediately a picture flashed before his mind, at first cloudy, but quickly becoming quite clear. Even in the first cloudy picture large scissors, with sharp bright blades opening and closing rapidly and scraping against one another in the air, stood out very vividly in a sort of yellowish white cloud above his genitals. Cousin —— forced him down on a couch which stood by the wall of this room, near the door, with her left arm under his right arm and across his chest, her hand being near his left shoulder. She then told the servant to give her the scissors from the adjoining table, and shouted, ‘ Go and fetch a dish,’ at the same time opening and closing the scissor blades just above his genitals. He could see, at the moment of the analytic recovery of the recollection, the movement of the blades and could again hear their grinding noise. Up to this instant he had not believed that they really meant to do anything to him, though he had been badly frightened by the rough handling he had received. But with the order to bring the dish he was really convinced that Cousin —— meant to cut off his genitals, and, as the servant appeared with a brownish pie-dish, a great sickness went through his soul. He said, ‘ Don’t, Cunny —— ’ (childish form of cousin), and she snapped out, ‘ Well ! Are you going to do it again ? ’ He was now crying, and after a moment or two turned his head to the left, away from the horror, and said in a weak voice, ‘ No ’. Cousin ——, who was sitting on the edge of the couch, turned towards the servant, who thrust the pie-dish savagely towards the writer, but Cousin —— pushed it away, saying, ‘ It’s not necessary, he’s given in ’.

The writer finds it impossible to doubt that this incident is a real one, which was totally repressed very quickly after its occurrence, on account of the extreme vividness of every detail, the fact that he can remember the incident occurring rather late one afternoon in actual waking life and the appalling and extremely fierce resentment which followed the analytic recovery of it. He regards the brown pie-dish

as strongly confirmatory, because he was expecting the servant to bring a shallow white gravy dish (which was what the word 'dish' used by his cousin apparently conveyed to his mind) and was surprised by the appearance of the much smaller deep brown pie-dish with steep sides. Further confirmatory evidence was obtained when he related the incident to his mother, imitating Cousin ——'s enunciation of the sentence, 'Oh, he's been doing that again, etc.' 'Yes', said his mother, 'that's exactly Cousin ——'s style.' His mother also said to his father, 'It's probably an actual occurrence, you know. . . . I believe every word of what he says. . . . If he had picked on anybody else I should not have believed him at all, but, instead of that he picks on the very one with whom it is possible in the light of what I have since found out about her. She is so untruthful, too, that it is no use asking her anything about the matter.'²

The recovery of the incident was not immediately accompanied by such acute horror as might be imagined, but mainly by great dulness and sadness. The telling of the incident to a few relatives and friends apparently raised the affect of horror and the following feeling of fierce

² Some more facts came to light regarding the servant. The writer remembered that she was the instigator of this plan to his cousin, and various facts he remembered about her—namely, that she always wore a black dress, that she was rather severe-looking, and that she always wore steel-rimmed spectacles while sewing—enabled his parents to identify her as a certain Miss ——, an unmarried person of about thirtys-even who was in the house when he was between three and four years old and who died through fire about six months after leaving. She was, it appears, a dressmaker—this would account for the recollected proximity of the scissors, but before he knew that she was a dressmaker, he had remembered that there were cotton reels and a workbasket on the table at the time. Also that the tablecloth was of a coarse plush-like material of a yellowish-green colour.

His mother subsequently remembered that one afternoon on her return while this servant was in the house the latter said to her, 'He's had a crying fit.' This remark particularly impressed his mother at the time as such a thing had not occurred before, and she replied that the servant must have been mistaken, such things being unknown in the family, whereupon the latter replied that perhaps she had made a mistake. His mother asked him what was the matter but he replied that he was all right. The writer has no recollection of these conversations, and thus cannot say whether they occurred on the afternoon in question; but, from the reported unique nature of the occurrence, it rather looks as though they might quite well have done so.

resentment to the highest pitch. For some days the writer was utterly miserable, and felt himself back in the time when he was a small helpless child expecting his genitals to be clipped off the next moment, and he has never felt so completely lonely and lost in the world before. Accompanying or alternating with this misery was fierce anger, and his cousin's life would certainly not have been safe if he had met her at that time. He found his friends and relatives quite incapable of appreciating the strength of these feelings, or of any adequate sympathy. After a time the writer began to recover from the intensity of the affects and was able to listen to reasonable suggestions, such as that the threat was never intended to be carried out, but was solely a threat made with the object of frightening him and curing him of a tendency to exhibition.

Gradually, then, he recovered from the feelings of horrible ill-treatment and profound humiliation as his intelligence was brought to bear on the matter. His general mental condition and physical health very greatly improved, and a former slight tendency to '*folie de toucher*' and '*folie du doute*' has now entirely disappeared. The former he would explain in his own case by the desire to realize he was still alive (i.e. had escaped castration) by freshly orientating himself to the world.

His former intermittent tendency to avoid stepping on the cracks between paving stones has also disappeared. He would explain this tendency by supposing that the cracks represent definite clear cuts recalling castration. In this connexion it is interesting to remember the childish saying that 'If you step on the cracks you will never have a sweetheart'. The writer is also inclined to believe that in his own case a general, though slight, lack of self-confidence, a subjective internal mental irritation and want of placidity tending to insomnia, and a peculiar kind of mental sensitiveness relating to the teeth were all due to the castration complex (cf. being mysteriously—formerly inexplicably—impressed with a crack between kerb-stones on extracting a milk-tooth. The tooth doubtless represented a phallic symbol under the circumstances).

In contrast with the common verbal threat of castration we here have the threat *acted*, with every convincing accessory employed. The effect of this in heightening the intensity of the complex is natural enough. The 'moral' is too obvious to need comment.

NOTE ON FREUD AND BLAKE

Blake's Prophetic Books are renowned for their extreme obscurity. In his own days they were regarded as the wild outpourings of a madman. Blake himself regarded them, however, as his chief life's work, and one of the finest letters ever written is that written by Blake to Butts, in which he gives his reasons for wishing to leave Felpham and Hayley's patronage—he found that remaining there impeded him in composing the Prophetic Books. While he uses the extreme language of a visionary, at the same time he is so calm and business-like; he weighs up the probable result of leaving Felpham and returning to London with such precision, he knows it will mean more struggle and poverty, of which he has already had experience in full, and yet in face of that he calmly assesses the force of his inner urge which he feels he must obey.

In face of that letter it would be merely ridiculous to dismiss the Prophetic Books as meaningless rhapsodies. It is true they are still almost impossible to unravel, but the key to them may lie hidden in the future.

I venture to suggest that Freud's speculations in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* present a parallel to some of Blake's imaginings.

Freud says he has observed in children and neurotics a repetition-compulsion which in the normal adult loses its ascendancy, but which he suggests inheres as a primal part of every instinct. This further leads to the assumption that all animate matter existed once as inanimate matter, to which it has an indomitable desire to return. The Will-to-live, the Will-to-power and the sexual instinct, though they appear to contradict this assumption, are only part impulses and, in fact, ultimately lead to the same goal—death—only by a prolonged route. Without that prolongation, it may be that the primal cell would not discharge all its energy and therefore not die fully. The main idea is, however, that in all living things there exists a protest against life itself—the lust of death is for ever in conflict with the lust of life in all animate matter.

Now let us turn from the patient intellectual observer to the man of passionate and surging intuitions.

One of the shorter Prophetic Books, *The Book of Urizen*, is said to contain the germ of all the ideas expressed in the others. I would suggest that it may be interpreted broadly as a vast and complicated pageant of primal cellular existence. Not that the comparisons can be

made to fit with any exactitude, but broad correspondences may be indicated. The intricacies of the poem, though so baffling, do not suggest greater complexity than the interactions of the primal impulses.

Blake speaks about the 'Eternals' as the source apparently of all things, and perhaps they may be taken as corresponding to inanimate matter. The opening event of the poem is a vast and awful cleavage amid these Eternals, and Urizen hurls himself from them. Let us suppose Urizen corresponds with the primal urge of life rending inanimate matter. The result is cataclysmic—for Urizen has plunged into awful self-torment, yet he cannot return to the Eternals. He can only divide and each division brings its fresh agonies. Space, time, morality, nature arise and bind him fast; he is entirely cut off from the Eternals and the whole tragedy of animate existence has started. Urizen never for one moment suffers respite from the torment of his state; he is the primal cell desiring death and yet impeded by his own division from achieving it.

It is always rather puzzling why Blake—an entirely good man himself—should have rebelled theoretically against the bonds of knowledge and religion, but perhaps it was just because he felt they were the myrmidons of life and just how to master life rather than prolong it was his aim.

His illustrations are mainly monsters, but are they not just suitable for his subject—the presentation of something subhuman, a single cell? Personification is of course the poet's method of achieving complete objectivity in his representations. If a modern poet, after reading Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, sought to write a poem on it, he would no doubt employ something like Blake's device. Far from being wild, the illustrations and dynamic quality of his lines seem quite appropriate if we can accept the theory that we are dealing with a pageant of cellular existence.

Honor M. Pulley, London.

THE PEARL AND CASTRATION SYMBOLISM

One day a patient during analysis remarked quite spontaneously that she was going to call her vulva 'Moti'. I asked her why she gave it that name. She said, 'Because it is a pearl. "Moti" means a pearl'. As I did not know this word she explained that she had been reading Kipling's *Plain Tales from the Hills*, and the word 'Moti' meaning a pearl occurs in that book. I asked her why her vulva was a pearl.

She said, 'A pearl is a wound in an oyster'. Then correcting herself added, 'A pearl is the result of a wound in an oyster'. I remarked, 'If a pearl is the result of a wound in an oyster and you call your vulva "Moti" or pearl, then it seems to follow that you consider your vulva is the result of a wound.' She agreed with this idea. I next asked her when she got the wound. She said, 'When my father died, he took away his penis.' The patient's father died when she was eighteen months old. If we consider her last remark, 'my father took away his penis', we find that it means deprived her of her love-object, for she calls a penis 'Lalji,' which means beloved. This word is also from *Plain Tales from the Hills*. If, on the other hand we substitute 'my penis' for 'his penis' in her remark, and this is legitimate seeing that she has the wound, then we have a definite idea of castration by the father. There seems also to be a self-castration in virtue of identification with the father, thus, his = my, my father = I.

Identification with the father is shown in the following incident. During the next analytical hour she said, 'I feel that I am walking with you holding on to your thumb.' She then added, 'You remember I told you once that I used to catch hold of my father's thumb, and wanted to put it in my mouth'. This she had previously told me as a memory. She next mentioned that the thumb also represents a phallus. It is obvious that I am standing in the place of her father. Suddenly she said, 'I feel I must touch your thumb.' Thereupon she immediately extended her left thumb and pressed forcibly upon it with her right forefinger. Here is a clear case of identification, and also a castration of the father. She had his penis.

The patient, therefore, before she was eighteen months old, had desired and obtained the father, i.e. his penis—castration of the father by the daughter. The father dies, thereby depriving her of his or her penis—castration of the daughter by the father.

Douglas Bryan, London.

ABSTRACTS

CLINICAL

E. H. Connell. The Significance of the Idea of Death in the Neurotic Mind, 1924, *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. IV, p. 115.

In commenting on the chaotic terminology of medical psychology the author explains his use of terms such as Regression, Narcissism, Reality and Pleasure Principle. He discards the term Libido, however, in favour of 'Instinct Interest.'

It is noteworthy that the idea of death is frequently present in the neurotic mind, but absent in the physical illness. The impulse of death in the mind of the melancholiac becomes less pronounced when physical disease occurs. Connell maintains that this impulse is due to affective tension denied conative expression and unable to attach itself through regression to imaginative phantasy. The idea of death varies with the intensity of the excitement suspended between the Reality and Pleasure Principle functions. In discussing the death impulse in Melancholia, the author rejects Freud's theory of projection of hate on to the Ego on the grounds that recovery occurs, and that such projection does not relieve or comfort the melancholiac. He continues to dispute the question of projection in melancholia by comparing this psychosis with paranoia. In melancholia the affect remains unpleasurable and exists as a tension which produces the death impulse. In paranoia the affect invests the Self by projection, regression within the delusion occurring to make it one of grandeur. The absence of the suicidal impulse in paranoia is explained by this mechanism of projection.

Psychoneurotics toy with the idea of death, the most serious attempts occurring in the case of Anxiety Hysteria. The neurotic's idea of death is equivalent to quiescence and is not dealt with objectively. It is part of the pleasure principle and possesses no reality. Discussing physiological changes due to the activity of the endocrine glands, the author observes that the death tendency is absent in Graves' Disease, whereas it is present in Anxiety Hysteria. The hypothesis that hyperactivity of sex gland secretion acts on the vagus and produces vagotonus, which in turn becomes related to repression and the death tendency, is discussed at some length. In summing up it is observed that the idea of death is psychologically due to tension from withheld affect, physiologically to alteration in endocrine secretion, and biologically to failure in the functioning of the self-preservative tendency.

Robert M. Riggall.

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Millais Culpin. The Treatment of Anxiety States. Modern Technique in Treatment. *Lancet*, 1924.

An article dealing with the treatment of pathological anxiety as it

exists in the psychoneuroses. It is written from the point of view of guidance for the general practitioner.

It is said that the aim of the treatment is to make the patient aware of his difficulties, the methods of doing this ranging from explanation and kindly insistence up to the full technique of psycho-analysis. Stress is laid upon the necessity of the physician overcoming his own resistances, which it is said will intensify those of the patient owing to his detecting the same resistances at work in the physician's mind.

Contrary to the regular views in psycho-analysis it is stated to be a matter of opinion regarding the revival of lost memories as to how much the patient should be pressed with direct questions.

Warburton Brown.

★

R. G. Gordon. On the Physiology of Tremor in Relation to the Neuroses. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1924, Vol. IV, p. 224.

Gordon classifies neurotic tremors according to their emotional accompaniment. When this anxiety is slight or lacking he finds a condition of simultaneous hypertonus of antagonistic muscles which often follows the result of a wound or other fear of movement in the limb. The removal of the tremor by relaxation cures the condition. The other group includes those cases accompanied by definite anxiety. This affective reaction is discussed from the physiological standpoint, particularly the 'thalamic' views of Bianchi and Head.

Having discussed the physiology of tremor in relation to organic nervous disease and toxic conditions, it is noted that in all these cases there is a diminution of cortical control over basal ganglion activity. Successful adaptation to environment and particular aspects of personality depends on the establishment of cortical function at its highest level, the development of neurotic symptoms corresponding to an interference with this function. The factors responsible for these symptoms are a constitutional lack of psychological synthesis and temperamental influences in relation to ductless gland secretion which are predisposing factors in the conflict between pleasure and reality producing anxiety. Regression of sexual conflict to a narcissistic level means that the thwarting of sex feeling becomes a threat to the individual. The author suggests that irregularity in the suprarenal secretion is responsible for the inhibition of cortical control with the development of the thalamic striate short circuit. The Freudian conflict may be dependent on this excessive secretion.

Robert M. Riggall.

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J. C. McKerrow. Neuroses. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1924, IV, 85.

The essential conception of McKerrow's theory of life is that of a relation of equilibrium between the living process and its conditions,

analogous to that existing in chemistry. A painful stimulus causes a disturbance of the viable equilibrium, which tendency is described in the following three 'laws':

1. Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances.
2. Unviable activity tends not to be repeated.
3. Activity tends to appear at its proper period.

McKerrow's theory of the neuroses is that they are the effects of deviation from the normal standards of viable equilibrium. Hysteria deviates from the normal standard in over-emotionality and neurasthenia in over-fatigability. This is explained in the case of hysteria, by the organism's relation to external (emotional) situations, and in that of neurasthenia, by the individual's relation to its inner environment or body. Obsessions depend on the first of McKerrow's laws; they are psychological idiosyncrasies. Repression depends on the second law. 'The natural man is interested in sexual matters; the conventional man is interested to ignore what interests him as a natural man'. The First Law stands for the Freudian libido and the Second for the censorship. In referring the physiological neuroses to physiological abnormality in the germ-cell, the author thinks he is labouring under no materialistic misconception. Life cannot be described in terms of physics and chemistry only. Viable equilibrium varies with the individual according to the environment.

Robert M. Riggall.

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DREAMS

G. H. Green. The Problem of the Terror Dream. *Psyche*, 1924, p. 129.

An attempt is made to show that Rivers' belief in the failure of the 'wish-fulfilment' theory of dreams causes unnecessary confusion. Having quoted the terror dream of a two-and-a-half years old child in which a big dog jumps up at her, the author points out that the leaping of the dog is the prelude to a wish-fulfilment, the actual incident of the jumping dog, which was the stimulus for the dream, being followed by conspicuous attention from relatives which had hitherto been lacking. In this case the dog appears in the dream in order to satisfy those wishes connected with the petting the child received from her relatives. If sleep had continued the dream would probably have had a happy ending. On this assumption the author bases his main theory that the terror dream is *the statement of a condition of wish-fulfilment* and not the fulfilment itself. The reason why simple wish-fulfilment dreams are rare in adults is because the things which stand in the way of wish-fulfilment have acquired 'meaning.' In the exhibitionistic dream the pleasure which should be felt in association with wish-fulfilment is mixed with the unpleasure connected with unsuccessful instinctive activity, the resulting conflict showing itself as 'anxiety.' In referring to post-war dreams an interesting analogy is

drawn between 'going over the top' or 'no man's land' and a condition of escape from civilization with its absence of any code of morality. Thus the war-dream would become *a condition of wish-fulfilment*. 'No man's land' would obviate the difficulties of peace conditions. In stating that wish-fulfilment seems to be the whole purpose of the war-dream, Green appears to disagree with Freud's latest theory that they obey a repetition-compulsion.

Robert M. Riggall.

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Frederick Mott. Sleep, Sleeplessness and Sleepiness. *Lancet*, 1924, pp. 1161-65.

An address dealing with the subject of sleep chiefly from the physiological point of view.

A column is devoted to dreams. The most significant feature about this is that the name of Freud is only mentioned to be dismissed with the remark that he has laid too much stress on sex. For the rest Sir Frederick Mott prefers to support his own view, that dreams are dependent entirely on external excitations, by the scientific method of quoting scraps from such writers as the author of *The Ingoldsby Legends*.

Warburton Brown.

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SEXUALITY

Edward Glover. The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis. 1924. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. IV, p. 134.

The oral stage is concerned with libidinal and self-preservative activity as well as the fusing or diverting of primary instincts. The shortening or prolongation of suckling constitutes either a traumatic experience or a fixation, the former being in the author's experience almost invariably traumatic. It is suggested that primary gratification, which normally should become subsidiary in the next stage and finally represented in the fore-pleasure of coitus, may abnormally retain its dominating influence and become inhibitory. This inhibitory disturbance may be *quantitative*, libido energy being withdrawn from one point to invest another (displacement and condensation), or to reinvest another point through regression. Ferenczi thinks that the 'handing on' is qualitative, the genital act being a merging of pregenital characteristics (amphimixis).

The importance of suckling to the child is described lucidly. Such factors as the smell of the maternal body and the colour and shape of breast and nipple are emphasized. The taste of blood from a cracked nipple reminds the child of his first blood-scented birth experiences. The punishment of weaning, preceded by the initial slaps administered for nipple biting together with the maternal erotic reactions to suckling, play an important part in future instinct modification.

Discussing Instinct-development and Object-formation, Glover traces the separation of a pleasure ego from the painful outer world by displacement of erotic tension into auto-erotic channels. Failure to differentiate a real Ego causes libido to become attached to the object and a path is found for love. The path for hate is found, as it were, by misapprehension, the mastery instincts fusing with the erotic to form the sadistic component of sexual gratification. The early confusion of subject and object causes the taking of the object into the mouth to be analogous to the introjection of objects into the ego. This is phylogenetically significant, the primitive belief being that food causes alteration in character. The early aggressive satisfaction of hunger causes hate to precede and find a path for love, the incorporated substance becomes a love object. This oral ambivalence may later be traced in the Œdipus situation. Other erogenous zones influence this ambivalent attitude towards objects besides influencing character formation. In *ejaculatio præcox*, Glover noticed a marked oral disposition in addition to strong urinary interests. Displacements of oral activity, such as found in kissing and biting, are also present in the fore-pleasure of coitus, providing mouth-nipple parallels. In comparing oral activities with component impulses, it is observed that touch, taste, sight and smell are especially associated with the mouth, and that these senses are the instruments of projection and object formation.

Maternal retaliations and other painful experiences help to associate pain with the erotic, this being reinforced by anal experiences. The flight from incest phantasies is associated with the castration complex. Loss of pleasure associated with birth, suckling and defæcation occurs at a time when objects are only part-objects. Weaning is a pre-castration disposition, the loss is associated with a part, not a whole object, as in the true castration situation. Flight reactions are important in their relation to homosexuality. In these cases the narcissistic value of the penis is carried over from suckling, *vid* urination. The narcissistic stage of object love equals self and penis and the influence of the mouth is expressed in fear, contempt and anger against the absence of the penis in the woman. In masturbation the penis is punished instead of the nipple, this constituting a situation of oral revenge. Oral fixations are important in the study of the psychoses. In paranoid regression a part introjection of the object, penis, fæces and probably breast, occurs as compared with the complete introjection of melancholia. Owing to faulty object relationship the formation of the ego-ideal is unstable. Alcoholism and drugging show a deterioration of the ego-ideal which seeks reinforcement from without; these are excellent examples of mouth influence. The strong oral fixations in these cases result in a strong precastration setting.

The oral subject obtains gratification in the colloquial and formal use of words. The oral sadist uses biting words and the passive type assimilates or digests. Biters and suckers may be observed in everyday life

during eating, drinking or smoking. Physiognomic oral characteristics point to the instinct tendencies as they existed at the commencement of life.

Robert M. Riggall.



CHILDHOOD

M. N. Searl. A Child Study. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1924, Vol. IV, p. 249.

This is an interesting sketch of the phantasy life of a Scandinavian child, six years of age, who lived with her mother and an eighteen-year-old step-sister, the child's father having been divorced. The author observes that an enforced over-occupation with phantasy, together with a strong ego-ideal, caused delay in the onset of the latency period, phantasy becoming the only possible compromise between reality and wishes. The author, who was intimately associated with the child, observed various reactions of love and hate towards herself which clearly illustrated the working of the Œdipus situation. The mechanism of a compulsion to phantastic lying and kleptomania, with their relation to each other, agrees with the observations of other observers. An interesting drawing is reproduced, showing the child's phantasy of faecal birth, and some observations are made concerning an attempt to establish relations with a love-object on the basis of her masochistic tendencies and anal-erotism.

Robert M. Riggall.



GENERAL

Bronislaw Malinowski. Psycho-Analysis and Anthropology. *Psyche*, 1924, Vol. IV, p. 293.

In this article, which is part of a larger publication on *The Sexual Life of Savages*, Malinowski outlines the nuclear complex in a matrilineal society hitherto unexplored. It is not correct to assume that the Œdipus complex is found in every savage or barbarous society, it must vary with the constitution of the family. The patriarchal family of modern civilization is compared with the matrilineal family of certain island communities in Melanesia. The Trobriand Islanders live in a social order in which kinship is reckoned through the mother, succession and inheritance only descending through the maternal line. The boy succeeds to the social position of the mother's brother, inheriting possessions from the maternal uncle instead of from the father. Owing to a strict taboo the boys and girls of the same mother are separated at an early age. The sexual development of the child differs from that present in civilized communities, and Malinowski failed to find any traces of sexual indecencies, interest in excretory functions or exhibitionism. There is no moral reprobation of infantile sexuality; small children play together in a sort of juvenile

republic, one of their main interests consisting of sexual pastimes. Thus the latency period of more civilized communities is absent. Repression is connected with submission to matriarchal tribal law and the prohibition of exogamy. In the Trobriands there is no friction between father and son, and the infantile craving for the mother spends itself naturally and spontaneously. The ambivalent attitude of veneration and dislike is felt between the man and his mother's brother, while repression of incestuous tendencies are connected only with the sister. In place of the usual Œdipus complex we find the wish to marry the sister and to kill the maternal uncle. From the foregoing the author claims to have established that Freud's views follow modifications brought about by various social constitutions. He thinks that these conclusions might amplify some of the Freudian formulæ in showing the correlation existing between biological and social influences: the universal existence of the Œdipus complex should not be assumed.

Robert M. Riggall.

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Alfred Carver. Primary Identification and Mysticism. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1924, Vol. IV, p. 102.

This study is based on the analysis of an alcoholic man aged thirty-eight, who had cultivated a mystical pantheism enabling him to feel in harmony with nature, which he personified as 'The Earth Angel.' Carver contends that the patient's mysticism is due to regression to an early time of life described by Burrow as the stage of primary subjective identification. Alcohol helped him to obtain 'direct throbbing communion with his mystical Earth-Angel'. The outstanding features of this case are his attitude towards his mother and his mysticism. Carver finds an explanation of these factors in Burrow's principle of primary identification, which is based on this observer's theory of the harmony existing between mother and foetus *in utero* and which persists in a modified form during early infancy. Ferenczi describes this as the stage of 'magical hallucinatory omnipotence'. Carver's case failed to reach the stage of object-investment, but continued fixed in the subjective mode of primary identification with the mother. During the stage of development of object-love and the Œdipus situation, disgust and hatred occurred towards the mother instead of love. The passive homosexual trends present in this case appear to be explained by Burrow's theory that unconscious homosexuality arises from primary identification with the mother which leads to auto-erotism and consequent love of the same sex. Following the suggestions of Burrow and Schroeder, the patient's strivings for mystical oneness with the universe are regarded as a regression to the subjective phase of existence *in utero*. Carver questions how far a neurosis should be regarded as sexual, and examines the motivation of sexual instincts found in urge and union: the first being entirely egoistic and the second associated with

altruistic relationships. If fixations occur in the primary subjective stage, which the author regards as pre-sexual, the wisdom of speaking of the resultant neurosis as sexual is questioned. He appears to regard the theses of Burrow and Schroeder as valuable additions to Freud's work.

Robert M. Riggall.

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J. C. Hill. Poetry and the Unconscious. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1924, Vol. IV, p. 125.

Examples of poems are quoted from the repertoire of a student of nineteen whose best work was created in a dissociated state. His conscious efforts lacked the true poetic quality and could have been as well expressed in prose. From this case the author concludes that a 'complex' is an important factor, both in the production and appreciation of a poem. Also that the poet does not always understand the meaning of his own poetry. The poem written in a hypnoidal condition, and later subjected by the poet to conscious criticism, frequently suffers from his censorship. The following example from the above-mentioned case is quoted as an illustration :

' There a sighing lane is turning
As a snake with drowsy coil
It probes into the ~~vaguies~~ shadows
As though seeking rainbow spoil.'

The beautiful word ('vaguies') coined by the poet, suggests much more than the substituted word 'shadows'.

Robert M. Riggall.

BOOK REVIEWS

Modern Theories of the Unconscious. By W. L. Northridge, M.A., Ph.D. Introduction by Professor J. Laird, M.A. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co, London, 1924. Pp. 194. Price 8s. 6d.)

Unlike most books by authors who have no personal experience of mental depths, this is a book that evokes the reader's respect. It is a serious attempt, undertaken soberly and dispassionately, to evaluate the numerous theories of the unconscious that have been put forward. The writer brings some valuable qualifications to his task: an extensive knowledge of the literature, though unfortunately with critical omissions in this respect, and a clear-mindedness, a sense of fairness, and an absence of prejudice not often met with in this turbulent field. He has evidently given some close thought to his subject, and he expresses his conclusions lucidly and dispassionately. On the other hand, there are two important lacks in his armamentarium: defective knowledge and, in our opinion, imperfect critical judgement. The first of these can, of course, be remedied; as to the second, we have no means of knowing. On the whole, therefore, the book strikes one as a product of immaturity and as having been prematurely written. It would certainly have been improved had the author had personal contact with actual workers in the field.

The book covers just the same ground as Levine's, which is not mentioned. Though fuller than the latter, it is not so sure and incisive. The first half is devoted to pre-analytical theories, and is much the better one; the second deals with psycho-analysis.

The author's imperfect critical powers show themselves, not only in his final conclusions, where after all the peculiarity of the subject would excuse much, but in other respects as well, notably in his lack of discrimination in regard to various writers. Thus, he deals adequately with Janet's work, but devotes a disproportionate space to that of Sidis (who, by the way, is spoken of in the present tense instead of in the past); Rivers obtains too extensive a hearing at the expense of Jung, essential features of whose theory are not expounded; Maeder's and Silberer's views should have received mention in a work having the purpose of the present one. Then there is a tendency to treat all passages found in psycho-analytical literature, from whomsoever they are, as equally authentic, which is unfortunately far from being justified; as a result, an extremely doubtful or badly expounded conclusion can be cited as 'what psycho-analysis says', no distinction being drawn between it and Freud's own writings.

As was indicated above, the author's reading, which is the essential source of his knowledge, appears to be much more extensive than intensive; he has covered a wide field, but often too superficially. For instance, since Freud's theory obviously inspired the work and is indeed its main

theme, one might reasonably have expected that a serious investigator, such as the author undoubtedly is, would not have felt competent to do it justice without at least reading through Freud's writings on the subject. Yet there is good reason to think that he cannot even read German. His references are confined to Freud's Lectures and the Interpretation of Dreams (with the exception of one to the Group Psychology). Although there is much talk of Freud's latest views, the latest one we can discover is on narcissism, and this is at least ten years old ; practically all Freud's later work is ignored, although much of it (especially the Metapsychology and *Das Ich und das Es*) have the most important bearings on the questions here raised. There is no reference even to Freud's important monograph entitled The Unconscious, and when one sees the name of the book this omission seems particularly unpardonable.

There are four chapters in the book. The first, largely condensed from Brett's masterly work, is perhaps the best in the book. It gives an admirably clear account of the speculations and theories on the unconscious from Plato to Ribot. It should have been clearly stated here, as indeed it is later on in the book (p. 127), that most of these, notably Leibnitz's, are really concerned with what nowadays would be called the subconscious or preconscious. The author is right in saying that 'from the Freudian point of view there is no early theory of the unconscious so important as that of Schopenhauer' (p. 11). A couple of errors occurring in this section will be noted later in a more appropriate context.

Chapter II is an excellent account of Myers' 'subliminal' theory. More than a passing mention should have been made of Dr. Mitchell's exhaustive review of the Doris Fischer case (not Fitscher, by the way), which is interestingly related here.

Chapter III, with the appropriate title 'The Theories of the Subconscious', gives a very clear account of the work and views of Janet (Binet is not mentioned in this connexion), Sidis, and Morton Prince ; we do not know a better review of the sort in the same space. But the chapter is marred by an altogether disproportionate exposition of the so-called New Nancy School, which is taken much too seriously. The author omits to point out that the writings of this 'School', well advertised as it is, contains not one novel idea, though many old ones are exploited afresh. On p. 68 the statement occurs, for which there is no warrant, that the influence of Bergson can be traced in psycho-analysis ; possibly the author is thinking here of Jung, but if so it should have been made clear.

In passing from the 'subconscious' theories to psycho-analysis the author controverts a statement made by the present reviewer to the effect that the development of the former was completely independent of Janet's work. The only evidence he brings forward is that 'Just before Freud originated his great system he paid a visit to Paris, where the work of Janet was well known. It is unthinkable that he should not have been

influenced by it' (p. 97). My statement, nevertheless, was quite correct. Freud went to Paris already in possession of knowledge about the mechanism of dissociation that transcended any to which Janet has even yet attained. Janet's work was not at that time well known in Paris (for the simple reason that it had not yet begun), nor was it twenty years later when I worked there myself, and I know from first hand that Freud never heard of it till much later. It must also be remembered that Janet's most brilliant work was done in a field, that of hysterical stigmata, which does not appear ever to have interested Freud. It is true that when writing ten years later on the subject of psychological dissociation he quotes Janet in support of this conception, then widely established, but none of his data or points of view are derived in the least from Janet.

There follows a presentable account of psycho-analysis, of course of a very elementary kind. The author rightly insists that, according to Freud, the unconscious contains important elements that have never been present in consciousness as well as those that have. If not always understanding, his attitude towards Freud's work is entirely sympathetic. He writes, for instance: 'He (*Freud*) makes it plain that he gives us no preconceived theory, but one that was suggested by the study of normal and abnormal mental states. This, in my opinion, is the great merit of Freud's theory—it is based on facts and endeavours to be true to them' (pp. 123, 124). He then describes the views of Adler, Jung, and Rivers. Of the latter three he evidently tends to favour Jung. Though he dismisses his conception of a 'collective unconscious' as being unnecessary because the facts in question can otherwise be accounted for, he considers Jung's method of dream interpretation to be 'more practical' than Freud's. Both, however, have their dangers: with Freud the patient may be unduly influenced by suggestion, while Jung's method 'opens the way far too much to freedom of speculation' (p. 155). This rather contradictory conclusion would seem to indicate a lack of close thinking at this point, and the author has never grasped (or probably even read) the real criticisms that psychoanalysts have made of Jung's 'method' and conclusions. He is quite taken in by the fallacy in what he calls Jung's 'unanswerable argument' about the right to take anything he likes as symbolical in dreams (p. 154). He has evidently no clear idea of what is meant in psycho-analysis by symbolism, and even uses the term in such a general sense as to make the mistake of saying that, according to Freud, 'ideas of a painful character are not permitted to enter consciousness except in symbolical form' (p. 129).

On the subject of heredity the author makes some unwarranted statements, e.g. that in the production of mental trouble Freud assigns to it a very insignificant rôle as compared with post-natal experiences (p. 114). Though Freud pointed out that infantile experiences are important in addition to the hereditary and current ones, he has never underestimated the importance of the others, though he is bound to admit that our present

knowledge, or rather ignorance, concerning the hereditary factors do not as yet permit any comparison being made of their relative importance. It is thus untrue to say that 'Jung recognizes to a much greater extent than Freud the power of heredity in influencing the course of later life' (p. 143); it is simply that Jung neglects the infantile factors. To judge from the constant stress Freud lays on the child's predetermined reaction to various experiences, and his evident inclination to believe that ontogenetic reactions tend to repeat phylogenetic ones, it would appear that he attaches an exceedingly high significance to heredity.

The author becomes seriously perplexed over the question of the formal content of the unconscious, almost certainly for subjective reasons. First he makes the mistake of saying that, according to Freud, the unconscious is practically non-cognitive (p. 17), a view the following passage (written in connexion with Prince's work) shows he himself favours: 'Either the marginal elements of consciousness are ideas dimly lighted up by consciousness or they are not ideas at all. The latter view seems to me the more likely' (p. 93). Then, not having read Freud's monograph on the unconscious, he cannot make out whether the unconscious is or is not supposed to contain affects or emotions, and questions whether conations rather than affects would not be the more appropriate term by which to describe it (pp. 134-136). As other writers seem to experience the same difficulty, perhaps the following statement of the matter may be made here. Freud holds the primal unconscious process to be essentially conative, an impulse of instinctual origin which has been aroused by some stimulus. This is probably always represented in ideational form (*Triebrepräsenz* is Freud's favourite expression here), so that an idea is but the spear-head, so to speak, of the impulse; Freud, of course, holds that ideas are richly present in the unconscious, but that they differ from those present in the preconscious or conscious mind in the interesting respect of being concrete conceptions of things or acts without any verbal investment, whereas in the other mental layers they are clothed in word forms. No one believes that emotions, in the proper sense of the term, occur in the unconscious, while as to affects one may say that the unavoidable term 'an unconscious affect' is a periphrasis for 'an affect that would arise were the impulse in question not inhibited in the unconscious'.

In the author's final critical chapter on 'Conclusions', which is much weaker than his expository ones, the goodwill and partial insight that have sustained him so far now desert him, and he ends in a position that is not easy to distinguish from that of academic psychology. It begins, it is true, with the remark that 'we regard the theory of Freud and his school as the most important of all the theories of the unconscious' (p. 173), but 'It is to be accepted, however, with certain restrictions and modifications' (p. 174). It will be seen, however, that these 'modifications' remove almost the whole of the psycho-analytical theory.

His main criticism would appear to be that psycho-analysts neglect the importance of consciousness, by confining it to a rationalizing function. (It is of course true that psycho-analysis dethrones consciousness from its previously unchallenged position, but the author has evidently not grasped what, according to psycho-analysis, is the actual function of consciousness.) 'It reasons and feels and wills and can do so independently of the influences and motives of the unconscious, otherwise what are we to make of psycho-analysis itself?' (p. 179). He would then appear to rob the unconscious of any definite mental content. 'To speak of "the unconscious" is quite intelligible, for this means those states or processes of which, as a matter of fact, we are not conscious. But to suggest that there can be ideas, emotions, wishes, fears, etc., of which we are unconscious sounds contradictory. "Ideas", "emotions" and other such terms imply consciousness, and the phrase "unconscious ideas" amounts, therefore, to "unconscious consciousness"'. . . . 'There cannot possibly be "unconscious ideas" or "unconscious wishes" unless what introspection reveals to us of our conscious process is hopelessly astray' (pp. 180, 181). What, then, is there left in the unconscious? According to our author, nothing but various mental dispositions or traces or tendencies. These consist of (1) impressions left from early emotions, (2) the meaning of certain tendencies. But 'it is surely wrong to describe the hidden or unknown meaning of a conscious tendency by such terms as "unconscious ideas", "unconscious wishes", and the like' (p. 189), and (3) forbidden tendencies which become sublimated and therefore disappear altogether from the unconscious (if so, how is regression to be explained?) and similar tendencies that once were conscious; 'It is the impulses that are driven from consciousness and yet have not found an outlet in sublimated activities that form the most important factors of the unconscious; but they exist unconsciously as tendencies or dispositions, not as ideas or wishes' (p. 190).

We see that the author gives handsomely with the one hand what he takes away with the other, for, although at one moment everything seems definitely to be removed from the unconscious, there nevertheless remains enough to satisfy most psycho-analysts. It would be hard to explain this antinomy were it not a familiar manifestation of an ambivalent attitude. The author, in fact, presents us with a pretty example of a man displaying no prejudices in the proper sense of the word, but manifesting important resistances of which he is quite unaware. Let us look further at this other side of the picture, for if the formal aspects of Freud's theory are thus treated we may expect more when it is a question of the actual content.

The author admits that *some* dreams contain wish-fulfilments, but this was known long before Freud; to prove this, he quotes a literary passage relating to the fulfilment of *conscious* wishes. 'It does not follow, however, that we are to interpret all dreams as wish-fulfilments' (p. 175)—no other

argument is given. The same applies to other Freudian conclusions. 'Similarly with the treatment of everyday mistakes and other "symptomatic" acts. Because some mistakes have been explained as "compromise formations" we have no right to generalize to the extent of holding that all are such, and if unconscious attachments to the father or mother are found to be at the root of some instances of neurotic trouble, we are not to rule out the possibility that other factors may sometimes provide the correct ætiology' (*loc. cit.*). As for infantile amnesia: 'No special explanation of much of this forgetting seems to be required. It is simply the rule to forget' (p. 186).

The author's levelling tendency, however, and his lack of what might be called a *dimensional perspective in psychology* is best illustrated by the following example. Quoting Rivers with approval, he admits that sexual factors may play a part in mental trouble, but denies 'that these are always the real cause of the neurosis': 'Let us describe a case which we have recently attempted to analyze with a large measure of success and which has led us to the conclusion we have just expressed' (p. 165). This patient was seen altogether six times, for half an hour to an hour once a week. Her symptoms, evidently connected with death thoughts, were relieved when she emotionally related the conscious memory of her sister's death when she was between six and seven. (The improvement presumably resulted from the transference and sanction due to the analyst's belief in the primary nature of the grief.) Comment on the right of founding conclusions on such an 'analysis,' and regarding them as overthrowing the thirty years of Freud's intensive work, is surely as unnecessary as on the following passage: 'May not the general nervousness and sensitiveness, characteristic of those who later fall victims to mental illness, be due to unwise teaching, and especially to the relating of too many weird ghost stories, all too common in the nursery book?' (p. 169). In no other subject than psychology could one find such *naïveté* coexisting with the acumen displayed elsewhere in the same book.

We would suggest to the author that he correct the following errors in any future edition. It is not true that in the last analysis Freud explains all wishes in terms of sex (p. 13). Freud did not investigate the case of Frau Anna O together with Breuer, or otherwise (p. 99). We have never heard of patients being asked to close their eyes during analysis (p. 115). It is not Freud's opinion that every dream originates in the unconscious (p. 132): he holds, on the contrary, that no dream originates there (but in the preconscious), and, further, that some dreams have nothing to do with the unconscious. Nor does he hold that every dream contains sexual material as its basal elements (p. 154). And the author is not, as he thinks, in disaccord with Freud's conception of the unconscious in 'advocating the view that it may consist in any tendencies that are subject to repression, and not merely those that are sexual' (p. 179).

The German *Zensur* means 'censorship', not 'censor' (*passim*), and surely 'preconscious' is preferable to the hybrid 'foreconscious'!

The index to the book is very inadequate, and the bibliographical references are carelessly compiled, even the author's name being omitted with many of them.

We have been obliged to point out the serious defects of this ambivalent book, but will close with some passages taken from the last page where the other side of the ambivalence once more gains the upper hand, let us hope finally. 'In conclusion, whatever be the fate of the Freudian theory as it now stands, there can be no doubt that Freud's psychology has enabled us to understand and explain life to an extent that was not previously possible'. . . . 'Freud is right when he asks those who pour scorn on psycho-analysis to put it to the test for themselves and they will understand its value. We have found this to be true'. . . . 'Thus, in our opinion, the greatest service that the modern study of the unconscious has rendered is that it has furnished us with a new point of view from which to study human life and conduct' (p. 192).

E. J.

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Love in Children and its Aberrations. By Oskar Pfister. Translated from the German by Eden and Cedar Paul. (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1924. Pp. 576. Price 24s.)

This large volume, which might almost be termed an encyclopædic account of emotional development in the child and adolescent, has as its aim, in the author's words, 'to show the general relationships of the development of love, to explain how desirable ends can be attained, and how necessary changes can be effected': and again, to make 'the assured and fruitful results of the modern study of unconscious mentation, and of the importance of the unconscious in mental development, accessible to the general reader'. Pfister adds that he has resolved to present these matters 'in as popular a vein as the subject permitted', and certainly he has accomplished his aim. His style and treatment are simple, straightforward, and as free from technical terms as is possible: he illustrates at every point from the most varied and interesting material, always drawing upon his own wide experience as an educator, a pastor, and a practising analyst, and he reveals throughout a sympathy, wise and deep, for humanity in all its stages and aspects. He divides the volume, after the plan of the work is detailed and a Survey of the History of the Problem is made, into three sections, as follows: Part One, 'The Normal and Abnormal Development of Love in Children'; Part Two, 'Formative Forces and Experiences'; Part Three, 'The Training of Love in Children and the Treatment of Love's Disorders'; and finally, after a concluding chapter which sums up very vividly the outstanding ideas already dealt with in much detail, an excellent bibliography completes the volumes.

It will be realized from these titles how wide is the range of the book, and how serious is Pfister's purpose and attitude: indeed, there is much to be studied here by the educator, the doctor, the parent, and above all by those who still know little of psycho-analytical theory, or misunderstand what they have heard about it. Specially to be noted are two sections entitled, 'What Psycho-Analysis is not' and 'The Concept and the Aims of Psycho-Analysis' (Part Three, Section B, pp. 510-518): these chapters should do much to answer the distorted views of, and ill-informed criticism against, the Freudian theory. Another interesting section is the one entitled 'The Educational Aim of the Psycho-Analyst' (pp. 527-530), in which Pfister shows himself cautious and modest in his claims for psycho-analysis: 'We must avoid exaggerated hopes. First of all, let me insist that it is extravagant to represent psycho-analysis as in itself an integral philosophy. Nor can psycho-analysis be regarded as a panacea for developmental errors' (p. 543). He unsparingly states many of the grave difficulties in the way of successful treatment, but with realization of such difficulties, he is still able to write: 'Despite these limitations, there remain vast possibilities of good open to curative psycho-analysis. It is obvious that the experience gained in curative education can be turned to account for prophylactic purposes. We arrive at a new education, which reaches out into the unconscious, and thus comes to the help of the traditional education, the education of the conscious, which has long been stagnant. *The pedagogy of the future will unite both these trends, the education of the conscious and the education of the unconscious, to form an integral whole*' (p. 550).

The value and weight of Pfister's volume has been noted, but it is essential to add that some of its characteristics do call for criticism. Perhaps the two most striking of such features are the following: first, that psycho-analysis is treated throughout (if not always in actual words, yet in suggestion) as an ethical instrument, having an ethical purpose, rather than as a science investigating the phenomena of mind and personality. Pfister has, of course, his own outlook and his own beliefs, but these cannot be treated as part of psycho-analysis. There is a very strong disposition throughout the book to classify as superior (or 'higher') and inferior (or 'lower') different human manifestations, and then to demonstrate that psycho-analysis will always lead out to the 'superior' development, with a repudiation of 'inferior' impulses. Even if it were so, this is not the function of psycho-analysis, whose work is investigation, the tracing of connexions, and the history of the development of one kind of emotion and activity into new forms; not moral judgment or ethical valuation. Pfister sometimes seems to be concerned with the latter processes at the expense of the former: for instance, we are never shown clearly the relation between more primitive sexual impulses and sublimated developments from these former, nor the course of the latter's evolution. He

deals with sublimation itself (pp. 527 *et seq.*) but gives a discourse on the ethical value of it, and its work in creating higher types of men and women who will evolve a nobler type of earthly life, rather than a description of the mechanisms of sublimations and the best psychological conditions for its effective working—which things are the all-important aspects to be understood and demonstrated. Perhaps this is in part due to Pfister's view of sublimation and indeed of the whole analytic process: which leads to the second somewhat inevitable criticism. Throughout the book the suggestion is conveyed, in many various ways and in spite of the expression of complete agreement with Freud's theories, that successful analysis largely consists of a conscious change of attitude on the part of the patient owing to his *understanding* of hitherto unknown psychic elements. Needless to say, Pfister deals with transference and stresses its importance (he quotes Freud's own saying that the transference is the battlefield upon which the contest between the conflicting forces in the patient is fought out) and the difficulties it creates for analyst and patient (pp. 533–536). Yet, in reference to the love or hate manifestations projected upon the analyst, he writes as follows: 'The false attitude towards some object of previous experience is now assumed towards the analyst. There has been progress in so far as in the conscious there has been a breaking away from the previous object: but the cure is incomplete, for in the unconscious the undesirable fixation persists. *By explaining the illusion we unloose the new neurotic bond. . . . The love is then sublimated to friendship. . . . The breaking away from the analyst is usually facilitated by the direction of the analysand's thoughts towards inspiring and ideal activities*'. (Italics are reviewer's.) Such a passage surely does give a handle for a charge often laid, in misunderstanding, against the analytic process: namely, that it professes to cure by explaining to the patient what is amiss with him, and encouraging him subsequently to alter his attitude: the reference to love being 'sublimated to friendship' can imply nothing else, and it must be submitted that this is a perfectly misleading and incorrect use of the term 'sublimation,' which is always, in Freud's sense, an *unconscious* process. It seems that Pfister is often confusing the psycho-analytic process with a re-educative process which doubtless can, and should, play a part in the treatment, though it cannot be substituted for the former.

These points are put forward because it is desirable that a book which can give so much enlightenment to parents and educators should not afford opportunities for misunderstanding or hostile criticism.

Barbara Low.

Psycho-Analysts Analysed. By P. McBride, M.D., F.R.C.P.E., F.R.S.E. With Introduction by Sir H. Bryan Donkin, M.D. (Oxon.), F.R.C.P. (Heinemann, London, 1924. Pp. 142. Price 3s. 6d.)

The Introduction to this book is nearly a sixth of the length of the text proper and, as the point of view of both writers appears to be identical, the two may be considered together. The first question that naturally arises in regard to a book purporting to be a critical study of a branch of science is what qualifications the writers possess for undertaking it. Their names are certainly not known among students of psycho-analysis. From reference to the Medical Directory we learn that Dr. McBride is a throat specialist who obtained his medical qualification in 1876; Sir Bryan Donkin, who obtained his in 1873, was a children's specialist, but in his introduction he tells us that he retired from private medical practice twenty-five years ago. Further inquiry, however, is rendered unnecessary by the authors themselves, both of whom make categorical statements on the matter in uneasy anticipation that the question of competence may be raised. Sir Bryan Donkin quite truly says that most analysts protest that no one without personal experience of the subject is competent to pronounce judgement on the problems involved, but his only reply to this criticism—one which is surely universally valid in science—is that 'Such an attitude . . . is manifestly sophistical—a mere gesture of retreat in avoidance of forced surrender' (p. 3). Later on (p. 11) he writes: 'Psycho-analysts teach that beginners in the practice of this cult must proceed with confidence in its principles, and that the patient, in order to attain success, must always be ready and willing to undergo the necessary examination and follow the doctor's directions. It is impossible to understand why it is necessary that the theory of psycho-analysis, purporting to be based on a scientific discovery of the first importance, should, alone among all other scientific studies, demand on the part of all inquirers a preliminary conviction of its soundness before any examination has been undertaken to test its truth'. In what branch of medicine, it may be asked, is it advantageous that the patient should *not* be ready to be examined and treated, and in what branch (? surgery) is it desirable for the beginner in practice *not* to have confidence in its principles? We fail to see any connexion between the obvious truisms in the first sentence of this passage and the quite false innuendo in the second.

Dr. McBride is equally emphatic that investigation of a subject is a superfluous preliminary to forming conclusions about it. He starts with the calm assumption that 'each one of us presumably can analyse his own mind' (as, presumably, each one of us can without external assistance or without acquiring any technique whatever examine his own heart, lungs, bladder, or stomach), an assumption which, if true, would surely render superfluous the existence of psychiatrists or clinical psychologists. The question at issue, whether any thoughts exist outside the field of conscious-

ness, is settled by the *dictum* 'To us it seems highly improbable that such memories as the analysts unearth have ever been really forgotten' (p. 133). Indeed, it actually reflects on the character of anyone who prefers to investigate the matter before coming to any conclusion and who chooses what would seem the most honest method, namely, of making the experiment on themselves. Such inquirers 'have to begin by revealing to another all they hold most secret and most sacred. It sounds uncommonly like martyrdom, and to us it seems that those who are able to carry it through conscientiously must have characters of a peculiar type' (*loc. cit.*).

How is this to be reconciled with the statement elsewhere that 'enlightened medicine entirely refuses to take anything on trust in its own sphere, and demands that every new remedy shall be subjected to critical examination before it is believed in' (p. 90)? Yet on the same page Dr. McBride likens psycho-analysis to 'a religion which admittedly (!) cannot be subjected to logical proof' and describes it as 'a cult among medical men which demands from its followers a faith apparently as blind as was ever exacted by priest or Church'.

Renouncing investigation, therefore, the authors adopt the attitude of the opponents of vivisection, of vaccination, and of bacteriology in general, maintaining that all that is necessary to form a judgement is a little casual reading, and evidently a very little at that. There remains still the possibility that they can read on this delicate subject with balance and understanding, without allowing their apprehension to be emotionally disturbed. As will be shown, however, even this is not so.

We may begin with a point small in itself, but symptomatic of the whole. In describing psycho-analysis, Dr. McBride devotes what is perhaps a disproportionate space to an account of Breuer's case of Frau Anna O, no doubt because he believes that Freud evolved the method of psycho-analysis from this basis (p. 21). To fortify this, or for some reason that does not appear, he insists that Freud also examined the case, though few facts in the development of psycho-analysis can be more familiar to readers of the literature than that Freud never saw the patient and did not even hear of her until years after the treatment was carried out. In itself the point is, of course, quite unimportant, but what is to be thought of the emotional state of a man who cannot read such a simple matter without being impelled to distort and invent?

We have now to draw up a much more sweeping indictment. Incredible as it would appear to those unaccustomed to 'criticism' of psycho-analysis, the greater part of this book is taken up with fighting phantoms, with disparaging psycho-analysts for holding a belief which not one of them has ever held. The feeling on the point is so intense that the accusation in question is never very clearly defined, and it took some careful reading to ascertain what precisely it was. Both authors fulminate against some frightful heresy, some 'unproven assumption' that constitutes the false

basis of all Freud's mistaken theories, which they term his belief in a 'dynamic psyche'. At first we were puzzled to know what was so very wicked about this, for we have never come across anyone who could conceive of a psyche that wasn't 'dynamic'. Then it dawned on us from the comparison of various contexts that both authors appear to be under the strange misapprehension that Freud believes the mind to be independent of the body, to be an entity acting on its own in space. Odd as this appears, we can come to no other conclusion after observing the intense anxiety, evinced throughout the book, to prove that the mind is related to the brain, and from numerous passages such as the following: 'The conception of "psyche" is barren; its introduction serves only to magnify word-play and increase confusion' (p. 7); 'It is indeed the question of the connexion between brain and mind which really lies at the bedrock of the whole discussion of the matter of psycho-analysis' (p. 10); 'the position of psycho-analysts in assuming a "psyche" or non-material principle of life and mind' (*loc. cit.*); 'This author (*Freud*), as we have mentioned in a previous chapter, assumes the existence of a psychic energy and endows it with dynamic properties. After considering the facts brought to light in the last chapter, we must admit that this proposition does not seem to have any support sufficient to justify its acceptance as a premiss. Indeed it is so improbable that it is difficult to account for its adoption by various writers on psycho-analysis on any other assumption than that it is necessary in order to make their position tenable' (p. 79). We feel almost ashamed at having to contradict this absurdity by stating that—in this respect at least—Freud is as orthodoxly medical as the two authors themselves; by referring to his categorical statement that no fact is better established than the relationship between mind and brain; to his constant insistence of the inter-relation between mind and body in general (one instance: his view that syphilis in the parents predisposes to mental—psychoneurotic—disturbance in the offspring); to his expectation that his psychological findings will one day be expressed in terms of physiological chemistry; and by pointing out that no man has done more than Freud to bring into convergence the disciplines of physiology and psychology in founding the latter on a theory of the instincts, the organic basis of which has surely never been disputed.

If the mind as a whole fares thus badly at the authors' hands, their indignation may be imagined at the idea of an unconscious mind. Naturally this is inconceivable to them and therefore does not exist. Their objections are so trite, unoriginal and empty of real content that we do not propose to repeat here what has so often been dealt with at length; the most exhaustive justification of the conception, both theoretically and practically, is, of course, Freud's well-known essay on the subject (*Collected Papers*, Vol. IV). Sir Bryan Donkin, it is true, has the hardihood to say that 'no serious attempt has been made by leading psycho-analysts to

defend the validity of their fundamental postulate of the " Unconscious Mind " ' (p. 2), and we must charitably suppose him to be simply ignorant of psycho-analytical literature. But, one asks, what makes such a man, aware of his ignorance on the point, prefer to state that no discussion of the subject exists rather than to adopt the simple expedient of addressing a postcard to some one who would enlighten him ? Indeed, if this obvious device had been adopted, the authors would have been saved the trouble of writing the greater part of the book.

It is impossible to do more than touch on the numerous other ' criticisms ' of psycho-analysis. When we are criticized for our acceptance of determinism, we are wont to reply that in this we differ in no way from any other scientific workers ; here, however, we learn to our astonishment that psycho-analysts ' appear to regard the deterministic philosophy as something peculiarly appertaining to themselves ' (p. 4). Dreams are due to fortuitous excitation of brain cells, and have neither meaning nor importance ; after repeating *dicta* to this effect several times, Dr. McBride suddenly adds ' Our reasons for this view have just been stated.' Infantile sexuality is, of course, preposterous, and the belief in its existence (or, rather, ' the view that early years are necessarily stained (!) by sexual impulses of any kind ' (p. 78)) comes about merely from starting with a ' theory ' on the subject ; how anyone could have started with a ' theory ' about anal erotism before actually coming across it passes our wit to imagine. There is no *statistical* proof of the therapeutic advantages of analysis, and Sir Bryan Donkin has seen ' many instances of harm ' done by it ; naturally, he does not specify either the kind of cases or the harm. The old bogies about transference, cost, and unwarrantable time appear once more.

The only passages justifying the title of the book are some in which Dr. McBride suggests that psycho-analysts belong to a special ' type of mentality which renders the whole-hearted acceptance of unproven doctrines possible ' (p. 95). They are very susceptible and impressionable ; ' Men of this sort are often inclined to mysticism and perhaps too ready to believe what is presented to them in a plausible and forceful way. When this happens they may hesitate to apply to the statements of others such critical faculties as they possess, or, it may be, that nature has denied them such faculties ' (p. 93). He makes great play with the present reviewer's essay on the anal character and sums up ' if it is merely conjectured and incapable of proof ' (which he obviously believes), ' then it ought not to have been brought forward as a contribution to medical literature, and to have done so shows a laxness of mentality and an absence of self-criticism which is strongly suggestive of an unscientific mind ' (p. 102). We should have thought that a far-reaching scepticism of much of what is taken for granted in ordinary life is a good deal more characteristic of psycho-analysts than credulity or mysticism, but the matter is obviously too personal to pursue along these lines.

Sir Bryan Donkin enthusiastically lauds his partner in this undertaking for his 'dispassionate fairness.' That is as it may be. That this 'fairness' has cost him an effort of self-control appears from the following passage, which refers to his omitting certain criticisms: 'On reflection he has, however, decided to leave his readers to draw unaided such inferences as may occur to them lest he should be led to transgress the canons of good taste which should guide every author in his discussion of the writings of another' (p. 105). We applaud this fine sentiment and are happy to think that we are not in a like predicament; for we find it possible to describe Dr. McBride's book quite simply as being, in our opinion, superfluous.

E. J.



The Artist and Psycho-Analysis. By Roger Fry. (Hogarth Press, London, 1924. Pp. 20. Price 2s. 6d.)

The contents of this brochure constituted a paper read last year before the British Psychological Society. It is concerned much more with art than with psycho-analysis and the author's incursions into the latter field have evidently not carried him very far. He expounds, with the clear insight we should expect from such a distinguished artist and student of æsthetics, the view, that is now becoming almost orthodox in art circles, to the effect that æsthetic appreciation is highly peculiar in its nature, and must be carefully distinguished from the numerous emotional appeals made by most works of art in virtue of more or less extraneous associations. He points out, quite correctly, that psycho-analysis so far has concerned itself far more with the latter group of emotions than with the former and sympathetically asks for further investigation into the nature and meaning of what he would call pure artistic feeling. As the present reviewer intends to deal with this subject shortly, taking Mr. Fry's paper as a text, further comments on this interesting brochure may be deferred for the moment.

E. J.



The Re-creating of the Individual. By Beatrice M. Hinkle, M.D. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1924. Pp. 465. Price 18s. net.)

Amongst the qualifications necessary for the production of treatises on popular psychology a flair for seductive, if somewhat awe-inspiring, titles seems to rank very highly indeed. But in justice to Dr. Hinkle, it must be added that at the very outset she endeavours to allay any trepidation which scrutiny of her title page may arouse. She is at pains to assure us that no attempt has been made to hold words to one particular meaning; and when, on the following page, she refers to psychic disturbances for which she can give 'no other name than soul sickness', the comforting thought arises that if at times her exposition induces perplexity, it is a state of mind which is shared on occasion by the authoress herself.

This tranquil elasticity in the use of terms is slightly shaken on page 4 ; Dr. Hinkle assures us, and we would be the last to contradict her, that Freudians will deny that her work can be called psycho-analysis at all. Nevertheless she claims the right to employ this term, and in view of her earlier reassurances as to the meaning of words, it would be churlish to say her nay. Now scattered throughout at least two-thirds of this book we find copious allusions to Freudian psychology, and the second chapter is devoted to a discussion of the ' Freudian sexual interpretation '. Here at any rate an opportunity exists for quotation of unequivocal terminology, but a glance at the references is sufficient to show that the endeavour has over-taxed the resources of the compiler. In a volume published in 1924 the most recent reference to Freud's writings is an isolated quotation from a paper first translated in 1922 ; apart from this the references are drawn almost entirely from the introductory lectures delivered in 1915-17. One can hardly assume that the translator of Jung's *Psychology of the Unconscious* has been hampered by linguistic difficulties in obtaining access to the literature of the subject, but the omission of any reference to Freud's work on ego-psychology is in itself a sufficient commentary on Dr. Hinkle's title to be taken seriously.

In one sense the opening chapter is a remarkable achievement : setting out with the avowed aim of tracing the development of the individual in terms of analytical psychology the writer carries us right to the end of the chapter without any of the awkward casualties incident to a plain description of actual mechanisms. The reason for this becomes apparent in the first few pages of the second chapter dealing with infantile sexuality, i.e. with an actual description of certain instinctual activities and the part they play in the development of the individual. The writer believes that such an examination can be profitable only when made in a spirit free from prejudice and forthwith falls foul of the analytic view of the part played by the anal stage in ego and libido development. This after all is quite in keeping with the popular view and deserves no special comment. It is a different matter, however, when we find the writer attributing to Jones the view that a sexual fixation on the act of defæcation lays the foundation of *all* future character traits. Apart from being a manifest misstatement, this surely gives some indication of the writer's unconscious attitude ; it is in fact another example of that ' unwitting honesty ' to which Freud has so often referred. Infantile sexuality is clearly the rub.

Just how fundamental the difficulty is may be gathered from the following chapter. After a somewhat garbled account of different views on the nature of the unconscious, which, in so far as it relates to Freud's teaching, would have been immeasurably more accurate had the writer been content with abstracting Freud's own description (published 1915), Dr. Hinkle gets into difficulties on her own account. The problem of inter-relation of different psychic systems she simply gives up, taking refuge in

Jung's differentiation of collective and personal unconscious. It is in fact the logical continuation of the tendency of the previous chapter, and constitutes the next step in the flight from the implications of infantile sexuality and the part played by the Œdipus complex in the mechanism of repression.

A few obstacles remain, but these are easily brushed aside in the succeeding chapter. With the help of the 'prospective tendency' in dream interpretation and a reading of symbolism which might be described as retrospective expurgation, escape from any embarrassing investigation of the individual's development is assured. The deliverance is celebrated by an obviously enjoyable plunge into 115 pages of descriptive psychology. For those who are fretted by any attempt to deal with character formation in terms of ego and libido development, this chapter on type-psychology must be like unto the balm of Gilead. Those on the contrary who are interested in psychogenesis will search in vain for any reference to the subject-matter of the previous controversial chapters. There are, it is true, occasional faint echoes of former unhappy strife, as when the Œdipus complex is sometimes mentioned, but on these occasions it is forthwith decked out in more seemly terminology. On occasion homosexuality is referred to, but in a reassuring way, e.g. p. 227: 'In the case just mentioned no definite homosexual tendency was exhibited, but a certain mild ideal relation to other youths of his own type was recognized by himself to have a tinge of this character'. It is a chapter full of comfort for prospective patients who are apprehensive about psychological treatment, since it soon becomes evident from a perusal of case-histories that the re-creating of the individual is going to be effected in a spirit of chatty impeccability.

A characteristic reaction now sets in: having expurgated the history of individual development the writer gravitates back to masculine and feminine psychology, needless to say re-introducing the Œdipus complex as a 'symbol'. The reaction persists through the following chapter on the psychology of the artist where we are familiarized with the conceptions of 'psychic coitus', 'higher synthesis', etc.

At long last we come to the process of reintegration of the individual, but first of all it is necessary to get rid of such inconvenient obstacles as are involved in an understanding of different forms of psychoneuroses. This is soon accomplished. The process itself then begins with a detailed anamnesis and a preliminary discussion of personal weaknesses, etc., to obtain a general intimate view of the 'totality' of the individual. The patient gains objective insight and transference commences: the analyst becomes a symbol for the patient. Resistances arise and are reduced, inactive psychic functions emerge and we reach the end of the chapter.

In two respects the book illustrates the working of the pleasure-pain principle. Those familiar with the writings of Helen Hope will recognise that comfortable discursiveness of the 'heart to heart' school whereby more unseasonable psychic motivations are glossed over. But a more

significant tendency is apparent. Psychology has not yet recovered from the wounds inflicted on its self-esteem by the findings of psycho-analysis, and Dr. Hinkle is undoubtedly an expert at applying the salve of 'analytical psychology' to the smart. She has done her work well, and although it may not reach the wider circle open to the journalist, it will nevertheless make, in every sense of the term, a popular appeal.

Edward Glover.

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The Psychology of Self-Consciousness. By Julia Turner, B.A. (Lond.). (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1923. Pp. 243.)

This 'little book', to use the oft-repeated diminutive of the authoress, comprises simple instruction on electricity, innocuous interpretations of 'quaint' phantasies (such as a father with his head in the fire) and 'charming' dreams (the back view of a nude woman), together with an exposition of a new hypothesis of anxiety. There is expression of a debt of gratitude to Professor Freud. For this indebtedness see extracts in the *Glossarial Index*, II—an indebtedness also to Dr. Jones. But the actual text of the book is free from it. It seems that Professor Freud has overlooked 'the seemingly trifling distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness.' Miss Turner has not overlooked it, and so can apply a key whereby 'dream analysis becomes a means of unlocking many of the problems which have long defied human speculation'.

The 'perceptual' level of consciousness we are told we share in common with animals. On this level sexuality is a fact. That which differentiates us from animals is that we are also self-conscious, i.e. 'conceptual subjects.' 'Reality' for a 'perceptual' subject is a *symbol* of reality for the 'conceptual subject' (p. 26). Therefore (p. 41), 'sexuality is the first, last, and greatest symbol for the "conceptual" subject'. Likewise 'all sensory dream elements are symbolic . . . to give the illusion that sexuality and its symbolism are to be taken literally is to undo the work of ages of human experience' (p. 87). The 'dream is the stronghold of ethical life' (p. 151). Dream and conceptual levels concern themselves only with sex as a symbol. The reality of sex belongs only to consciousness (perceptual level). For the writer the symbol is the thing. The reason can be found on page 46: 'Sexuality therefore is feared in every form and guise, even when legitimate'.

The literal problem of sex is thus shelved and the way is clear for a development of a new hypothesis of anxiety. Even here the initial trauma of life (birth) is omitted. It seems that anxiety is the conflict between the power wish (life hunger) and expiation (desire to sacrifice). These conflicting forces in *symbols* of sexuality represent maleness and femaleness. The way to 'perfecting life' (p. 201) is 'the unification of power and expiation (corresponding to marriage), with the resultant emergence of the soul (rebirth: corresponding to child-bearing)'.

'Conceptual' life involves (p. 135) 'loss of immediate power as a perceptual subject'. But all is well, for on page 135 we find 'the New Life brings a new power; its weapons and its tools are spiritual.'

Page 194: 'Sexuality dare not be debased into a mere biologic function.' The 'concept' that biologic function is debasing is the product of the 'conceptual' not the 'perceptual!'. On page 123: 'It may or may not be a fact that the subject was better fitted to accept the rôle of wife and mother. What is certain is that the phantasies show conceptual progress'. 'Fitted to accept the rôle of wife and mother!'. That consummation attained, the patient's conceptual life would give no uneasiness to a Freudian practitioner. The book ends with a quasi-religious interpretation of Flecker's *Gates of Damascus*. Miss Gosse, who writes it, says, 'To no one is a gateway nothing but a hole in a wall'. Least of all to a Freudian is a 'gateway *nothing but*'. The issues of life and death go through it—biologically and psychically. Reconciliation to it on the 'perceptual' no less than on the 'conceptual' level is the only solution of anxiety.

Ella Freeman Sharpe.



Psycho-Analysis and the Drama. By Smith Ely Jelliffe, M.D. and Louise Brink, A.B. (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 34. Price \$3.)

In their Introduction the authors state that 'the drama releases the feeling into an intuitive freedom with itself far more profoundly effective than mere intellectual understanding of the dramatized situation. Then it enlists these released impulses in a new synthesis for a higher sublimation'. They then proceed to say how the drama can supplement and, perhaps, be a substitute for psycho-analytic treatment.

A number of plays (*Magic, Eyes of Youth, Peter Ibbetson, Redemption, The Army with Banners, The Willow Tree, The Yellow Jacket, Dear Brutus, and The Jest*) are examined psycho-analytically; the complexes are pointed out and the underlying conflicts revealed.

Eric Hiller.



Psycho-Analysis and Æsthetics. By Charles Baudouin. Translated from the French by Eden and Cedar Paul. (Allen & Unwin, London, 1924. Pp. 328. Price 16s.)

In the Preface the translators claim for this book that it 'is an application of psycho-analysis to the theory of æsthetics as illustrated by a detailed study of Verhaeren's works'. The 'interpretation Freud has supplied for dreams Baudouin achieves for the imagery of the artistic creator.' *Psycho-Analysis and Æsthetics* solves the 'riddle of artistic appreciation'. Baudouin 'claims no merit for having brought our analysis to so satis-

factory a conclusion and for having found so faithful an expression of Verhaeren's personal life in the manifold symbols we encounter in his work'. These impressive statements in the Preface and the author's satisfaction in the conclusion may carry weight with popular exponents of psycho-analysis, but students of the subject will find nothing in this volume that will help to elucidate the 'riddle of æsthetic appreciation' except the copious extracts from the poet's works.

The author shows no knowledge of the fundamental conceptions of Freudian theory, albeit it is claimed that this book makes an achievement that parallels Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*. A few illustrations will suffice to show this ignorance.

'Unconscious' and 'subconscious' are everywhere used as equivalents. Page 22: We are told that the reason for the alarm experienced in a nightmare is due to the displacement of affective stress on to a harmless object (in the dream) from the real cause of anxiety (in the present). Page 23: 'We rarely dream of our major occupations.' 'We do dream them under a mask.' This is because of a 'process of repression whereby we automatically disembarass ourselves of something disagreeable'. Page 90: 'We do not repress crude instincts merely: we repress likewise, sublimated instincts'. The author coins the term 'autophilia' for 'auto-erotism'. On page 284 we are told that 'two tendencies . . . seemed to grow from one plant: the two tendencies are autophilia and asceticism. The former becomes increasingly purified until I feel I may speak of it as a platonic love of self'.

'The symbol is often the expression of the subject's "unconscious"', but on page 28 a symbol is 'a poetical comparison'. Hence we are not surprised to find that (p. 287) a 'tree' is a symbol of asceticism and that (p. 264) 'gold' is a symbol of an exalted life and that 'at first this life was sensual but "gold" . . . was to become the symbol of the ecstasy of soul'.

On page 205 we learn that 'The Œdipus complex has revealed itself to be of very frequent occurrence'.

From these illustrations it will be evident that the author can be no guide to the elucidation of the drama in the poet's soul. He could not be that since he finds it necessary 'to make our ideas more digestible and acceptable to those who are strongly opposed to Freudian doctrine' (p. 24).

Happily, the genius does not concern himself with the digestive troubles of the public. The author of the book endeavours to reassure himself that there is no need 'to veil our faces when we discover in the human imagination of a man of genius that which is the pendant of the caudal vestige in Plato's skeleton'. Happily the genius is too occupied by the inner necessity to unveil his own face to care whether we are shocked, but only the unveiled will apprehend his works. We therefore commend the poems

to those approaching the study of æsthetical problems. From those the conclusion becomes inevitable, that one 'key to the riddle' is that the stimuli for æsthetic feeling (contemplation of beauty) lie in rebellion against the repellent aspects of material existence—which rebellion is the reaction against strong infantile preoccupations (see E. Jones, *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*). The bibliography contains no reference to such pertinent studies as Freud's *Leonardo da Vinci*, Jones on *Hamlet*, nor to Jones' *Essay on Symbolism*.

E. F. Sharpe.

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The Psychology of Laughter and Comedy. By J. Y. T. Greig, M. (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1923. Pp. 304. Price 12s. 6d.)

As is well known, most books on the subject of laughter are extraordinarily tedious to read. Mr. Greig's book, on the contrary, is written in a delightful vein which happily hits the mean between heaviness on the one hand and undue frivolity on the other. It can be cordially recommended both on the score of being very readable and because it evinces unusual broadmindedness on the part of a professional psychologist.

Due weight is given in the book to the genetic aspects of the problems and the connexion between first smiles and oral erotism is made clear (p. 50). The author's main thesis about laughter appears to be that it is due to the sudden giving way of a previous obstruction, laughter being one of the ways in which the surplus energy may be used which is no longer required to push against the obstruction. Although he prefers the term 'love instinct', he appears to consider the whole subject of laughter as being essentially dependent on sexual factors. The same is true of tickling which he defines as 'intermittent tactual stimulation of the erotogenetic zone' (p. 53). His analyses of the various situations leading to laughter, comedy, humour and wit are mostly acute and always interesting. In discussing the Punch and Judy show, he accepts the phallic significance of Punch, but gives a very thin explanation of the pleasure at seeing the baby being thrown out of the window, which shows that he has probably not read the contribution Freud made to this theme in connexion with Goethe's childhood.

Early in the section on wit comes the following paragraph which deserves to be quoted as indicating the author's attitude towards psycho-analysis: 'Tendency wit, then, on Freud's view, is either sexual or hostile, either a sexual advance or a more or less vigorous attack. If the word *love* is substituted for the word *sex*—for reasons I indicated in the third chapter—I have no comment to make on this, the central thesis of Freud's book, beyond accepting it, and acknowledging the real debt I owe to him for enunciating it so clearly and supporting it with such a wealth of instance. I do not wish to go laboriously over the same ground as he has already traversed with a light heart and a vigilant eye, because the reader, be he

psychologically trained or not, who is not to be convinced by Freud's reasoning, is not likely to be convinced by anything I could add to it, and it is a great deal better that any one interested in the discussion of the question, and not already familiar with Freud's work, should make himself familiar with it at first hand without further delay, than that he should waste time over a second-hand and probably inadequate transcript from me. I propose to take it as proved, therefore, that tendency wit, whatever other characteristics it may have, is either love behaviour, or hate behaviour, or an uncertain compound of both, and that the primary satisfaction of such wit is the satisfaction of love or hate impulses. It may also be remarked in passing, that hate impulses seem to predominate on the whole' (p. 201).

Nevertheless, the author does not accept Freud's main contention concerning the nature of wit, namely the distinction he draws between pleasure resulting from the technique of 'wit-work' and that arising out of the repressed elements of tendency wit. On the contrary, he denies totally the existence of what Freud calls the harmless joke, where pleasure is purely of the former kind. This appears to us especially strange in an English writer, for surely the most characteristic form of both humour and wit in England is its harmlessness, a feature which leads continental observers to describe many of the jokes of *Punch* as being 'merely silly'.

The book concludes with an extremely valuable appendix which contains abstracts of all the important writings on the subject from Aristotle and Cicero to McDougall and Freud.

E. J.



Text-book of Psychiatry. By Professor Dr. Eugen Bleuler. Authorized translation by A. A. Brill, Ph.B., M.D. (George Allen & Unwin, London. Pp. 635. Price 25s.)

The scope and importance of this book is well indicated by the following quotation from Dr. Kirby's Introduction: 'This book marks a notable advance in psychiatry in that it emphasizes sharply the contrast between the older descriptive psychiatry of Kraepelin and the newer interpretative psychiatry of the present time which utilizes the psycho-analytical principles and general biological viewpoints, developed by Freud and his pupils in Europe and by Meyer, Hoch, White and others in this country. Bleuler was apparently one of the first psychiatrists to grasp the great importance of a psychodynamic viewpoint in the study of mental disorders and as early as 1906 he published a paper on Freudian mechanisms in the symptomatology of the psychoses. Although he became convinced of the value and importance for psychiatry of many of Freud's formulations, he has always preserved a well-balanced and distinctly independent

attitude towards psycho-analytic theories and in the course of his work he has not hesitated to criticize certain aspects of the Freudian psychology.

'As an introduction to the study of clinical psychiatry the physician and the student will find the chapters dealing with the principles of psychology and psychopathology particularly helpful and stimulating. While Bleuler adheres to Kraepelin's general scheme of classification of clinical types, it will be found that unlike Kraepelin he does not stop with the mere enumeration of symptoms but seeks through the application of psychological principles to give an interpretation and explanation for the particular reaction type under consideration.'

From our knowledge of this well-known book we can only endorse Dr. Kirby's estimate, and are glad to see an English translation of it appear.

Reservations must, however, be made in regard to the small section on the psycho-neuroses, a subject which has evidently not interested the author. This section is painfully inadequate, and it is a great pity for the author's reputation that it has been incorporated at all in the book.

Dr. Brill, the translator, has the advantage of being very familiar with Professor Bleuler's mode of thought. He was his assistant at Zurich many years ago, and has ever since retained friendly relations with him.

E. J.



The Primitive Archaic Forms of Inner Experiences and Thought in Schizophrenia. By Dr. Alfred Storch (Tubingen). Translated by Clara Willard (Washington). (Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 36, New York and Washington, 1924. Pp. 106 + xvii. Price \$2.)

The object of this interesting monograph is to draw attention to the similarity between schizophrenic and archaic experiences and thought. The author quotes cases to illustrate the various symptoms and then draws parallels from the thoughts, religious rites, taboos, magical acts, etc. of primitive races.

Special consideration is paid to the loss of the boundaries of the ego, as illustrated by fusion of the ego with the objective world or with other individuals, identifications, participations and so forth. The variations are too numerous to be discussed in a brief abstract and the book will well repay reading in full; but it is curious that there is no reference to such common classical symptoms as stereotypy, echopraxis, negativism and others.

Here and there the author supports his thesis by quotations from psycho-analytical literature.

W. H. B. Stoddart.

A Study of Masturbation and its Reputed Sequelæ. By J. F. Meagher, M.D., F.A.C.P. (William Wood & Co., New York, 1924. Pp. 69. Price \$1.50. Baillière, Tindall & Cox, London. Price 6s.)

Though it cannot be said that Dr. Meagher has solved any of the difficult psychological and practical problems that arise out of onanism (a better word than masturbation, which the author defines as 'all methods of causing pleasurable sex sensations by an individual's own efforts'), he has the courage to recognize that it is a psycho-pathological problem, that the resultant ills are due mainly to the unconscious conflicts that are aroused, the act revivifying infantile activities, experiences and phantasies.

Although a large number of authorities are quoted, Dr. Meagher is rather indiscriminating in his selection; such catholicity as is shown by the numerous quotations from Kisch and authors of equally unscientific judgement makes one feel a little uneasy when one finds the author equally supporting the views of Freud and Jones, to the latter of whom the little book is gracefully dedicated. The views of the authorities are not always given quite correctly; Freud, for instance, has nowhere stated that four neuroses—primary neurasthenia, anxiety neuroses, hysteria and compulsion neurosis—may result from masturbation (p. 44); he has made it quite clear that the pathological factors in the first two offer an almost complete contrast, whilst the latter two are not directly connected with the physico-sexual apparatus.

With all the great respect for marriage which perhaps a psycho-analyst alone has, it is impossible to accept the statement that most extramarital coitus is masturbatory in character; it would be quite inaccurate to say this of coitus with prostitutes, or even of prostitutes themselves.

In the chapter on treatment, amid much advice that is quite sound, there are indications that the author has not really obtained all his views from first-hand investigation, but has accepted widely prevalent and entirely superficial opinions. He tells parents to pay more attention to the friends their children make, thus endorsing the erroneous view that unhappy traits are due to bad companions. As preventives, Dr. Meagher advocates 'music and the cultivation of the arts and sciences, and good clean literature'. What is good clean literature? More dangerous is the advice that the guilt must be encouraged to conquer the habit—'to please his parents'. Dr. Meagher believes that no normal ethical adult can masturbate without suffering great mental distress. There he is certainly wrong; there are plenty of high-minded persons who practise masturbation without any sense of guilt or physical distress. Dr. Meagher agrees that masturbation is not abnormal in young children; this is evidence of an open mind, and I believe that further research will convince him that no treatment at all is required for the ordinary masturbation of adolescence. Masturbation as a symptom of psycho-sexual maladjustment disappears with the solution of the conflicts. Speaking generally,

one may say that when no remorse is experienced, when it is no longer regarded as a sin, in short when masturbation is quite harmless, it is not much practised.

If we have called attention rather to points of disagreement rather than of agreement, it is because we think that this book deserves to have and will have so wide a reading among individual men that further editions may allow the author to reconsider some of his judgments and views.

M. D. Eder.



The Internal Secretions of the Sex Glands. By Alexander Lipschütz, M.D., Professor of Physiology in Dorpat University (Estonia). (Heffers, Cambridge, 1924. Pp. 513. Price 21s.)

A full review of the German version of this book was published in this JOURNAL (Vol. II, p. 143, 1921). The author has now performed the feat of writing it in English, and it has been revised by Professor Marshall. This English edition differs very considerably from the German one inasmuch as the author has recast much of it, and has incorporated into it the recent work of subsequent years. We need only remind the reader that it is a standard work on this subject and also contains the most accessible reference in English to the work of foreign writers. The importance of the subject for all students of sexuality, where psychology is particularly hard to separate from physiology, is evident.

E. J.



Walt Whitman's Anomaly. By W. C. Rivers. (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1913. Pp. 70. Price 2s. 6d. Obtainable from the author at Worsboro' Bridge, Barnsley, Yorks.)

This is a brochure demonstrating convincingly the important part played by homosexuality in Walt Whitman's constitution and writings. It is a sign of the times that the author, when this book was first published ten years ago, had to argue strongly to make out a case, whereas nowadays his conclusion would be obvious at first sight to anyone having any knowledge of homosexuality.

E. J.



An Introduction to the Study of Mind. By William A. White, M.D. (Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., Washington, 1924. Pp. v. + 116.)

We have here another of the charming volumes through which this gifted author seeks to popularize the teachings of modern medical psychology. It is a book that hardly lends itself to a critical review, but we can cordially recommend it as containing a very readable and per-

suasive account of the introductory aspects of clinical and social psychology. The book contains a number of references, including one to Freud.

E. J.



The Meaning of Dreams. By Robert Graves. (Cecil Palmer, London, 1924. Pp. 167. Price 6s.)

The following passage from this book will sufficiently characterize it: 'Freud's position is briefly this, that every dream is expressing some sort of desire which the dreamer in his waking life has not been able to attain and, more than that, has not even dared to consider, because somehow horrible, or unnatural or very strongly disapproved of by the neighbourhood. These wishes are centred in the passions and in order to account for children dreaming, Freud has been forced to say that even very small children are subject to the same inclinations and passions as grown persons; it is this theory that has given Freud most ill-fame and frightened away the common-sense man more than ever from the subject, particularly as the Freudian theory soon attracted to Vienna a number of students who liked nastiness for its own sake, so that the work which they did on the lines the Professor laid down often had nastiness as its chief aim; then Freud's heading "the passions", which he intended in a broad sense, became more and more restricted, so that Freud has been perhaps unjustly blamed for the findings of his disciples' (pp. 11-12).

In another place, the author considers that: 'Dr. Rivers has done a great service to science by . . . putting the whole matter in a more reasonable and attractive form' (p. 19). Throughout the book the author gives rein to his free fancy in the interpretation of dreams. Perhaps the most amusing example is the statement that snakes in dreams are usually 'a symbol of a friend's treachery' (p. 65).

We cannot consider that this mixture of crass ignorance, malice and prejudice makes a very adequate basis for a book of this kind. The only readable part of it, though extremely superficial, is the final chapter on 'Dreams and Poetry'.

E. J.



Psychology and the Sciences. Edited by William Brown, M.D., D.Sc., M.R.C.P. (A. & C. Black, Ltd., London, 1924. Pp. viii + 184.)

In view of the great increase of interest in Psychology—especially in applied psychology—during the last few years, the present volume of essays dealing with the relations between psychology and certain allied sciences is very welcome. It is all the more remarkable in that it represents a course of lectures given at Oxford by men who are in nearly every case actual teachers at that university—a university which, of all the great educational institutions of the world, has perhaps shown the least friendly

attitude towards Psychology. Dr. William Brown, who acts as general editor as well as contributor of one of the essays, is undoubtedly to be congratulated on having successfully organized such an undertaking. The wide field covered by the book is indicated by a mere enumeration of the disciplines into relation with which Psychology is brought. These are as follows (the name of the writer on each subject is given in brackets) : Biology (J. S. Haldane), Anthropology (R. R. Marett), Logic (F. C. S. Schiller), Ethics (L. P. Jacks), Theology (A. E. J. Rawlinson), Education (M. W. Keatinge), Medicine (W. Brown), Psychical Research (T. W. Mitchell).

All of these essays are stimulating and many of them open up wide vistas for future speculation and research. To deal adequately, either by way of description or criticism, with the very various and not always harmonious views that are advanced in the course of the book would of itself necessitate an essay, the length of which would be totally out of proportion with that of the book itself. Workers in any of the special spheres here touched upon will naturally turn in the first place to those portions of the book with which they are particularly concerned, and it may be confidently predicted that, although they may not always find themselves in agreement with the authors, they will in the majority of cases certainly find substantial food for thought.

In the interest of completeness it is to be regretted that Physiology and Sociology come in for no consideration. And if an applied science such as Education is included, why not also Industry, the psychological aspects of which have of late been receiving much attention, not to speak of Politics, which, though scarcely as yet a 'science', is even more important from the point of view of human welfare, and the psychological study of which appears in the light of recent developments to be no longer hopeless? Again, if it is decided to include Theology, it seems hardly fair to exclude Epistemology or Metaphysics.

It is scarcely necessary to add that psycho-analytical considerations play a fairly important part in some of the essays, particularly those on Ethics, Theology, Medicine and Psychical Research.

Having said this much with regard to the book as a whole, we will venture to make a few comments with reference to the individual essays, with especial emphasis on a few particular points which seem to the present reviewer to touch on certain questions of very general interest to the psycho-analyst.

We will deal first with the contributions of Dr. Jacks and Dr. Rawlinson, dealing with Ethics and Theology respectively, the attitude of these two writers being somewhat similar. Both writers make full acknowledgment of the usefulness of psycho-analysis in their especial sphere, but underneath this apparent friendliness the reader soon begins to detect something of an anxious *noli me tangere* attitude, which leads one to think that the

acceptance of the psycho-analytical point of view is somewhat superficial and that this may have led to what seems to be the failure to realize fully some of the deeper implications of psycho-analysis with regard to the subjects under discussion.

Dr. Jacks thinks that psycho-analysis has made moral problems more difficult and complex. It is our duty, he considers, to understand the unconscious (though he scarcely seems to realize the full difficulty of the task), and our new knowledge, although it may simplify some problems, compels us to face many others of which we were previously unaware or which at least seemed relatively simple. There is all the more need moreover of ethical principles to co-ordinate and make proper employment of the new knowledge, which in itself may be used either for good or for evil.

While it is perhaps scarcely possible to quarrel with this general position that psychological knowledge does not and cannot in itself afford ethical principles (though even here the questions involved are—as we shall try to indicate in a moment—more complex than might at first appear), it is to be regretted that there is no fuller discussion of the ways in which psychological knowledge can be used for attaining ethical goals. The recent work on delinquency and criminality, for instance, has shown that, granted the acceptance of certain ethical standards, the practical application of psychological principles (for the most part those to which psycho-analysis has drawn attention) may be our most potent weapon in the struggle to make conduct conform to these standards. Quite apart, however, from particular problems of this sort, it would seem that psychological knowledge must, for many types of ethical theory, react powerfully upon the whole conception, application and use of ethical principles. If, for instance, as has so often been postulated, the *summum bonum* is to be found in a mental state or mental function, it is to Psychology that we must turn for knowledge concerning the intimate nature of this state or function; without such knowledge our concept of the *summum bonum* must be relatively vague and unhelpful, while with every increase of such knowledge the structure and use of the concept will undergo a corresponding modification.

While Dr. Jacks's essay is inadequate in its consideration of these matters, it contains no serious attempt at all to deal with what is probably the most fundamental, difficult and far-reaching of all the problems that concern the relations between Psychology and Ethics. This is the problem as to how far and under what circumstances the psychological and ethical points of view are really interchangeable, how far the one may for certain purposes be substituted for the other. It can scarcely be doubted that preoccupation with psychological interests tends, for instance, to replace the moral by the psychological attitude with regard to education and crime. The modern teacher and social reformer is endeavouring more and

more to understand the stupid or delinquent individual (in the hope of course of improving his behaviour) rather than to blame him or to punish him. The new method is in many respects more helpful and more hopeful than the old, inasmuch as it enables us to influence conduct with far greater delicacy and precision and even holds out the promise that in course of time we may be able to transform the art of producing good behaviour into something resembling an applied science. The question as to how far this tendency to substitute the psychological for the ethical attitude may (actually or legitimately) go is one that, before many years have passed, will have to be very seriously faced by all who undertake to explore the borderland between Ethics and Psychology.

Mutatis mutandis the whole situation is very similar with regard to Theology. Dr. Rawlinson insists, quite rightly from the usual standpoint, that Psychology can give no final verdict as to the objective truth or untruth of theological beliefs. On the other hand, he admits that Psychology (and psycho-analysis in particular) has to some extent explained the subjective nature and genesis of these beliefs. He fails, however, to get to grips with what would seem to be the logical consequences of this admission. Granted that the psychological explanations of the subjective origin of theological beliefs are satisfactory, there would seem to be two courses open to the theologian; he may either accept the verdict of the ultimately subjective nature of the subject-matter of Theology, or he may seek for independent objective confirmation of his beliefs. In the latter case Theology will have the same relationship to Psychology as have the physical sciences. In the former case, however, Theology becomes a branch of applied psychology with the addition of a little history and sociology; it will become the study of man's beliefs about the Deity.

The influence upon *Religion* of such a Theology as would be implied by the adoption of this last alternative is a further all-important question, one that is logically unconnected with the above-mentioned choice, but which for emotional reasons will in most cases exercise an important influence upon this choice. In so far as Religion may seem to require an objectively real Theology, the admission of the subjectivity of theological beliefs might be regarded as inevitably leading to the break-up of Religion (or alternatively to a refusal on the part of religious minds to bring Psychology into relation with Religion). If, on the other hand, Religion can exist independently of an objective Theology, Religion may have nothing to fear from Psychology. Such religion would, however, it is pretty clear, be of a philosophical rather than a theological type; it would moreover in all probability be a progressive religion, advancing *pari passu* with psychological and philosophical knowledge.

Dr. Rawlinson fails, however, to consider these alternatives and gives the impression that he wishes to postpone any such difficult decision. He consoles himself meanwhile with the thought that Psychology is in

many respects still a very youthful and undeveloped science, that psychoanalysts themselves are not free from the complexes they write about and that there may be a wide difference between 'normal' and 'abnormal' psychology. This attitude on the part of a writer who sets out to deal in scientific fashion with the relations between Psychology and Theology is surely disappointing, for it is little more than trifling with the most fundamentally important of all the issues concerned. A more courageous attempt to deal with the real difficulties of the situation would have given evidence both of a greater sincerity and profundity in the treatment of theological questions and of a more consistent attitude towards Psychology (for if we admit that psycho-analysis has satisfactorily demonstrated the subjective origin of theological beliefs in many cases, we must surely be prepared to face the possibility of the same thing happening in all cases, even in regard to such beliefs as we ourselves may cherish).

Dr. Schiller, in dealing with problems that are—in form at any rate—not unlike those encountered in the case of Ethics and Theology, is prepared to go very much farther with the psychologist than is Dr. Jacks or Dr. Rawlinson. A logic divorced from Psychology is for him sterile and meaningless. His own view is that Logic should inquire 'what men really mean by what they say, how they try to convey their meaning, how far they succeed, whether they attain truth and what sort of truth they attain'. It should be a Logic of 'personal meaning' and 'actual thinking' (even at the expense of lending itself less readily to the 'annual efflorescence of chestnuts in examination papers'). Such a Logic, it would seem, would be little else than a particular branch of applied Psychology, in much the same way as we suggested above in the case of Theology.

Dr. Keatinge in discussing Education makes less use of psycho-analysis than recent discussions in this field would have led us to anticipate. His essay is very largely devoted, however, to a consideration of the ways in which recent Psychology is of more interest and assistance to the teacher than was the Psychology of some fifty years ago, and he thinks that the more detailed study of conation by modern writers is among the most important of the changes that are significant in this respect.

Dr. Brown's attitude with regard to Medicine is fairly well known from his other works and does not therefore call for detailed examination here. He insists strongly on the superior explanatory value of psychological over physiological hypotheses in the present state of our knowledge, and pays a high tribute to the importance of psycho-analysis as a therapeutic method, though he would agree with Dr. Rawlinson in demanding caution as regards arguing from the 'abnormal' to the 'normal'.

Dr. Haldane does not refer to the recent excursions of psychoanalysts into biological theory. His essay is in the main philosophical in character.

It is much to be regretted that Dr. Marett is equally silent about psycho-analysis in his treatment of Anthropology, especially as his essay

is from the literary point of view perhaps the most brilliant of the whole series.

Dr. Mitchell writes on Psychology and Psychical Research with that impartiality and breadth of view that characterizes all his works. He lays stress on the great interest of psychic phenomena to the psychologist and makes a somewhat detailed comparison between mediumistic traits and multiple personality, with particular reference to psycho-analytic views on identification. While dealing with the subject of 'control' (by alleged spirits), he refers to the somewhat rare phenomenon of 'direct control' as one that is exceptionally difficult to explain. In these cases the spirit appears to take full possession of the medium, who behaves and talks in a manner characteristic of the dead person. This may be explained it is suggested, as in the case of dramatic impersonizations by a hypnotized subject, by an identification with the control personality, so far as this personality is known to the medium. But the explanation is more difficult in those cases where the medium 'has never seen or had any knowledge of the communicator now claiming to control'. Dr. Mitchell here suggests that 'the sitter has unconsciously identified himself with the dead friend who is purporting to communicate' and that 'the supernormal powers of the medium may lead to a telepathic transmission or transfusion of "the identification" from the subliminal of the sitter of so vivid a nature as to render possible the striking phenomena of direct or personal control'.

An alternative and perhaps a simpler explanation suggests itself to the reviewer, who has, however, not given sufficient study to the phenomena in question to judge himself how far it will really cover the facts. This explanation is twofold. In the first place (as on Dr. Mitchell's own hypothesis) the sitter identifies himself with his dead friend. In virtue of this identification he will then (and this is the first new element in the proposed explanation) behave in certain respects similarly to this friend—in mannerisms, speech, etc., so that the medium may obtain some clues from observation of the sitter's behaviour. (These clues may be obtained either consciously or unconsciously; in the latter event they would be similar to the unconscious perceptions that have been studied in one connexion or another by quite a number of psychologists.) In the second place the sitter will quite naturally tend to identify the medium with his dead friend, and will therefore tend to see a resemblance between this friend's behaviour and that of the medium, even where there is little or no objective resemblance, or to exaggerate such resemblance as may have been brought about through the first-mentioned process. How strong may be the tendency to see resemblances of this kind is known to every practising psycho-analyst, who—in the course of a single day's work—may, in virtue of the 'transference', find himself identified by successive analysands with quite a number of persons of dissimilar character and appearance; to each analysand in turn it appears as though the analyst

were behaving in a manner very similar to that of his own (the analysand's) father or other important relative whose *imago* is concerned in the transference. This hypothesis—if it worked—would have the advantage of explaining all the phenomena on the basis of known aspects of perception and identification without resort to the still very doubtful and little understood process of telepathy.

J. C. F.

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Primitive Ordeal and Modern Law. By H. Goitein, Barrister-at-Law. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. Pp. ix + 291, with Bibliography.)

The title, the brilliance of its author, and the fact that this is the first interpretation based on any psycho-analytical knowledge of a large body of law, excite the liveliest interest in this book. Unfortunately the author's psycho-analytical knowledge is not sufficient to solve many of the problems encountered, and this review must discuss the misadventures of an author who picks and chooses among the theories, neglecting obvious facts and the deductions from them. The reviewer none the less wishes to express gratitude for much stimulating reading and many valuable suggestions.

In the first place, the book attempts to explain law, the signal position of the judge in the courts, the relation of primitive law to totemism, the significance of the oath and ordeal, without referring to the place of the father in the nuclear complex, which lies at the root of our individual and social life. According to him the Œdipus complex is a desire to return to the mother and nothing more, as though we were all orphans from birth. (*Totem and Taboo* and *Sonderstellung des Vätermordes* are omitted from a bibliography which includes twenty-seven psycho-analytical references.)

Secondly, he tries to dispense with sexuality: 'care must be taken not to translate it [the word Libido] surreptitiously in thought by its Latin grammar rendering and identify it with sexuality' (p. 105). He qualifies libido further by saying that when the surpassing function of sexuality is attained the process does not stop there, but constant transformations by desexualization turn it into other channels till finally it is of something more than merely individual reference. This shows that he lacks understanding of the pregenital anal-sadistic tendencies, and without the employment of this concept the development of law is, it seems to us, unintelligible.

Thirdly, he accepts the word 'unconscious' and uses it frequently, but considers 'it would be a mistake to try and set up two orders of mental functioning and divide the mind into two halves' (p. 179). He is left with the fundamental innate desire to return to the mother (the word incest is put into inverted commas as though it was being acclimatized to our language) and yet considers that in primitive communities 'Taboos are observed, "*incest*" is avoided as a matter of course' (p. 180) [reviewer's italics]. As he is convinced of the fact of conflict and therefore requires

something to put against this longing to return to the mother (which we gather is not exactly incestuous, however) he institutes a Themis complex, which is fed from the sex complex, rests on the basic elements of the ego and has important potential affinities with the herd complex. About the Themis complex 'grew the ordered systems of rational legal concepts, till the completely formed legal consciousness appeared' (p. 183). As it seems an impossible task to take this psychological system and explain with its aid neuroses, dreams and myths, it would be interesting to see how a psychological system already successful in these fields could furnish an explanation for a lawyer's puzzle.

To the question What is Law? the author gives three answers. First there is the Austinian definition, 'Law is Force', 'an obligatory rule of conduct emanating from the sovereign' (p. 17). 'Every general rule that expressly or impliedly is a command of the sovereign is law, and nothing else is law' (p. 18). This definition has the merit of being clear, and the author brings against it the usual objection that its scope is too narrow, though he does not attempt a psychological explanation why it should have held such sway among jurists and how it arose. The example of a law given by the author is a good test for the validity of any theory. At the entrance to the British Museum Reading Room a notice runs 'Should readers be absent for more than an hour from the seats which they have taken, such seats will be considered available for incoming readers'. This is clearly not a command and yet it may fairly be called a law. Another school says Law is Morality. This definition fails to place the Order of Precedence, for example, or the Regulations of Meetings of Political Parties, within the scope of law, but it certainly embraces the British Museum notice. Having elaborated these arguments the author proceeds to his own definition (p. 197), 'Law is a compendious name for the sum of the influences that determine decisions in the judge's court'. He stresses it and we note that this gives the central position to *Action at Law*. He tries to explain the psychological origins of this excellent definition in terms of the vague Themis complex, but does not use the latter upon the Austinian doctrine. If the Themis complex is put aside for the moment and the hypothesis advanced in its place of the development of civilization from the now familiar primal horde we shall be able at a glance to place the three schools referred to in a definite order. Assuming that in the most primitive state the individuals were governed by the All-Father whose word was law we can say that the Austinian doctrine represents a fixation at that level. The next stage in the hypothetical evolution was the banding of the brothers; a new code was instituted. Instead of (obligatory) obedience to the All-Father there is now an obedience to the wishes of the brother clan. The *dictum* 'Law is Morality' may be said to arise at this level. The assumption is that the brother clan slew the All-Father and later idealized or deified him. As a God he was more pliable than as an actual

living tyrant, he was modified by the attributes with which he was invested. Physical violence was banned among those who shared the same Father-ideal and they became capable if not indeed of brotherly love at least of litigation. But they brought the Father back to govern their disputes in the person of the Judge, and the emotions which caused his death produced equally strong reactions. In his presence no violence must be done, Combat gave way to milder forms of Action, albeit still on the same pre-genital level—a sadistic fight gives place to Wager, which gratifies the other anal tendency. Oath takes the place of ordeal, the word (or thought) replaces the deed as refinement makes more demands. All these and many more reflections arise when the Father is given a place in the Œdipus complex and the pre-genital stages are remembered. The author faithfully traces these historical legal developments but offers only the vaguest associative links because, it seems to us, he forgets an all-important bond—the relation of man to his father.

There is another topic which occupies much space in the book, the relation of oath and ordeal to the developmental stages in progress from the lowly condition of Gatherers to the Advanced Agriculturalists. The author does a valuable service in bringing the two into relation, but does not give detailed analyses of the stages and the transformations from one to the other. This should be the material for a larger work; in the present volume the author has not given himself sufficient room.

John Rickman.

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The Origin of Magic and Religion. By W. J. Perry, M.A. 1923. (Methuen & Co., Ltd., London. Pp. v + 212. Price 6s.)

The Growth of Civilization. By W. J. Perry, M.A. 1924. (Methuen & Co., Ltd., London. Pp. v + 224.)

The columns of this JOURNAL are not the place for criticism or appreciation of the general theories of the historical school of ethnologists, and we may confine ourselves to the consideration of those aspects of Mr. Perry's argument which are of particular interest to psychologists. The general importance of the theory is not to be over-estimated. It is clear that in dealing with psychological material drawn from the comparative study of the various cultures, we are bound in the future to have regard to the historical relationships of the latter. It is no longer possible for us to bring together a heterogeneous mass of belief and custom and ritual, gathered from travellers' tales of the peoples of the world as they are to-day; to treat these without any consideration of the migrations and contact of cultures and naïvely to apply the word 'primitive' to all those that differ markedly from our own.

Mr. Perry's strictures on vague generalizations of this sort, and the crude attempt to draw parallels and conclusions based on such usage, are fully justified and not unnecessary even at this date. And yet it is clear

also that in all those cultures which embody a smaller accumulation of scientific knowledge and strictly logical thought, the mechanisms of the really primitive mind are more easily seen, and what is unconscious in ourselves appears to be normally nearer the surface.

Turning now to the specific interest for psychologists of these volumes and leaving on one side the frequent jump from probability to fact, which Mr. Perry makes even with regard to the theory of migration of the elements of culture, one cannot help noting a certain crudity in the movement of his thought, which is not confined to his psychological assumptions, but which is perhaps most apparent and most marked there.

The very great service he has rendered to social psychology by his demonstration of the actual motives of early man in moving about the world—the outcome of his genius for superposing maps—has come about in spite of, or perhaps because of, his apparent unfamiliarity with general psychology. It is, perhaps, his very *naïveté* of attitude to human relations, the *naïveté* of a schoolboy who is much more interested in things than in people, and who tends to regard people with the same concrete dispassionateness with which he looks at things, which has enabled him to see that the pattern of the lives of early men was not, after all, so different from that of our own as we have often supposed. Yet this crudity of his psychological thought and lack of acquaintance with general psychology is undoubtedly the source of some of the weaknesses in his general theory, and makes his ready criticism of such psychological theories as have come his way of very little pertinence. His general psychology, indeed, appears to be that of a simple association of ideas, and this renders him rather helpless in front of the central psychological problem of the original source of those beliefs and symbols whose migrations about the world he is able to deal with so clearly and brilliantly, as when e.g. he reflects upon the origin of the killing of the King: ‘Being sons of the Great Mother they presumably had some of her characteristics, and thus were givers of life to the community. So, when they got old they were useless, and were put out of the way; though it is not clear why it was considered necessary that they should be sacrificed’. Indeed, he is unable to penetrate to any depth into the fundamental question which is, in the last resort, one of psychology of the first fashioning of these beliefs and symbols. He overlooks entirely the two questions that remain, when his own work as a student of the actual history of migrations of culture is finished, and on the assumption that his record of the facts is correct, viz. (1) why the food-gathering peoples to whom the archaic civilization was brought were so ready and quick to assimilate it? and (2) what psychological processes underlie its first fashioning in the Valley of the Nile?

His own views as to the general implications for social psychology of the facts of the migrations of culture, as he sees them, are fairly clear and definite. He feels, for instance, that he has demonstrated, once and for

all, that there is no general mythopœic faculty or general tendency to personify in the mind of primitive man. He insists upon 'the specific nature of early thought', and denies a 'universal innate tendency on the part of early man to elaborate ideas about the external world and to build up these ideas into religious and magical systems'. He, with Elliott Smith, is able to show the concrete nature of the interests which led to the development of magic and religion and the specific character of the things symbolized in primitive ritual. That this is a true reading of the facts will be agreed by all psycho-analysts. Indeed, it must be said that the historical school of ethnologists does not lay sufficient emphasis on the concrete nature of the interests and desires of early man. They do not go far enough in this respect. As has been pointed out only recently by Ernest Jones (in his paper on 'Psycho-Analysis and Anthropology' in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. LIV, 1924), 'the symbols of the Great Mother are not to be understood as referring to a mere general conception of the Great Mother or abstraction of the "idea" of motherhood, but as having reference to the desire for the actual mother of each individual; and the ritual of the rebirth is not to be understood as: "This is the sort of thing that will enable you to achieve rebirth and continued existence", but, rather, "As you know in your deepest heart, the only hope of attaining immortality is to penetrate into the Valley of the Shadow of Death, to pass once more through the portals of your mother's womb, to undergo a second birth that will annul the effects of the first and will thus enable you to re-enter Paradise: here is her womb"'.

While Mr. Perry is thus right in insisting on these concrete interests, yet that clearly does not mean that it is useless to look for universal mental processes and common elements in the thought of human beings in different times and places; for there are always present certain fundamental problems arising from the general relationships of human beings to one other, underlying the specific differences due to geographical conditions or historical contacts. There is the universal desire for life and for more life, the immense drive of which Mr. Perry has himself shown, without staying to analyze it; there is always the relation between parents and children, between the individual and the group. Wherever man goes he carries himself, his family and his fellows with him, and thus the endo-psychic factors must be always dominant, and the essential nature of the psychological problem always and everywhere the same.

This has to be borne in mind in considering the problem of universal symbolism. The suggestion that there are universal symbols makes Mr. Perry angry, but his criticism of the view is far from discriminating. It is, of course, clear that no one can use, for instance, the cowrie shell as a symbol if he has never seen one; he cannot evolve 'the idea' of the cowrie shell out of his own mind; but the fact that the cowrie shell or any other like symbol is readily seized upon as a symbol, when it is met with,

has to be given its due weight. The things symbolized and the need for symbols are universal ; and, as every individual analysis shows, there are certain objects and types of objects which tend to have the same symbolic value for all minds.

Another direction in which Mr. Perry and his associates feel that they have a word to say is with regard to the relative importance of the different fundamental motives of mankind, and the part these have played in cultural history. They interpret the historic facts in terms of the instinct of self-preservation, taking that instinct crudely and simply. The cowrie shell itself, as an object of human interest, is interpreted simply in terms of 'self-preservation', and the fact that the 'portal of life' which it resembles and stands for is also an object of sex desire is absurdly, if conveniently, ignored ; indeed, one might suppose it a fact not known to Mr. Perry. No surprise can then be felt by the reader that the problem of the internal relations of the different groups of instincts is not dealt with or even hinted at ; and still less that the evidence yielded by the psycho-analytic study of the individual is not considered. This accounts for the crudity of the discussion (p. 183) as to the 'equation between the two independent ideas' of rebirth and immortality. Because there is 'no logical connexion' between rebirth and immortality, although the two ideas are always found together—'when it [the idea of rebirth] occurs, it is bound up with the idea of eternal life'—Mr. Perry thinks that 'some specific origin must be found for the idea ; some one man must have started the process of thought'. It does not occur to him that the two 'ideas' may have nothing to do with logic, but may have their origin in the genetic experience of every individual. We can hardly, therefore, expect him to avail himself of the accumulated evidence that, in the mind of the individual, rebirth is de-birth, and immortality is a return to the timelessness of the womb, the two 'independent' ideas being thus one and the same.

The Growth of Civilization is, on the whole, of less direct interest for psychologists than the former book, but Mr. Perry's ingenious theories on the origin of war must be considered, because these do imply certain psychological views, which would be very important if they were true, and certain questionings of current views of human nature, particularly of the instinctual character of the pugnacious tendencies in man. From Mr. Perry's view, not only are wars and rumours of war a legacy of the geographical conditions in the Valley of the Nile, which resulted in the division into Upper and Lower Egypt, but the subjection of women and cruelty to children are derived from that source also. In other words, had the configuration of the Nile Valley and the early history of Egyptian society been different, the feminist movement in modern England and the work of the R.S.P.C.C. would not have been required ; and the Great War would never have occurred.

It is a naïve and interesting suggestion, but one that no observer of young children themselves can possibly subscribe to. Mr. Perry's question (p. 193) whether it is true that an infant, when in any way thwarted, will evince anger and start to make violent attempts to get its own way, can be answered quite simply and directly in the affirmative by any observer. It is not open to doubt that aggressiveness is innate in the human male, and that man has to learn to 'restrain certain innate violent tendencies' (p. 194). And yet Mr. Perry's suggestion that much of a child's violence is a simple reaction to the violence of adults is a sound and important one; and it is, indeed, quite possible that wars are made, and may perhaps be unmade—if only we knew enough about it—in the nursery. But that is a matter of the fate of the instinctual tendencies in the individual, not a matter of the geographical and historical conditions of the Nile Valley.

Mr. Perry derives historic violence not only from the geographical dualism of Egypt, but also from the ancient custom of the killing of the King and the later substitutes for the royal sacrifice. Here again, Mr. Perry's psychology fails him completely. He would attempt to explain the killing of the King in purely intellectual terms of a simple association of ideas about the King's importance as an irrigation engineer, and the need to have a King who was in his prime. In other words, he derives violence from the fact that the King is killed, not the killing of the King from the innate violence and hostility of his subjects. But this is a matter on which not only psycho-analysts but all general students of human nature have something to say. There is no need, however, to say it in the columns of this JOURNAL.

It is clear that Mr. Perry's work, which no one doubts to be of great importance, would be very much enhanced in value if it were throughout informed by a sound psychology, and, above all, if he were able to bring to his objective survey of the historic facts of human relationships an insight that can only be gained by an intensive and genetic study of the individual.

Susan Isaacs.



Some Aspects of the Life of Jesus. By Georges Berguer. (Williams & Norgate, London, 1923. Pp. 332. Price 15s.)

This is a charmingly written but conventional account of the life and ministry of Jesus. The author endeavours to illuminate his subject with the help of modern psychology, but we do not consider that he has added any notable contribution thereby. His attempt to employ psycho-analytic principles for the purpose is certainly unsuccessful. He starts by giving a short account of the Œdipus complex, but hastens to add: 'It is evident, as I have already said, that we must not take these words, hatred of the father, love of the mother, in the literal sense which we give them in our adult language' (p. 110).

The analytic point of view is rapidly abandoned for anagogic and spiritual interpretations of the story of the immaculate conception, where the author has nothing new to say.

E. J.

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Signs of Sanity and the Principles of Mental Hygiene. By Stewart Paton, M.D. (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. Pp. 236. Price 7s. 6d.)

This book is intended for the general reader, and the mental hygiene movement in America and this country will doubtless produce a crop of similar publications.

If insanity can be prevented by telling people how they are to think and act, Dr. Paton's book will be very useful to America; for we are told that, in the State of Massachusetts for example, one person in every twenty dies in a State institution, and one in ten has been in a State institution for the insane or feeble-minded.

The author is a strong believer in the heredity of mental characteristics, even in such details as the science and art of shipbuilding. There is not even an allusion to the possibility of such skill being transmitted from father to son by word of mouth, imitation, etc. There are the usual platitudes about *mens sana in corpore sano*; and 'psycho-analysis is an effort to keep alive the old myth concerning the independence of body and mind'. Yet Dr. Paton does not hesitate to make free use of the discoveries of psycho-analysis. For example, he recognizes hallucinations to be the fulfilment of unconscious wishes, states that a belief is a desired emotion and talks of complexes, projection, autistic thinking and so forth.

The book can, however, be of no service to the readers of this JOURNAL.

W. H. B. Stoddart.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY THE

GENERAL SECRETARY, DR. M. EITINGON

Announcement by the General Executive

Having consulted the Councils of the British and Swiss Branch Societies, the General Executive has decided, in accordance with the resolution taken at the Eighth International Psycho-Analytical Congress (held at Salzburg), that the Ninth Congress shall take place in Switzerland.

The choice of the actual place will be made by the General Executive, acting in conjunction with the Swiss Society. Places in French Switzerland are under consideration, for example, Montreux.

Reports of the Branch Societies

FIRST PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSEMBLY HELD IN GERMANY

For a long time a need has made itself felt for closer connexion to be established between the adherents of psycho-analysis who are scattered throughout the different parts of Germany. The International Psycho-Analytical Congress, held at Salzburg in April, 1924, provided an opportunity for those members who came from Germany to come to some decision on this matter. It was decided to hold a Meeting in the autumn of this year, 1924, partly in order that the members of the Association and those adherents of our science who are not members might become better acquainted with one another, and partly to provide a suitable opportunity to those who are interested and wish to learn something of psycho-analytical methods. Dr. Landauer (Frankfort) and Dr. Abraham were asked to undertake the arrangements.

The Meeting took place at Würzburg on October 11 and 12. All who attended—the total number of persons being forty-eight—stayed at the Schwan Hotel, where the proceedings took place.

After the opening formalities at the first meeting, a number of papers were read. Dozent Dr. F. Deutsch (Vienna) spoke on the subject of the body in health and sickness from the psycho-analytical point of view. He gave a survey of psycho-analytical findings with regard to the influence of the unconscious on the body.

Dr. K. Landauer (Frankfort) spoke on 'Equivalents for Grief'. He showed that a number of conversion-symptoms are, in the realm of nervous disturbances, the bodily equivalents of the affect of grief.

In a paper entitled 'From the Analysis of an Obsessional Neurosis in a Six-year-old Child', Frau M. Klein (Berlin) traced the pathological manifestations to the child's abnormal instinctual life, and threw some light on the technique and results of the treatment.

In his paper, 'Further Contributions to the Theory of Homosexuality', Dr. F. Boehm (Berlin) discussed mainly certain self-deceptions to which homosexuals are prone and which are also likely to affect the physician's verdict.

Dr. Helene Deutsch (Vienna) spoke on the psychology of the female climacteric, with special reference to its regular relation to the mental phenomena of puberty.

These longer papers were followed by short communications. Dr. Clara Happel (Frankfurt) gave some analytical notes with reference to male homosexuality (exhibition before boys). Dr. G. Wanke (Friedrichroda) spoke on psycho-analytical observations at a sanatorium, illustrating his remarks by a number of examples. Dr. J. Hárnik (Berlin) made a contribution to the subject of 'unconscious feelings of guilt', demonstrating an interesting process by which the sense of guilt was projected outwards.

The proceedings were continued on Sunday, October 12. Privatdozent Dr. Giese (Stuttgart) spoke on psycho-analytical problems met with under manufacturing conditions. He introduced his hearers to a number of questions of industrial life, upon which a fresh light has been thrown by the results of psycho-analytical research. Dr. Abraham (Berlin) communicated part of the analysis of an obsessional neurosis, and in this connexion spoke of the psychological peculiarities in acute forms of this disease.

A report was then given of some of the activities of the Berlin Psycho-Analytical Institute. Dr. Simmel gave an account of the organization and work of the Institute, touching especially on its courses of training, and gave those members who came from a distance important information on the facilities for training offered in Berlin. Dr. Sachs gave his experience of 'instructional analyses' and explained to his audience the meaning of this important part of psycho-analytical training.

The Assembly seems to have fulfilled the expectations with which it was organized, and testimony was borne to its value by the decision that a second Assembly of the same sort should meet in Weimar next spring (shortly after Easter).

J. K. Abraham.

BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Third Quarter, 1924

July 1, 1924. Dr. Hárnik: Technical procedure in a character-analysis.

September 23, 1924. Short communications:

- a. Dr. Alexander: The influence of the analyst's intuition upon the course of an analysis.

b. Dr. Abraham: Character-formation at the 'genital' phase of development.

c. Business Meeting: Dr. Abraham reported the arrangements made for the 'First German Psycho-Analytical Assembly,' to be held at Würzburg on October 11 and 12.

In September Dr. Hanns Sachs gave a course of lectures in London, which were not open to the public, before an audience consisting of twenty-five persons. The course occupied six evenings, the subject being 'The Technique of Psycho-Analysis'.

List of Members

1. Dr. Karl Abraham (*President*), Berlin-Grunewald, Bismarkallee 14.
2. Dr. Franz Alexander, Berlin-Charlottenburg, Kurfürstendamm 206/07.
3. Dr. Felix Boehm (*Treasurer*), Berlin W. 50, Rankestrasse 20.
4. Dr. Max Eitingon (*Secretary*), Berlin W. 10, Rauchstrasse 4.
5. Dr. Georg Groddeck, Baden-Baden, Werderstrasse 14.
6. Frau Dr. Clara Happel, Frankfurt a. M., Bethmannstrasse 12.
7. Dr. Jenő Hárník, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Ludwigkirchplatz 12.
8. Frau Dr. Karen Horney, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Kaiserallee 202.
- ✓ 9. Frau Melanie Klein, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Jenaerstrasse 20.
10. Dr. Heinrich Koerber, Berlin W. 15, Meinekestrasse 7.
11. Dr. Hans Liebermann, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Trautenaustasse 18.
12. Frau Dr. Josine Müller, Berlin-Schmargendorf, Helgolandstrasse 1.
13. Dr. Carl Müller-Braunschweig, Berlin-Schmargendorf, Helgolandstrasse 1.
14. Dr. Sándor Radó, Berlin-Schöneberg, am Park 20.
15. Dr. Hanns Sachs, Berlin-Charlottenburg, Mommsenstrasse 7.
16. Dr. Emil Simonson, Berlin-Halensee, Georg-Wilhelmstrasse 2.
17. Dr. Ernst Simmel, Berlin-Grunewald, Kaspar-Theyss-Strasse 9.
18. Fräulein Dr. Anna Smeliansky, Berlin W. 35, Potsdamerstrasse 29.
19. Frau Dr. Margarete Stegmann, Dresden A, Sidonienstrasse 18.
20. Dr. Ulrich Vollrath, Stadtarzt, Fürstenwalde a. Spree.
21. Dr. Georg Wanke, Friedrichroda i. Thüringen, Gartenstrasse 14.
22. Dr. W. Wittenberg, München, Elisabethstrasse 17.

Associate Members

23. Frau Alice Bálint, Budapest, I, Orves-Utca 10 (Naphegy-ter 8).
24. Frau Dr. med. Therese Benedek, Leipzig, Emilienstrasse 2.
25. Dr. Rudolf Löwenstein, Berlin-Charlottenburg, Grollmannstrasse 22.
26. Cand. med. Wilhelm Rohr, Address unknown.
27. Cand. med. Walter Schmideberg, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Kaiserallee 32.
28. Fräulein Ada Schott, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Fasanenstrasse 43.

Honorary Member

Dr. Alexander Ferenczi, Budapest.

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Third Quarter, 1924

No Meetings of the Society were held during this Quarter.

Douglas Bryan,

Hon. Secretary.

List of Members

1. Dr. Douglas Bryan (*Hon. Secretary*), 72 Wimpole Street, London, $\frac{1}{2}$ W.1.
2. Mr. Cyril Burt, 30 Princess Road, Regent's Park, London, N.W.1.
3. Dr. Estelle Maude Cole.
4. Dr. M. D. Eder, 2 Harley Place, London, N.W.1.
5. Mr. J. C. Flügel, 11 Albert Road, Regent's Park, London, N.W.1.
6. Dr. D. Forsyth, 9 Harley Street, London, W.1.
7. Dr. E. Glover, 6 Bentinck Street, London, W.1.
8. Dr. J. Glover, 6 Bentinck Street, London, W.1.
9. Mr. Eric Hiller, 35 Gray's Inn Road, London, W.C.1.
10. Mrs. Susan Isaacs, 1 Hoop Chambers, Bridge Street, Cambridge.
11. Dr. Ernest Jones (*President*), 81 Harley Street, London, W.1.
12. Miss Barbara Low, 13 Guilford Street, London, W.C.1.
13. Dr. T. W. Mitchell, Hadlow, Kent.
14. Dr. Sylvia Payne, 57 Carlisle Road, Eastbourne.
15. Dr. Stanford Read, 11 Weymouth Street, London, W.1.
16. Dr. J. Rickman, 26 Devonshire Place, London, W.1.
17. Dr. R. M. Riggall, 31 Wimpole Street, London, W.1.
18. Mrs. Riviere, 10 Nottingham Terrace, London, N.W.1.
19. Dr. Vaughan Sawyer, 131, Harley Street, London, W.1.
20. Miss E. Sharpe, 16 Gordon Street, London, W.C.1.
21. Dr. W. H. B. Stoddart (*Hon. Treasurer*), Harcourt House, Cavendish Square, London, W.1.
22. Mr. James Strachey, 41 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.
23. Mrs. James Strachey, 41 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.
24. Dr. H. Torrance Thomson, 13 Lansdowne Crescent, Edinburgh.
25. Dr. A. C. Wilson, 27 Nottingham Place, London, W.1.
26. Dr. Maurice Wright, 86 Brook Street, London, W.1.

Associate Members

1. Miss Cecil M. Baines, 187 Adelaide Road, Hampstead, London, N.W.3.
2. Dr. Mary Barkas, 46 Connaught Street, London, W.2.
3. Dr. W. H. Brend, 14 Bolingbroke Grove, Wandsworth Common, London, S.W.
4. Dr. Josephine Brown, Pan's Field, Headley, Hampshire.
5. Dr. Warburton Brown, 11 Weymouth Street, London, W.1.
6. Miss Mary Chadwick, 6 Guilford Place, London, W.C.1.
7. Dr. M. Culpin, Meads, Loughton, Essex.
8. Dr. W. Eddison, Banstead Mental Hospital, Sutton, Surrey.

9. Rev. P. Gough, S. Mark's Vicarage, 5 Abbey Road, London, N.W.8.
10. Dr. Bernard Hart, 81 Wimpole Street, London, W.1.
11. Dr. S. Herbert, 2 S. Peter's Square, Manchester.
12. Dr. M. B. Herford, 19 Redlands Road, Reading.
13. Dr. W. J. Jago.
14. Miss M. G. Lewis, 16 Gordon Street, London, W.C.1.
15. Dr. M. P. K. Menon, 7 Church Street, Edmonton, London, N.9.
16. Prof. Percy Nunn, London Day Training College, Southampton Row, London.
17. Dr. G. W. Pailthorpe, 40 Parliament Hill Mansions, London, N.W.5.
18. Mrs. Porter, Haughgate, Woodbridge, Suffolk.
19. Miss J. B. Saxby, 21 Y Groes, Rhubina, Cardiff.
20. Miss N. Searl, 16, Gordon Street, London, W.C.1.
21. Dr. Hamblin Smith, H.M. Prison, Birmingham.
22. Dr. T. Waddelow Smith, City Asylum, Nottingham.
23. Mr. A. G. Tansley, Grantchester, Cambridge.
24. Dr. C. R. A. Thacker, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge.
25. Dr. Rees Thomas, Greyridges, Retford, Notts.
26. Mrs. N. S. Walker, 36 Rosary Gardens, London, S.W.7.
27. Mr. F. R. Winton, 7 Eton Avenue, London, N.W.3.
28. Dr. L. Zarchi, 95 Down Road, Clapton, London, E.5.

Honorary Members

Dr. Karl Abraham, Berlin.
 Dr. Ferenczi, Budapest.
 Dr. Otto Rank, Vienna.

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1924

April 5, 1924. (The Hague.)

a. Dr. Adolph Meijer : *Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse*. The speaker gave a brief survey of the book by Rank and Ferenczi which had just appeared under this title. All those present took part in the ensuing discussion.

b. Dr. S. Weyl : Remarks on the case of a hospital nurse suffering from anxiety-states.

June 21, 1924. (Haarlem.) The President referred in terms of appreciation to our associate member, Dr. I. Varendonck, the news of whose death came upon us as a painful surprise.

Dr. von Emden gave a report of the Eighth Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association.

In conclusion short communications were made by several members.

Dr. Adolph F. Meijer,

Secretary.

List of Members

- Professor Dr. K. H. Bouman, Jan Luijkenstraat 24, Amsterdam (*Librarian*).
 Dr. A. van der Chijs, Van Breestraat 117, Amsterdam.
 Dr. W. H. Cox, Asylum 'Willem Arntsz Hoeve', Den Dolder.
 Dr. J. E. G. Emden, Jan van Nassaustraat 84 Haag (*President*).
 Dr. A. Endtz, Anstalt Oud-Rosenburg, Loosduinen.
 Dr. J. H. van der Hoop, Roemer Visscherstraat 19, Amsterdam.
 Professor Dr. G. Jelgersma, Terweepark 2, Leiden.
 Dr. J. Knappert, Haagstraat 71, Wageningen.
 Dr. B. D. J. Linde, Boomberglaan 4, Hilversum.
 Dr. Adolph F. Meijer, Emmalaan 20, Overveen (*Secretary*).
 Dr. S. J. R. de Monchy, Schiedamsche singel 112, Rotterdam.
 Dr. Fred Muller, Julianastraat 8, Haarlem.
 Dr. F. P. Muller, Leidsche straatweg 2, Oegstgeest (bei Leiden).
 Dr. J. H. W. Ophuijsen, Prinsevinkenpark 5, Haag (*Treasurer*).
 Dr. A. W. van Renterghem, Breestraat 1, Amsterdam.
 Dr. J. M. Rombouts, Oegstgeest.
 Dr. Aug. Stärcke, Den Dolder (bei Utrecht).
 Dr. A. J. Westerman Holstijn, Van Breestraat 1, Amsterdam.
 Dr. Simon Weyl, Onde Delft 68, Delft.

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Third Quarter, 1924

No meetings took place during this Quarter.

Dr. Imre Hermann,
Acting Secretary.

List of Members

- Dr. Michael Josef Eisler, Budapest, V., Nador-utca 5.
 Dr. Béla Felszeghy, Budapest, IV., Veres Pálné-utca 4.
 Dr. Sandor Ferenczi, Budapest, VII., Nagydiófa-utca 3 (*President*).
 Dr. Imre Hermann, Budapest, V., Maria Valeria-utca 10 (*Secretary*).
 Dr. Istvan Hollós, Budapest, V., Negykorona-utca 16.
 Aurél Kolnai, Wien, VI., Webgasse 11.
 Frau Vilma Kovacks, Budapest, I., Orvos-utca 10.
 Dr. Lajos Levy, Budapest, V., Szalay-utca 3.
 Dr. Zsigmond Pfeifer, Budapest, VII., Rakoczi-utca 18.
 Dr. Laszlo Revesz, Budapest, VIII., Fh.-Sandor-utca 17.
 Dr. Géza Roheim, Budapest, VI., Hermina-utca 35/a.
 Dr. Sándor Szabó, Zürich, Voltastrasse 24.
 Dr. Géza Szilagyi, Budapest, VII., Damjanich-utca 28/a.

Associate Member

- Frau Dr. Maria Kircz-Takacs, Budapest, I., Krisztina-körut 5.

Honorary Member

- Dr. Ernest Jones, London.

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1924

April 9, 1924. Short communications and reports.

a. Dr. Hitschmann : Hirschsprung's disease.

b. Dr. Reich : Twilight-states.

c. Dr. Jokl : Two dreams.

April 30, 1924. Dr. Reich : Report and discussion of papers read at the Eighth Congress held this year at Salzburg.

May 14, 1924. Flora Kraus : Masculine and feminine languages among primitive peoples.

May 28, 1924. Frieda Teller : Development of libido and modification of species.

June 10, 1924. Dr. Reich : Ambivalency, conflict and ego-ideal.

June 24, 1924. Dozent Dr. Schilder : The problem of memory.

The following new members were admitted to the Society : Dr. Robert Wälder (Vienna) and Frau Flora Kraus (Vienna).

Obituary

Frau Dr. Hug-Hellmuth

On September 9, 1924, in her fifty-third year, Frau Dr. Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, a member of the Vienna Society, of whose services, especially in the field of child-psychology, our readers need no reminder, was murdered by her eighteen-year-old nephew, Rudolph Hug. In a will made a few days before her death, she expressed a desire that no account of her life and work should appear, even in psycho-analytical publications.

Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld,

Secretary.

Third Quarter, 1924

No meetings were held in this Quarter.

List of Members

1. August Aichhorn, Wien, V., Schönbrunnerstrasse 110.
2. Lou Andreas-Salomé, Göttingen, Herzberger Landstrasse 101.
3. Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld, Wien, XIII., Suppégasse 10.
4. Dozent Dr. Felix Deutsch, Wien, I., Wollzeile 33.
5. Dr. Helene Deitsch, Wien, I., Wollzeile 33.
6. Dr. Paul Federn, Wien, I., Riemergasse 1.
7. Dr. Otto Fenichel, Berlin.
8. Dr. Walter Fokschaner, Wien, VI., Kasernengasse 2.
9. Anna Freud, Wien, IX., Berggasse 19.
10. Prof. Dr. Sigm. Freud, Wien, IX., Berggasse 19.
11. Dozent Dr. Josef Friedjung, Wien, I., Ebendorferstrasse 6.
12. Dr. H. von Hattingberg, Berlin.
13. Dr. Eduard Hitschmann, Wien, IX., Währingerstrasse 24.

14. Dr. Wilhelm Hoffer, Wien, IX., Döblingerhauptstrasse 71.
15. Prof. Dr. Guido Holzknicht, Wien, I., Liebiggasse 4.
16. Dr. Ludwig Jekels, Wien, IX., Berggasse 29.
17. Dr. Robert Hans Jokl, Wien, III., Sechskrügelgasse 2.
18. Dr. Michael Kaplan, Wien, I., Elisabethstrasse 10.
19. Dr. Salomea Kempner, Berlin.
20. Flora Kraus, Wien, XVIII., Julienstrasse 44.
21. Prof. Dr. Levi-Bianchini, Nocera Inferiore (Salerno).
22. Dr. Karl Landauer, Frankfurt a. M., Kettenhofweg 17.
23. Dr. I. Marcinowski, Bad Heilbrunn, Isartalbahn, Bayern.
24. Dr. Richard Nepallek, Wien, VIII., Alserstrasse 41.
25. Caroline Newton, Daylesford, Berwick, Pa., U.S.A.
26. Dr. H. Nunberg, Wien, VIII., Florianigasse 20.
27. Prof. Dr. Otto Pötzl, Prag, Psychiatrische Klinik.
28. Beate Rank, Wien, I., Grünangerstrasse 3-5.
29. Dr. Otto Rank, Wien, I., Grünangerstrasse 3-5.
30. Dr. Wilhelm Reich, Wien, I., Neutorgasse 8.
31. Dr. Theodor Reik, Wien, IX., Lackierergasse 1 a.
32. Dr. Oskar Rie, Wien, III., Estegasse 1 a.
33. Dr. I. Sadger, Wien, IX., Liechtensteinstrasse 15.
34. Dozent Dr. Paul Schilder, Wien, II., Taborstrasse 11.
35. Walter Schmiederberg, Berlin, Kaiserallee 32.
36. Eugenia Sokolnicka, Paris, VIII., Rue Chevret 30.
37. Dr. Maxim Steiner, Wien, I., Rotenturmstrasse 19.
38. A. J. Storfer, Wien, IX., Porzellangasse 43.
39. Frieda Teller, Prag, III., Plaska 14.
40. Dr. Robert Wälder, Wien, I., Wiplingerstrasse 21.
41. Dr. Karl Weiss, Wien, IV., Schwindgasse 12.
42. Dr. Eduardo Weiss, Trieste, S. Lazzaro 8.
43. Dr. Alfred Winterstein, Wien, XIII., Wattmanngasse 38.

